An update on the war following a recent trip. The situation has improved compared with Fall 2024. Russian offensive momentum slowed significantly over the winter, though it is premature to claim that the front has stabilized, especially following AFU withdrawal in Kursk. Russian advances were stalled for three reasons: materiel exhaustion from losses in the fall, effective Ukrainian adaptation to how Russian forces were prosecuting offensive operations, and winter weather conditions which affected the pace of operations. This dynamic may not hold as we get further into the spring. Russian forces appear to be regrouping for renewed offensive operations. Ukrainian forces have improved tactically at countering how RF fight, employing UAS to compensate for a deficit of manpower at the front.
AFU is successfully attriting Russian forces at 0-30km through a combination of mining, drones, and traditional fires. This enables a low density of forces to hold the front. Russian units often don’t reach defensive positions and much of the equipment is lost in assaults. Ukraine invested in this approach last year by significantly expanding drone units such as Birds of Madyar, Lasar Group, Achilles, etc. It also invested in scaling up mine and drone production. Drone formations are the primary stabilizing factor along the front right now. Drones are responsible for over ~60% of the daily RF casualties at this point, and are the principal means of stopping attacks in combination with mining, and traditional artillery. Better integration has led to a more systemic approach at the tactical level.
Drones continue to expand their role as counters to other types of drones. There is a growing role for UGVs in logistical roles, and as part of breaching operations. Actual automation is slowly coming along with terminal guidance, uncrewed turrets, etc. Ukraine is now making much of what it needs for day-to-day combat needs, from mines to drones. But, it remains dependent on the West for long precision strike (GMLRS), interceptors for air defense systems, parts/maintenance, and other non-materiel forms of support. Ukraine received significant amounts of arty ammunition and equipment over the winter, and increased its own production of drones. Across much of the front there is relative parity in artillery fires and strike drones with some asymmetries in specific categories of systems.
The recent appointments of a new commanders, especially Drapatyi taking over both Land Forces and OSUV Khortytsia, has had positive effect on the morale of subordinate units. In May 2024 Drapatyi took over defense of Kharkiv on the second day, stabilizing the situation. Training reform is finally being tackled, and there are prospects for change under the new Land Forces commander, improving the quality of training, facilities, updating the content, replacing instructors, and tying training to actual combat needs.
A structural deficit of manpower continues to be Ukraine’s leading problem. Mobilization remains insufficient to address these challenges & the sizable absent without leave (AWOL) problem. The amnesty law has led some to return to units, but AWOLs continue to sap the force. Ukraine has thankfully suspended creating new brigades, reversing what was one of the more puzzling force management choices in 2024. And there is progress being made to stand up new Corps formations, which are closer to divisions, based on the AFU’s best brigades.
In recent months Russian forces have not advanced significantly near Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk. Much of the Russian progress has been around Velyka Novosilka, Kurakhove, and Kursk. However, in Kursk AFU has been forced to withdraw from most of the territory held. Recent Russian advances in Kursk were taking place well before the suspension of US military assistance/intelligence. The battlefield geometry of a salient was inherently unfavorable. Russian forces chipped away at Kursk until they could interdict the few resupply routes. DPRK assaults pressured Ukrainian lines, but the core problem was logistics as Russian fiber-optic FPV drones increasingly interdicted resupply routes. That said, AFU withdrew without major personnel losses, and the retrograde looked somewhat better than Avdiivka. Unfortunately, there will be significant equipment losses due to the withdrawal, and the vehicle loss ratio is going to at best be 1:1 over the course of the operation. But there was no mass encirclement at Kursk. I know most folks understand this, but it merits repeating.
Given the character of the fighting, territory changing hands is a lagging indicator for what’s happening between the two forces. Consequently, ‘gradually then suddenly’ transitions are going to be common when a set of positions become unsustainable.
In my view holding Kursk wasn’t doing much for Ukraine at this point. Trading it for something seemed an unlikely proposition. The offensive did not lead to a change in the overall dynamic in the war, or a large shift of RF forces from Pokrovsk/Kurakhove axes. I retain an overall mixed view of the Kursk offensive, and think it would have been best as a 1-2 week raid. That said, it also could have also gone a lot worse than it did. It was gamble that yielded initial tactical success, but ultimately didn’t pay off in my view.
Russian forces continue to suffer from low force quality, but also a general inability to overcome prepared defenses, backed by mass precision. The scale of attack, whether infantry, lightly motorized, or mechanized is typically insufficient to break through AFU positions. Over the course of 2023-2024 Russian forces had adapted emphasizing assault groups and detachments, essentially ‘majoring in the minors.’ These tactics yielded incremental gains, grinding through the front, but do not lead to operationally significant breakthroughs. For more on Russian military adaptation, assault groups, and why Russian forces ended up fighting the way they have been, you can check out this much longer report from 2024:
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/assessing-russian-military-adaptation-in-2023?lang=en
RF has been dealing with a degree of materiel exhaustion after high loss rates in the fall, but current RF contract rates continue to provide replacements and enable rotations. RF recruitment went up considerably in the second half of 2024. The bottom line is that despite the observed accelerated gains in the fall, the Russian military is visibly underperforming relative to its materiel advantages, and those gains were made at very high cost.
Though it is too early to assess if Ukraine is on track to stabilize the front, or if this is an intervening period, and Russian offensive intensity will resume later this spring, and into the summer. The front line is not about to collapse. Despite AFU being largely pressed out of Kursk, the overall situation from Pokrovsk to Kupyansk improved. The implication being that Ukraine is not in a desperate situation requiring a rushed ceasefire under unfavorable terms. Ukraine still has a chance to stabilize the front, if positive trends are sustained, manpower and force management issues addressed. UA and the West have to plan around the prospect that no ceasefire is imminent, or that in any case it will not lead to a durable peace.
https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1902694940485767451
Comment: I don’t have much to add to this analysis by Michael Kofman, a senior fellow and defense analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace… if it still exists. I do strongly recommend you read the linked article on “Assessing Russian military adaption in 2023.” It’s a detailed piece concentrating on Russia’s adaptions, but it also covers some of Ukraine’s adaptions over the years.
I think the key take away is that drones and EW are dramatically altering military organization, strategy and tactics for both offensive and defensive operations. Ukraine and Russia have learned these lessons the hard way, but they are now the worldwide leaders in how to wage war. We will see how fast the US, Europe and China can learn these lessons.
TTG
TTG – can’t see the pig for lipstick in that Kofman piece. But your key takeaway is drones and I remember you saying small arms fire is more effective than generally thought. But it would have to be massed small arms fire, wouldn’t it?
I thought of that again during a Patrick Lancaster video from near the front line in Kursk. Lancaster had been poking around a recently taken position accompanied by some Russian soldiers. They were out in the open and suddenly a drone was seen a little way off. One of the soldiers fired at it and reckoned he’d taken it down. Only a short burst.
They then drove away very fast. Worried about another drone being sent over. There was no evidence that I could see of a drone being downed but maybe it had been. If so it was an amazing shot. Or lucky.
Shot down or not, the mere threat of a drone was enough to clear that position of the little detachment accompanying Lancaster. Another reason for the Russians not wanting to occupy remnant Ukraine unless they absolutely have to. If the Provos had had drones during the Troubles, none of the little patrols I used to see moving around could have been sent out. Policing hostile territory, long term, would move from being difficult to being near impossible.
The Provos were able to do essentially the same thing in places like South Armagh. They made the roads so dangerous that the squaddies were forced to use helicopters not just to move around troops, but to even remove trash from their stations. No drones needed, mines and country roads laden with improvised explosive devices and a IRA unit that was renowned for its sniper teams.
Once they forced the Squaddies off the country roads they then started targeting the British choppers themselves. They actually took down six different British choppers. The last soldier killed in this round of the troubles was killed by an IRA sniper team, killing a soldier with a Barrett .50 in Bessbrook, South Armagh, in 1997. The sniper team took the shot from about half a mile away.
The only reason they were not more effective in Belfast, Derry and other places was the more difficult nature of urban warfare as well as loyalist death squads that made operating more difficult. If the IRA had drones it would have been game, set, match.
Having said that, the north is a much different place these days. I was there recently and the ugly mountaintop emplacements with their helicopters are gone. Even the emplacement in Crossmaglen is gone. Took me a minute to remember where it was walking down the road. I still remember seeing sqauddies walking the streets of Crossmaglen back in the late 1990s after the GFA was signed. Not a solder in sight these days.
Stefan, you say “If the IRA had drones it would have been game, set, match.” Thank you for this shrewd insight. How would facial recognition capabilities and cameras everywhere have boosted the royals? Heck, how would the much greater tolerance of Europeans for collateral damage alter the gloves-off/gloves-on calculus of the royals? Game, set, match in the North Ireland conflict was a bullet in the head of the enemy. Fortunately, dumber heads found a way, an alternative to following the truly dumb heads.
Stefan – that’s a vivid picture of life in those conditions. I found it all a bit surreal. Walk the dog of a morning and suddenly a line of impossibly young looking squaddies popping out of the fog.
More on small arms fire to down drones. That Lancaster video mentioned above now supplemented by another. First few minutes of this video. Found by a commenter “Hermius” on b’s site.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MowWjVqhWaI&ab_channel=PatrickLancaster
If that drone was in fact shot down, and didn’t just run out of battery, then a quite remarkable shot. From the back of a fast moving pick-up on a bumpy road. Lancaster has more lives than a dozen cats and seems intent on using them all up fast.
If this report’s on the level – can’t tell – then putting “drone” in the search box tells one everything you never wanted to know about life on the front lines under drones.
https://meduza.io/feature/2025/03/17/otsyuda-vyhod-odin-trista-ili-dvesti
On the level or not, there’s now a great heap of other material showing what life on the front lines is really like. Bezuglaya’s making noises about it, and others, so it’s not just random interneters.
After the psycho stuff in the ME I can’t say I reckon much to Trump, any more than I did to Biden. But if his initiatives bring closer to an end to the living hell our proxies are being put through, that’s a win in my book.
Seems some Ukrainian troops are keeping Ivan busy by now doing limited crossings into Belgorod.
And since February 2022 they’re claiming they’ve inflicted 900,000 casualties on the Russian military. Mostly Yakut, Tuvan, Dagestanis and other minorities so it may still be fulfilling Putin’s goal.
Greeting All This The Real Jim Im back Best Regards
welcome back JIM
Leith, is “Ivan” in your post a reference to Ukrainian Ivans or Russian Ivans? They’re both Ivans. And it’s not really clear whom you meant. Still, someone is busy for sure.
I dunno. Assessment seems fairly realistic, but a bit rosy.
“…Ukraine is not in a desperate situation requiring a rushed ceasefire under unfavorable terms. Ukraine still has a chance to stabilize the front, if positive trends are sustained, manpower and force management issues addressed.”
That’s pretty weak ‘optimism’. If the best they can hope for is to ‘stabilize the front’, and even that depends on some pretty big Ifs, I’d say that this is a fine time to negotiate.
There’s *nothing* there about Ukraine being able to push Russian forces out of [former?] Ukrainian territory. The likelihood that Russia will resume [slow?] advances this Spring & Summer is admitted but down-played. The only scenarios in which Ukraine could regain the Donbass, Azov coast, and maybe even Crimea now hinge on fantasies of regime change in Moscow. How many more Friedman Units will that take?
Russia has been trying to defeat Ukraine for years (how many FUs is that?). At the rate things are going, this war will be longer than WWI. The “the Great Power Russia is justified” crowd has ignored the obvious… that as long as Russia fails to comprehensively defeat Ukraine in the field, Russia is losing. Get that? Russia is losing. It started a war with a neighboring country that it has failed to win. And there is no clear path to its victory. I suppose hope springs eternal among the realpolitik set.
“It started a war with a neighboring country that it has failed to win.”
I’ve had this argument with TTG in a previous article: define what Russia’s goals were that prompted it to start this SMO and then you can argue whether or not the Kremlin has won.
If their goal for starting this war was:
1) Stopping Ukraine from entering NATO then Russia has already won
2) Ensuring the safety and security of the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine then Russia has already won.
3) Forcing the USA to face up to reality and negotiate a new security architecture for Europe then Russia isn’t there yet, but that’s clearly where Trump is heading. So, yeah, that’s encouraging for the Kremlin too.
ked:…”Russia fails to comprehensively defeat Ukraine in the field”….
That’s a statement that confuses tactics for strategy.
ked: “And there is no clear path to its victory”
Of course there is. If the Russians can negotiate a deal with Trump then final victory is theirs, because that’s the one goal that has yet eluded them.
But as I said, the trajectory of events is encouraging: they must be confident that they can clinch that deal.
But, please, tactics are tactics. Strategy is strategy. Don’t confuse the two.
… define what Russia’s goals were…
ked> who knows & who cares? war aims are the 2nd casualty of war.
If their goal for starting this war was:
1) Stopping Ukraine from entering NATO then Russia has already won
ked> at best, they’ve slowed it down. & as long as Nasty is prez, it’s a moot point.
2) Ensuring the safety and security of the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine then Russia has already won.
ked> those areas are safe & secure? you moving?
3) Forcing the USA to face up to reality and negotiate a new security architecture for Europe then Russia isn’t there yet, but that’s clearly where Trump is heading. So, yeah, that’s encouraging for the Kremlin too.
ked> as disappointing as it may be for some, Nasty ain’t forever. & the EU NATO members growing consensus on how to go it alone through military strength is a fine victory for Vlad, ain’t it.
ked:…”Russia fails to comprehensively defeat Ukraine in the field”….
That’s a statement that confuses tactics for strategy.
ked> no, you are the one who is confused. tactics have little-to-nothing to do w/ it. in fact, Russia could “win the battles & lose the war” (like any “military victory”). & it is also possible to “win the war & lose the peace” (like any “war won at conclusion of hostilities”).
ked: “And there is no clear path to its victory”
Of course there is. If the Russians can negotiate a deal with Trump then final victory is theirs, because that’s the one goal that has yet eluded them.
ked> “final victory” via a Nasty Deal w/ Vlad. oh yeah, that’ll work, that’ll last … just like his tariff deals, & wars w/ Canada, Denmark, Panama god-knows who else before he’s done wailing.
But, please, tactics are tactics. Strategy is strategy. Don’t confuse the two.
ked> please, don’t be insulting.
ked: “who knows & who cares? war aims are the 2nd casualty of war.”
And yet the Russians don’t seem to agree.
The Russians stated their “war aims” at the beginning of this SMO, they have reiterated them throughout this war, and they appear to be sticking to their guns in the negotiations with Trump.
How very odd. Tis’ a mystery.
Maybe they just, you know, go into a war with a clear idea of what they want to achieve, and then stick at it until that is achieved or they have lost.
That seems to be in marked contrast to Western thinking where wars are started for hare-brained reasons – or, really, for no clearly-articulated reason at all – and then prosecuted with a “war aims are the 2nd casualty of war” kind of attitude.
Muddle into war and then muddle through the war seems to be a rather…. odd…. reason to fight wars, don’t you think?
Y.eah, Right, Russia’s early move towards the Ukrainian capital was part of Russian strategy or tactic?
Strategy IMO.
As I see it the attack on Kiev was an attempt of a quick victory. Which failed due to fierce Ukrainian resistance.
If Russia had been able to cordon Kiev off by controlling all access from the west and east with secure (easily defended) supply lines running from Belarus and Tjernihiv then the war would have stopped in 2022.
It was a tactic to spook Zelensky and get him to negotiate terms with Russia.
And as I hope everyone now accepts as fact, it was working: the Ukrainians agreed to the terms and all that was necessary was Zelensky’s signature on that agreement.
Until Bonkers Boris waddled into Kiev and told Zelensky not to sign.
I was pilloried here when I pointed that all out at the time – Pat Lang banned me for being a propagandist – but even Boris now admits that is what happened.
Ah yes, Y.,R., Putin’s later statement, he ordered the troops to retreat, at the öoint Ukraine had agreed to sign his demands. That was quite clever.
Minor problem, people actually studied what Putin held up, when he uttered that claim, in Africa, was it? Idicating: here, look, the to be signed document!! Only needed Z.’s signatur.
Tousle-head Boris didn’t prevent it. It wasn’t close to finalization. But yes, most of us hoped they would come to n agreement. I sure did.
Yes Poul, I was a bit ironic, but thanks, makes sense. A tactic in a larger strategy that never changed.
Personally it felt to me, all he was looking for post Maidan was US’/”the West’s” attention. He now has it. We’ll see.
Leander, you can view the statement by Putin here:
https://x.com/onlydjole/status/1670141702797967361?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1670141702797967361%7Ctwgr%5Efcaac5f01576efe39bb8c1aaf68a05a58e4aae06%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hindustantimes.com%2Fworld-news%2Frussiaukraine-signed-peace-treaty-vladimir-putin-says-then-shows-document-101687079021115.html
The Treaty was finalized – as he says, 18 articles and an addendum – and that was what he held up. And Putin points out that the leader of the Ukrainian delegation had signed on the bottom lone.
So, yes, it was finalized and required only Zelensky’s signature and whatever process of ratification is required under the Ukrainian constitution.
And – yes – on the basis of that signature by the Ukrainian delegation to the talks Putin did indeed order the withdrawal of Russian troops near Kiev.
None of that is in dispute now. All sides accept that this is what happened.
And….. Zelensky never signed it. It was never ratified by the Ukrainians. They did, indeed, throw it in the bin.
Why? Because of Boris Johnson.
He now openly admits that he instructed Zelensky to throw that document away, and that’s exactly what Zelensky did.
I’m not lying about any of this. I am not in the least bit confused about what happened in April 2022. And I am perfectly correct to point out that there is a word to describe the behavior of Zelenksy and Johnson: “perfidy”
Yeah, Right,
Zelenskiy never signed it so it wasn’t finalized. If it called for US, Britain and others to provide security guarantees to Ukraine, Putin would have had to get them aboard before it could be called finalized. Putin also sent a draft treat to the US prior to his invasion of Ukraine. It meant nothing other than to lay out what Putin wanted.
LeaNder – one thing we can be sure of. There was no “Battle for Kiev”. That’s straight invention.
There was certainly a lot of military activity up there. There are several possible scenarios that account for that military activity. That the Russians were hoping to storm a major city with the forces they had isn’t one of them.
We can be more confident when we look at the result of that military activity rather than speculating about the intention behind it. The result was that large numbers of Kiev troops stayed up around Kiev while the Russians got on with the real business further south.
Brilliant strategy or a blunder with happy results? Take your pick of those and a number of other scenarios. But while all of us were watching what was happening around Kiev we failed to notice a most remarkable military operation out of Crimea and the Donbass.
It was that operation that placed the Russians in the position to pursue the strategy they’ve followed ever since. Safe from any incursion across the LoC into the Donbass, with Kiev AD disrupted by missile attack in the first few minutes of the SMO, and with the Kiev army demolished as a cohesive fighting force from then on, they could sit back and pursue the policy they’ve followed ever since.
Attrition. Attrition of whatever manpower NATO could send against them and attrition of whatever equipment NATO could send in.
Were I a conspiracy theorist I’d argue that that attrition was the aim on both sides! Not just the Russian. Against all common sense, and often against the express wishes of the Ukrainian General Staff, the dunderheads in NATO running the show exposed the Kiev forces to attrition from early 2022 on. We’re seeing that even now.
But I’m not a conspiracy theorist and the reality is rather more pedestrian. This was a PR war all along for such as the Milley/Cavoli/Radakin trio. The illusion of forward movement, of ultimate victory, had to be maintained to keep the electorates of the West supporting the continuance of a lost war. That hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men had to be sacrificed in that cause, and a few of our own, was neither here nor there.
You and I are, I think, of the same mind about this war. A callous and inept attempt to “bleed” or even demolish the RF. But we’re in a tiny minority, you know. Are are the bulk of your fellow countrymen and women still as Russophobic as ever? Still as eager to swallow the stories the politicians and press feed them?
If so, Germany’s going to get itself in even more of a pickle. A second go at the Russians in less than a century and one can only hope the results this time round aren’t as disastrous.
He now openly admits that he instructed Zelensky to throw that document away, and that’s exactly what Zelensky did.
I absolutely doubt he did. His visit as an expression of solidarity surely mattered to Ukrainians.
Here’s a bit of context for the event. He had to offer something, considering the African efforts at meditation between Ukraine and Russia? Remember? Look already in 2022 the head of the delegation–who did not have the rights to sign–signed the agreement:
The draft treaty was initialled by the head of the group of negotiators from Kiev – he signed it. Here it is, it exists. It is called: The Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and Guarantees of Security of Ukraine. Namely, the guarantees, which you mentioned, dear friend, President of South Africa, 18 articles. …
But after we withdrew our forces from Kiev, as we had promised, the Kiev authorities, just like their masters usually do, dumped it into the dustbin of history, let’s put it mildly, I will try to avoid any foul expressions. They rejected this. Where are the guarantees that they will not withdraw from other agreements? But even amidst such circumstances, we never refused to hold talks.
Absolutely masterful. Problem:
The document he holds up shows the date April, 15, 2022. That is 16 days after Johnson’s visit in Kyiv. Look I am willing to admit that Johnson’s visit as expression of solidarity did matter to Z.
But how can Johnson have prevented Zelensky from singing something that accoding to the document did not exist on March 30, the day of his visit?
image via an article on matters by Andreas Rüesch, NZZ.
https://archive.is/Ad6aR/9d328bdff414fe9a23d80910d465d6eff0ef005a.jpg
Wiki, Ukraine-Russia Peace negotiations, April 2022
https://tinyurl.com/Ukraine-Russia-April-2022
The Kremlin has broken 190 negotiated agreements since Putin took over.
LeaNder: “I absolutely doubt he did.”
He absolutely did, in an interview with The Times.
But Boris being Boris he started out by blustering out that the claim is “complete nonsense” and “Russian propaganda” only to continue on and admit that, yes, yes, OK, he had spoken to the head of the Kiev regime, Vladimir Zelensky, at the time and expressed concern about the possibility of any agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
https://globaleuronews.com/2024/01/11/russian-propaganda-johnson-refuted-arahamiyas-statement-on-istanbul-2022/
So that is Boris being Boris i.e. talking out of both sides of his mouth.
His “expressing concern” is a euphemism for telling Zelensky not to sign that agreement.
LeaNder: “His visit as an expression of solidarity surely mattered to Ukrainians.”
Riiiiiiight. Because he couldn’t possibly express solidarity from the dispatch box of the House of Commons.
Remind me again: why did his trip to Kiev catch everyone by surprise? Was it because it was one of those Drop-Everything We Have To Stop This Now!!!! moments?
LeaNder: “The document he holds up shows the date April, 15, 2022. That is 16 days after Johnson’s visit in Kyiv.”
Not really the “gotcha!” that you think it is.
Putin wouldn’t take the original document with him on an overseas visit: the original would have been digitally scanned and put on the Foreign Ministry database, and the paper would have been archived away somewhere in that same ministry.
So when Putin goes overseas and wants that document for a show-and-tell then the Russians would have printed another copy from the scanned image, and it would be date-stamped from the date the printer went brrrrrrrrr.
I mean, please, get real.
Putin is not going to claim the head of the Ukrainian delegation had initialed that document if that wasn’t true precisely BECAUSE he would be handing a PR coup to the Ukrainians.
They could parade that very official before the world’s press and have him say “That’s not my initials, and nobody in my delegation signed anything”.
No such denials have ever come from any one of those delegates.
But we do have corroboration from an impeccable Ukrainian source – David Arahamiya, who is Zelensky’s party leader in the Rada – that Boris scuppered the deal:
https://globaleuronews.com/2024/01/11/russian-propaganda-johnson-refuted-arahamiyas-statement-on-istanbul-2022/
“In addition, then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson arrived and said he did not want to sign anything with the Russians and “let’s just go to war”.”
Ok, my mistake. Or a mistake I picked up from Andreas Rüsch’s article? Possibly, my brain stores numbers a lot better then names. And March 30, was my late father’s birthday.
So, Johnson’s visit was only three days before the 2022 Russian draft Putin held up as evidence in 2023. That does not change his argument. The document Johnson supposedly prevented Z. from signing on the day of his visit, didn’t exist yet.
Andreas Rüesch–that’s a very Swiss name ;)–via Google translate:
Putin, however, unintentionally provided proof that some of his account could not be correct. The document he held up was dated April 15, 2022, not March 30, and was thus only created after Johnson’s visit to Kyiv. The theory that negotiations broke down as a result of British intervention is therefore untenable – in fact, the two sides continued negotiations long after, well into May.
Archive link:
https://archive.is/Ad6aR#selection-519.0-519.452
You and I are, I think, of the same mind about this war
Be so kind and spare me your disingenious verbal acrobatics. Will you? I promise I’ll do my very, very best to ignore you too.
Andreas Rüesch: “The document he held up was dated April 15, 2022, not March 30, and was thus only created after Johnson’s visit to Kyiv.”
Read my previous post: Putin would have had his foreign ministry run up another copy of the original to show everyone. He would NOT take the original document with him.
So, yes, the FACSIMILE that he had would have been dated April 15, because that’s the date that this FACSIMILE was printed.
I don’t quite know why you can’t comprehend that (pretty simple) concept.
The Kremlin would have strict version-control procedures: there would be the original, dated March 30. A facsimile produced on April 15 would carry on it the date it was produced.
That way they can keep track of how many copies are in circulation, and when they were created.
I take it you’ve never worked in a government bureaucracy?
Yeah, Right,
Have you taken a close look at that document in Putin’s hand? You’re grasping at straws with that explanation. A facsimile copy would have a date in much smaller font at the very top or very bottom of the page. That date is part of the document.
TTG: “Have you taken a close look at that document in Putin’s hand?”
I have, and you should too: the font is different.
TTG: “You’re grasping at straws with that explanation.”
Well, one of is, certainly. Just not me.
TTG: “A facsimile copy would have a date in much smaller font at the very top or very bottom of the page.”
The font used for the date is different than that used in the body of the text, TTG.
TTG: “That date is part of the document.”
Nooooo, it isn’t, but thanks for trying.
Yeah, Right,
The document is the version of the Russian proposal as it stood on 15 April 2022. That’s what the document says it is in the same font and same size as the rest of the document. Don’t be confused by some lines in italics or bold. That’s the only date on that particular document. I’m sure there were earlier and later versions of the document as negotiations continued containing modified proposals. Or are you trying to assert that Russian negotiators only presented one take or leave it version of an agreement?
I’m sure the Russian negotiators hoped every version of their proposal would be accepted as a finalized version of the agreement. In truth, none of them were ever finalized. I’m also sure the Ukrainian negotiators thought the same of the various versions of an agreement that they presented.
I despair of the laziness behind so many of the assertions made on this site.
It took me all of five minutes to install Google Translate and scan that image that is the centerpiece of Andreas Rüesch’s “slam-dunk.
You can do it to, LeaNder and TTG.
And….. it is exactly what I said it is.
The two lines say this:
Project as of 15.04.2022 (12.15)
Sent to the President of the Russian Federation on April 15, 2022
I am absolutely, positively, 100% correct: those two lines of text are document-management headers to indicate that a COPY OF THE ORIGINAL WAS SENT TO PUTIN ON 15 APRIL 2022.
It is not in any way, shape or form any indication that this document was created out of whole cloth on 15 April 2022.
It’s a copy.
It’s a copy of the original.
It’s a copy of the original that was made on 15 April 2022 BECAUSE PUTIN REQUESTED A COPY.
OK? Everyone got that? No more misunderstanding or misrepresentations?
Sheesh. I thought you guys were trained in this stuff and were taught to test your assumptions.
Apparently not.
So, yes, the FACSIMILE that he had would have been dated April 15, because that’s the date that this FACSIMILE was printed.
Ah well, so Putin is a clairvoyant too. Is he? Otherwise, your argument needs further labor. Exquisite maskirovka?
Anyway, the printing happened on April 22 for an event in June 2023? Is that your argument? Without taking a closer look:
The official Kremlin Site/The President/Events
Meeting with heads of delegations of African states
Vladimir Putin received heads of delegations of African states in the Constantine Palace.
June 17, 2023 20:15 St Petersburg
https://tinyurl.com/Putins-Peace-Deal
yeah right –
Putin is now suggesting UN control of Ukraine.
A better idea is UN control of Russia to de-Nazify the FSB. With OSCE control of Russian elections the Russkies could vote their conscience and get rid of the gnome in the Kremlin and his band of crooks. If that happened Russia could again become a great country.
https://x.com/CommSenseMonkey/status/1905647558732517882
leith: “Putin is now suggesting UN control of Ukraine.”
There is actually a very sound – indeed IMO a compelling – legal argument behind that suggestion.
Which I am happy to explain to you, and explain (though that shouldn’t be necessary) why that legal argument is NOT applicable to Russia.
Happy to do it, if you are willing to receive it.
Though I suspect not, seeing as how you appear to be much happier residing in a world-view where the Russians – the Russians!!!!! – are a hotbed of Nazi ideology.
Hate to break it to you, but their “Nazi sentiments” are right up there with India Jones, and we all know that ol’ Indy hates those guys.
Yeah Right –
Putin proposed UN control so it can run Ukraine elections. First, it’s against the Ukrainian constitution. Second, huge majorities in Ukraine are resolutely against deals with Putin that give him time to rearm to take more of their land and torture & murder more of their their people. So in no way would Ukrainians elect someone more deferential to the Kremlin.
Putin knows this. His charade with elections is a ploy to delay negotiations and blame Zelenskyy for the delay. He also wants to use it to create hindrances and handicaps in Kyiv as elections in war when many of their people are refugees – or are in occupied territory and will get the thumbscrews if they don’t vote the way the FSB, GRU, OMON and/or Chechen Kadyrovtsy tell them to vote.
There was no majority of separatists wanting to join Russia in Crimea or the Donbas. Just a few pro-Russian rowdies in small groups. So Putin “sent agents, money, weapons, and eventually troops to destabilize Ukraine”.
Putin never honored the Budapest Memorandum. He never complied with the Minsk Agreements. He has broken over a hundred other treaties that he signed. Putin never faced any liability or retribution for those broken deals, so why would he change now and honor a new deal? Putin won’t like Zelenskyy’s replacement even if the UN holds a Ukrainian election. So he’ll continue his targeting of Ukrainian civilians with Iranian drones, NoKo ballistic missiles as well as Russian made ordnance.
PS – Russian people are not Nazis. The average Russian is hospitable and warm hearted even though they’ve been repressed and subjugated by the Tsars, the Soviets and the Putanistas. They have great culture, outstanding literature and music. It’s just Putin and his clique in the Kremlin that are Nazified.
Thanks, leith, for that fulsome demonstration of why you have no idea what you are talking about.
Your one and only comment that is of any relevance to the legal argument being put forward by Putin are three words: “the Ukrainian Constitution”
Putin is saying – quite correctly – that the plain text interpretation of the Ukrainian Constitution can only lead to the conclusion that Zelensky is no longer legally entitled to claim that he is the legitimate President of Ukraine.
And if he is not the legitimate President of Ukraine (and he is not) then he does not legally possess the authority that comes with that office.
With me so far?
The inevitable corollary is this: any orders that Zelensky gives are invalid, because of his lack of authority under the Constitution to give those orders.
Sign a treaty with Russia? Invalid.
Sign a minerals deal with the USA? Invalid.
Appoint a successor? Invalid.
Order new elections? Invalid.
Dissolve the Rada? Invalid.
Nothing he does, nothing he says, and nothing he signs is valid, and therefore is worthless.
Less than worthless, because anyone who accepts his signature in good faith is liable to be burnt in future when the next President of Ukraine declares that signature to be…. invalid.
Quite the conundrum.
So what Putin is arguing gets around that conundrum: the UN appoints itself as the trustee over Ukraine, it is then the UN (and not the warlord) who then organizes the new elections, and then the UN hands over its trusteeship to whoever wins those elections.
It’s happened before – I can give you several examples – and the results have been the same each time: legitimacy is created where none existed previously.
Because that’s THE fundamental legal problem now: Zelensky is naught but a “warlord”, he is no longer the President.
Personally I think there is another way out of this legal conundrum that doesn’t need the intervention of the UN, and it involves the leader of the Rada.
But that’s a story for another day.
Yeah, Right,
All your arguments matter not a wit. In February the Verkhovna Rada voted unanimously to extend Zelenskiy as President with full presidential powers as long as martial law is in effect. The resolution also included a reference to Article 108 of the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the incumbent head of state remains in power until the next elected president takes office.
leith: “It’s just Putin and his clique in the Kremlin that are Nazified.”
I am (slightly, only slightly) interested to hear what your definition of “Nazified” is, and how it can be measured.
Or is it just, you know, the vibe that you are feeling when you look into Putin’s eyes?
TTG: “All your arguments matter not a wit.”
I beg to differ. As does Putin. And I would wager that, very soon, so with Trump.
TTG: “In February the Verkhovna Rada voted unanimously to extend Zelenskiy as President with full presidential powers as long as martial law is in effect.”
[chortle] Ultra vires.
Look it up, TTG, it’s a thing.
TTG: “The resolution also included a reference to Article 108 of the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the incumbent head of state remains in power until the next elected president takes office.”
[chortle] Catch-22 comes back to bite that argument in the backside.
Article 108 starts with “The President of Ukraine exercises his or her authority until the assumption of office by the newly-elected President of Ukraine”
You can’t see the problem with that?
It’s quite obvious: “The President of Ukraine” has to be, you know, the President of Ukraine.
If he’s not (and he’s not) then Article 108 is a moot point.
Not to mention that the next line says:
“The authority of the President of Ukraine are early terminated in cases of”
Again, the problem is blindingly obvious: this isn’t a case of the EARLIER termination of the President of Ukraine.
Absolutely not: his term of office ticked down to the last second and then…. expired.
He was President, his term expired, and there was no “newly-elected President of Ukraine” to take his place.
Article 108 is inapplicable as a means of resolving that issue, and no unanimous vote from the Rada can change that because (did I mention this? I think I did) the Rada doesn’t have the authority under the Ukrainian Constitution to overturn that.
Zelensky is no longer legally entitled to claim to be the President of Ukraine, and NO shenanigans by the Rada and NO disingenuous appeals to Article 108 of the Ukrainian Constitution can alter that fact.
I don’t know who you go to for your legal advice (Google, is it? Or Copilot?) but whoever/whatever they are, you’ve getting very bad advice.
OK, TTG, here are the relevant articles of the Ukrainian Constitution that make a complete and utter mockery of your argument.
Article 83: “In the event that the President of Ukraine declares, by proclaiming a decree, a state of martial law or of emergency upon the whole territory of Ukraine in some
areas of the State, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall assemble within two days without convocation.”
So only the President of Ukraine can declare a state of emergency and impose martial law.
Article 83: “In the event that the term of authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine expires while a state of martial law or of emergency is in effect, its powers are extended until the day when the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine elected after the cancellation of the state of martial law or of emergency convenes its first meeting of the first
session.”
So there you have it: the only government body that gets an indefinite stay during martial law is…. the Rada.
As in: there is NOTHING in the Ukrainian Constitution that says that the President holds office for the duration of martial law.
N.O.T.H.I.N.G.
Not the office of the President of Ukraine. Not Zelensky. The Rada.
Now, onto the money-shot
Article 157: “The Constitution of Ukraine shall not be amended in conditions of martial law or a
state of emergency.”
Sorry, TTG, but the February unanimous vote in the Rada to “extend Zelenskiy as President with full presidential powers as long as martial law is in effect” falls foul of that Article 157. It amounts to rewriting the Ukrainian Constitution to include the office of the President of Ukraine, and the Rada is strictly prohibited for doing that during martial law.
As for an appeal to Article 108, I have already explained why that is inapplicable: it relates to the “early” termination of a President, and that’s not the case with Zelensky i.e. his completed his entire term of office, and there was no “newly-elected President” to replace him.
Article 108 is therefore entirely irrelevant, irrespective of what the Rada does or doesn’t “unanimously vote” on.
The Rada does not possess the legal authority to make that call, and according to Article 157 is expressly prohibited from usurping the Constitution to acquire that authority for itself.
Yeah, Right,
You can stamp your feet and scream all you want, Volodymyr Zelenskiy is the President of Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada says so. And the Ukrainian people say so according to the most recent polls.
YR –
Nazified: subjected to or converted to a form of fascism or autocracy characterized by a cult of personality, state propaganda, state capitalism, violence against dissenters, territorial expansion and genocide.
That definition is 100% Putin and his ex-KGB companions in the Kremlin. The long suffering Russian people, which you disregard as insignificant, will give them their comeuppance one day.
By the way, it was the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada parliament that implemented Martial Law. The vote was 300 For, none Against, none Abstained, and 10 Did not vote.
Ultra vires? нет. Only if you feel that only Putin has the right to interprete Ukrainian law.
20 May 2024 will mark the end of the five years of President Volodymyr Zelensky in office, as defined by the Constitution. If it wasn’t for the full-scale war, the country would be electing a President on the last Sunday of the month, the 31 March.
However, Article 19 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the legal regime of martial law’ stipulates that parliamentary, presidential and local elections are all prohibited under martial law.
At the same time, Article 83 of the Constitution clearly stipulates that “If the term of powers of the Verkhovna Rada [Parliament] of Ukraine expires while martial law or a state of emergency is in effect, its powers shall be extended until the day of the first meeting of the first session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine elected after the cancellation of martial law or the state of emergency.”
https://n-ost.org/article/constitution-put-to-test-during-martial-law
What makes you love Putin & his men so much? Trump too?
The definition of who is a Great Power is a functional one. If Russia starts an unprovoked war of conquest on a neighbor and fails to pull it off, they are by definition not a Great Power and should have absolutely no expectation that the real Great Powers will think they have any right to a Sphere of Influence.
“If Russia starts an unprovoked war of conquest on a neighbor and fails to pull it off”
If your predicate is wrong (and it is) then your conclusion is going to be in error (it is).
The war was neither “unprovoked” nor was it started as a “war of conquest”.
So marking this war as a Russian “fail” is incorrect, because your metric for measuring success vs failure is flawed.
ked, there is a clear path to Russian victory: nuke Ukraine. But the contemporary Russo-Ukraine war is a limited war – Ukraine will use any and everything they’ve got, but Russia negotiates the escalation ladder. Btw, love your reference to the shoes of my youth in you online name.
for some reason I always liked ’em more than Converse. maybe it’s what Mom got at the PX. they’re still on the mkt, in grown-up sizes too.
Vlad’s blown his wad w/ one-trick-pony threats of nuclear escalation. all he’s accomplished (along w/ partner-in-crimea, Nasty) is proliferation among the front line states.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14fbpVNRanU
Incineration of my family and your’s will be the test, for sure. But my guess you’ll be taken out by cancer or organ failure.
Elkern – the interview with Ian Proud, linked to recently, changes the picture.
https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/what-next-for-europe-as-trump-pivots
I had thought, as did most, that the Russians had given up on the West and were just stolidly ploughing on with their 2022 objectives. Proud asserts that this is not the case and that the Russians are genuinely interested in rapprochement with the United States.
Whether Trump himself can offer that is still perhaps an open question. He faces flat opposition from the Europeans, who still wish the war to continue. A BND official said recently that it would be in Europe’s interest if the war lasted another five years and we see from the reactions of various European politicians that the only “peace settlement” they could support would be one that was not consistent with the Russian war aims. For some of them, as with some of TTG’s correspondents here (!), RF delenda est is the only end to this war that would leave them happy.
More importantly, Trump faces significant internal opposition. His attempts at administrative reform are bitterly contested. His ideological stance and that of his supporters is a throwback to earlier days of moderate American conservatism and is quite at odds with the stance that prevailed in the Biden era – it takes little insight to see there’s trouble brewing there. His view of the war in Ukraine is also at odds with the view hitherto prevailing in the American political establishment. And the midterms are looming, elections that he must do well in if he is to keep a fractious Congress behind him as he attempts to push through those administrative reforms.
The last thing Trump wants, as he seeks to push through his programme in the maelstrom that is American domestic politics, is the reproach that he “lost Ukraine”. That the West was always engaged in an unwinnable war there, and that Trump is now recognising that reality, will be obscured by accusations that he is a “Russian patsy” or an “appeaser”. We’re already seeing that accusation openly levelled against him by the Europeans and by his own domestic opposition.
That opposition does not only consist of the Democrats. A powerful wing of the Republican Party is also opposed to Trump and that wing is also opposed to any rapprochement with Russia. That wing of the Republican Party is somewhat subdued at present but it’s still there and still with some support in the electorate.
So whether Trump can offer a genuine rapprochement with Russia, opposed as he is by what may be regarded as effectively a coalition of the Europeans, Democrats, and even many within his own party, is uncertain. If he can offer rapprochement that’s his sole card to play as he seeks an end to the hostilities in Ukraine. If Ian Proud is correct, that’s a powerful card because the Russians are also interested in rapprochement.
I believe that Ian Proud is correct. The Russians are waiting warily to see which way the cat jumps but if there’s a rapprochement there on offer they’ll take it. The United States is too big and powerful for it to be in the Russian interest to be permanently at odds with it. As I recollect Martyanov remarking some time ago, in the long term it would be better for the Russians to find a modus vivendi with the US than not.
Unfortunately Putin himself does not have a free hand. War has its own momentum and often can render insuperable difficulties that could previously have been glossed over. A substantial portion of Putin’s electorate now believes he is being too soft by far in this war. The Security Council, judging from statements coming out from some of its members, is more hawkish than he is. His military too. And Putin himself has repeated the minimum Russian objectives so often and so clearly that he is in no position to walk them back.
Those objectives stated most concisely by Lavrov in his Newsweek interview (my formatting):-
”On 14 June, President Vladimir Putin listed prerequisites for the settlement as follows:
– complete AFU withdrawal from the DPR [Donetsk People’s Republic], LPR [Luhansk People’s Republic], Zaporozhye and Kherson Oblasts;
– recognition of territorial realities as enshrined in the Russian Constitution;
– neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status for Ukraine;
– its demilitarization and denazification; securing the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens;
and removal of all sanctions against Russia.”
…………………
“All sanctions”. Might be some wriggle room there. In his recent speech to the regional industrialists Putin mentioned the beneficial effects of some sanctions so he might not be too worried about all of them.
“Denazification.” As said before, a vague term and would probably only amount to the removal of memorials to WWII collaborators, cessation of persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the elimination of material glorifying the OUN in the schools.
But agreeing on that, as I noticed Ian Proud touching on briefly in that interview, is not as simple as all that. It is an article of faith in the western electorates and for most of the western politicians that the assertion that ultra-nationalists, or “Nazis”, have the say in Kiev is Russian propaganda. For the Russians, however, removal of those ultra-nationalists is a core objective. It’s difficult to see how Trump, or any other western politician, could come to an agreement about the removal of those ultras without admitting that that core Russian objective is justified.
The other conditions are less controversial. From the recent Witkoff/Carlson interview it didn’t seem that the territorial conditions are much of a stumbling block, though for what it matters I doubt the Europeans will accept them in a hurry. There’s the making of a peace deal there that would end the carnage in Ukraine before we insist, in real truth, on “fighting to the last Ukrainian”. But it all depends on whether Trump can get that rapprochement against the stiff European and internal opposition he’s encountering.
If he can’t, that’ll be Odessa and Kharkov gone, and further tens of thousands of casualties. Until I watched that Ian Proud interview that’s the way I thought it would go. But if someone at home in the diplomatic world reckons there’s a slim chance it won’t, one can only hope that that slim chance comes off.
Even Von Rundstedt, that most Prussian of Prussians and maybe the best general they had, knew when “Make peace you fools” was the only option left. Our war with Russia is lost. We should man up and accept that reality and not insist on putting our proxies through more hell.
EO – Thx, saw this at MoA, was gonna ask TTG to post it here, too. (b has some good stuff, but I rarely read Comments there – the format sucks, and so do most ‘discussions’).
I hope Ian Proud is correct about Russia’s interest in rapprochement with the USA. His news of changes on the ground regarding our Embassy in Moscow is a good sign that he’s right, and I agree with his Grand Strategy assessment that Russia doesn’t want to become a satrapy of China.
I’m skeptical of the Trump Admin’s ability to manage such negotiations, for several reasons. Some of those are internal to the Administration, stemming from Trump’s character and his chaotic ‘management style’; it seems like most of them think that their highest priority is to tear apart the existing bureaucracies, throwing out babies with bathwater.
US ‘diplomacy’ has suffered from decades of irrelevancy and intentional attacks by the NeoCons, who first rooted out ‘Arabists’, then anybody else who wasn’t spawned in their Think Tanks. I find it hard to imagine that Marco Rubio can turn all that around quickly enough to support *real* negotiation.
And there are definitely external forces which will vociferously oppose any deals with Russia/Putin. Most Democrats – all the ones I know – have hardened their opinions (Zelensky = Hero, Putin = Hitler), partly *because* it reinforces their opposition to Trump. But for now, Democrats are irrelevant.
The only faction which really has the power to undercut any negotiations are the US NeoCons, who generally favored Biden’s Ukraine policies (and indeed triggered the conflict via Victoria Nuland’s influence over the Maidan Coup/Revolution). But I suspect that their position might change, now that Russia is no longer propping up Assad, aiding “The Axis of Resistance” against Israel. The US readout of Trump’s conversation with Putin included a claim that they “…shared the view that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel”, where the Russian readout only referred more vaguely to “cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation”.
MSM (including Fox!) have been framing Putin as The Bad Guy for years; it could take a while for them to turn that around, but we’ve seen other cases recently where Big Corp’s have adjusted their attitudes and behavior to accommodate Trump. I’ve long been extremely suspicious of the tendency of MSM Foreign Policy coverage to parallel NeoCon priorities; MSM is less extreme, and focuses on Culture War Issues (Putin Hates Gays!) which NeoCons ignore.
We may already be seeing MSM softening on Ukraine, in the same way that Ian Proud sees Europe coming around, with positive talk about a Ceasefire being a step toward accepting an end to the war – without ever having to admit defeat.
Thx for the link. There were other aspects of the video which I’d like to discuss here.
Elkern – there were indeed! A recent Macgregor interview with Daniel Davis takes much the same line. As for the Europeans, even if they follow Trump’s lead they may not find it too easy to kiss and make up with the Russians. The Russians know all too well that the White Tiger comes out of Festung Europa, not the United States.
Thanks.
There may soon be book burnings at the Pentagon and other places. Not to worry, it will be FM pyres.
Russia has lost gazillions. How much territory does Ukraine get vs Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Russia’s economic collaps will ensure that thebigger problems dividing
up Moscow. In any case, I’m glad that we won.
Who’s going to get Russia’s oil fields, will that create another war?
Christian J Chuba,
If anybody gets Russia’s oil fields, it will be China.
Christian,
Russia is not collapsing economically. As of last month they had the fastest growing economy of any major market in the world:
https://www.intellinews.com/putin-says-sanctions-have-strengthened-not-weakened-russian-economy-368450/
Russia is losing the military war but it is winning the economic war.
In the late 20th Century, I began finding myself lost in the Revolution in Military Affairs, the Three Block War, Future Combat Systems, Force 21. The powerpoints, the Battle Labs, the RFPs, went through many many increments.
I think it kinda worked, given the circumstances – as long as one accepts that a lotta $$$ is going to be spent (& blown) when being the planet’s premier power – through moments of peace & a lotsa little wars.
My dim insight is that it takes real war to get real serious about any kinda revolution in war techniques, technology, training & all that other stuff. Yet it is very useful to experiment, be aware of what’s possible via RD&E exercises & to watch what’s happening when & where war is breaking out … & breaking the latest model for How to War.
I have little doubt (even though anything is possible) that the US is capable of adjusting to the lessons unfolding in this first peer-contenders-engaged-in-lasting- modern-warfare in many decades. After all … we are participating in it through tech material & tech staff.
The growing consensus & actions of the EU’s “Coalition of Former US Allies & Sick of Russia’s Shit” powers will likely be successful. They will be far more efficient in their decisions & force development that the US has been – they don’t have the spare Eurodollars to blow. & are innovative… & they are close to the threat… & the leaderships & the people view Putin for what he has always been – a 19th Century autocrat who throws people out of windows.
A humble suggestion: perhaps list a potted summary of all the OTHER cozy assessments by Michael Kofman regarding Ukraine’s current position and future prospects.
That way it might be possible to make a judgement call on just how tinted his rose-colored glasses might be. Or just how prescient this fellow is likely to be. Whatever.
Or are we just going to go with the “broken clock, twice a day” vibe?
TTG,
I have said in the past that I have the most trust in your predictions with respect to the Ukraine war. I feel that Michael Kofman concentrates on the part of the glass that is half full for the Ukrainians and ignores the other half of the glass.
Last year you were kind enough to make some predictions about when you thought Ukrainian lines might begin to collapse. I am really kicking myself for not writing those down somewhere because I have lost track of them.
So if you have any interest in updating your predictions I would love to hear them.
James,
I don’t see Ukrainian or Russian lines collapsing this year. They are both exhausted, but are holding on. The Ukrainians have finally started to fix their force organization problems than caused them so much woe in 2024. That includes a better integration of their drone capabilities. And their drone industry, including R&D, leads the world. The Russians have adapted remarkably well over the last three years as Kofman’s longer article indicates. But their adaptions have relied on the acceptance of massive casualties. Still they have not felt it necessary to tap into Russia’s full mobilization potential. For that matter, Ukraine has not tapped into her full mobilization potential either. I think both countries see that as an absolute last resort. I really don’t think 2025 will be a decisive year on the battlefield.
TTG – thanks very much for your assessment. I am going to make sure I bookmark this one!
The claim that Russia’s economy is just fine runs contrary to many negative features of it. The main one is their considerable inflation, which runs around 25% and that is highly corrosive. Trump and Putin may want to become closer, but that will create a serious backlash in the US. The vast majority of Americans have a very negative view of Russia. As do the Europeans., except the Putin Pals and they are a small minority. What Putin has really accomplished is uniting Europe and getting them to spend a lot more money on their armed forces. He will now also have a much longer border to defend.
Keep hope alive, Lars. Keep hope alive.
In general, people who post on Ukraine-activated forums should avoid posting on economics. There are hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people out there who actually know something economics. Don’t open your mouth to show what you don’t know.
Well, Lars, if you’re mentioning Europe, wouldn’t be a bad idea if someone took the damn place over and ran it properly. But I wouldn’t suggest Putin for the job. He’s just a big softy. Someone like Vance would do. That man’s got a bit of go in him. Or maybe – let’s think outside the box – your Colonel Macgregor. He knows lots about Europe. And he saw at close quarters how the swamp operates when he worked for Trump so he’d be well placed to drain ours.
Dreamland aside, I have to dispute the comparison between the degree of Russophobia in Europe and that in the States. We’ve been schooled in Russophobia so long and so thoroughly here that mention “Russia” to the average European and he’ll start slavering like Pavlov’s dog. Mention it to the average American and you’ll have to show him where it is on the map first.
That barring the Beltway hawks of course. Mention any place on the planet to a Beltway hawk and he won’t want to fuss around looking at maps. He’ll just want to bomb it.
TTG…This is JIM Back Online. and since your Know My Back ground…As You Know…Im 82. Have Been Full Time Care Giver for My Wife….A Motnth And a Half Ago I Had To Takr Her o Hospital..For Revival.nd Treatment …First During Her Labs…She Tested Positve For COVID…Sars…I came Home Tested Next Day..and Red Line Fast…Now I Have Been In Hosptal 6 DAy..With More Disease..She …Has Been There for 6 Weeks…Never Rocovered…and is Going into HOSPICE…and I Though YUou Might Be Interested….Regards….Jim
Jim,
Sorry to hear of your recent travails. Covid is a son of a bitch. I don’t think anyone fully understands its full ramifications yet. I’ve had it twice, but it was relatively mild both times. The first time both my wife and I got it from someone coughing her guts out in a restaurant. This was before it was known here. My case was mild enough that I continued to strip and restain a deck during it. It stuck with SWMBO for months. She ended up with Covid toes. There was no test for it back then, but it was no flu. A couple of cases popped up about that time from government travelers to Egypt.
I’ll keep you and your wife in my prayers. You’ve always been an interesting and enjoyable contributor to our committee of correspondence and I hope you remain so for some time. Keep the faith, Jim.
Jim –
Sorry to hear about your bride. I’m hoping you can beat the Covid, get out of the hospital, and stay strong for her as well as for yourself.
Leith…Im home now..with the DIF…My Wife is under comfort Care in The Hospital..Until Placement into HOSPICE Facility.
Her 90 year old body is worn out..
Jim – about as bad a time as there could be. Best wishes.
Jim –
I lost my bride in 2022. She was in hospice care at home, the hospice nurses came three times a week; plus there was a hospice lady that came and gave her bed-baths and shampoos. I could not handle the other four days of the week by myself so our kids came and stayed with us to help out. We took turns in shifts to watch out for her so we could all get some sleep. Without that help don’t know what I would have done.
Speaking about old-timers,
does anyone know what has happened to F&L (earlier Fourth & Long)?
He used to be quite regular here.
He seemed to be able to read Russian,
and seemed to know quite a lot about what Russians were saying on Telegram.
Always interesting and informative to read.
I believe some time ago he said he was rather old, living in an apartment in NYC, and having health problems.
I hope he is all right.
The last comments from him of which I am aware were in October 2024:
https://turcopolier.com/the-recent-loss-of-vuhledar/
TTG…Thank You very kind.. My Status…Ive Been in Hospital for a Week…I Have DIF…And its Very Bad..It Results From My Taking so many Anti Biotics Prescribe For Me y..Over a Long Period They Destro
y The GUT..and The GUT Can Creat DIF.. its prevented me from being with My Wife At Hospital..
TTG –
Could you please promote English Outsider’s reply to my first comments above to a new Post? EO (presumably) posted it on MoA, but I’d like to be able to discuss it here, beyond the scope of my reply (also above). (MoA is a useful source of info – “b” does some good research – but I stopped reading Comments there years ago, because the format sucks, and so do most of the Comments).
elkern,
I’ll think about it. I’ve done that for EO’s comments before. I want to take a closer look at that Ian Proud video first.
Thx. Yeah, the vid is interesting. Ian Proud isn’t exactly a charismatic figure, but he’s an incisive speaker with interesting perspective and relevant personal experience, regarding Russia at least (not so sure about his views on US politics).
I’d never heard of the interviewer – “Jackson Hinkle” – so I looked him up. He scares me; a self-described “MAGA Communist”, a bit too ‘charismatic’.
Basicslly this article implies Heavy metal on about 23/4?Probably right.
“The implication being that Ukraine is not in a desperate situation requiring a rushed ceasefire under unfavorable terms.”
Ukraine has been effectively bankrupt for more than a year and is 100% reliant of foreign money to keep their government, an army, operational. Amnesty for an AWOL problem? That’s a morale problem and amnesty will keep people from getting shot by their own side for desertion, but will it make them fight?
” RF recruitment went up considerably in the second half of 2024.”
That doesn’t sound like their people think they are losing.
Fred,
“Russian media reports an alarming increase in convictions for desertion since the beginning of 2024. Courts across Russia render an average of 34 convictions daily for fleeing service.”
And that doesn’t count those Russians surrendering or being held by their own commanders for refusing to fight.
TTG,
It’s almost like the press is “fake news”.
Fred,
I don’t doubt Russian recruitment is up. It has to be to replace the KIAs, WIAs, captured and deserted.
TTG,
LOL are they doing like Ukrainians and using press gangs too?
Fred,
They sure as hell are.
Fred –
Those Russian press gangs are only in minority non-slavic areas. Or in prisons. Putin doesn’t want to anger his base. Might be too late though as now he’s worried about being assassinated by his own ethnic Russkii troops. A few days ago he had servicemen from a ceremonial guard in Murmansk being individually body searched just before he arrived. A Federal Protection Service [FSO] officer patted them down for “hidden weapons or explosive devices as they stood waiting for the Kremlin dictator to lay a wreath by the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.” … “Magazines were removed from their weapons and plugs fitted into the chambers.” Guess he’s worried that he’ll get taken out like Anwar Sadat. And earlier this week in Moscow FSO officers opened manhole covers and dempsey dumpsters to look for bombs close to where Putin was going to publicly speak.
Putin used his trip to Russia’s Arctic capital Murmansk to declare he intends to wipe out Ukraine.
https://x.com/DarthPutinKGB/status/1905653107549258121
LOL are they doing like Ukrainians and using press gangs too?
Fred, I seriously wondered if you and Pat were close friends, cc?, other ‘coupling up’ encounters I had with you two. …
You feel the Ukrainians are a ridiculous lot, soon owned mostly, or whatever is left owning, by the US anyway soon?
But what’s your take on the surfacing US vs. Russian interest encounter in the ‘Far North’? Put another way, emperor Trump’s (+viceroy et al.) desires up there vs. Putin’s recent postures up ‘North’. It seems India watches at length.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=noLEw3j7WK4
TTG,
A press gang is not recruitment.
Leith,
DarthPutinKGB is a meme account.
Any thoughts on the unfortunate situation in Lithuania involving four U.S. soldiers?
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-soldiers-missing-lithuania-army-m88-hercules-long-difficult-operation/
Keith Harbaugh,
I’ve seen an M-88 get bogged down in a swamp at Fort Benning in 1981. Took another M-88 to get it out. That M-88 probably wasn’t aware that it was driving right into a Lithuanian bog. Far worse and far deeper than that Fort Benning swamp. It’s going to take a lot of equipment to recover it. My guess is that the crew will still be in the M-88.
Trump’s first reaction should be shocking, but it’s really not. It appears Hegseth did not brief him on the situation and Trump was left clueless when asked about it. None of his lieutenants want to tell him Steiner’s Army isn’t coming.
Some information on the M-88 from a Lithuanian source:
https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2523768/m88-what-kind-of-vehicle-is-it-and-how-could-it-sink
Would be interesting to learn about the topography of the immediate surroundings of the submerged vehicle,
the Pabradė training ground
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pabrad%C4%97_Training_Area
“Within the Pabradė Training Area is the US military camp Camp Herkus where US forces were deployed on 30 August 2021,
its main purpose is to house US Army Soldiers in Lithuania.
…
Camp Herkus exists to train US troops in Lithuania following Belarusian military exercises near the border with Lithuania.”
https://maps.app.goo.gl/SDNC1UJJvajS8yfc7
TTG, do you have any familiarity with this area?
Keith Harbaugh,
That training area is fairly close to the border with Belarus. The area all along the border has a lot of extensive raised peat bogs. Those things are like 15 to 20 foot tall sponges. Any heavy vehicle will sink. I wouldn’t want to be wandering around there in any kind of vehicle, except maybe in an M556 Gamma Goat.