“Assault of Novoselivskyi” – TTG

“The forces of the assault groups of the unit, with the support of artillery and heavy equipment of the KRAKEN special unit and the forces of the 92nd OMB, carried out a fire raid on the occupied village of Novoselivske, Luhansk region. During the assault, the enemy was knocked out of the settlement, the enemy suffered losses in equipment and personnel, and some of the occupiers were captured. Currently, the village is controlled by the Ukrainian army.”

Comment: This video is one of many put together by the Kraken Regiment’s media section. Obviously, it’s propaganda but it’s still raw battle footage showing what the close fighting is like. The Kraken Regiment is a motorized infantry unit augmented with some heavier weapons, mainly captured since its formation at the start of the war. Unloading from unarmored vehicles that close to Novoselivske was a pretty ballsy move. Back in September, this unit assaulted a village in their HMMMV with 50 cal machine guns and NLAWs. Below are some observations made by a Major Geroux of the Royal Canadian Regiment on this video. First, a little background on the major.

“Major Jayson Geroux is an infantry officer with The Royal Canadian Regiment and currently a member of the directing staff at the Canadian Armed Forces’ Combat Training Centre’s Tactics School. He has been involved in urban operations training for almost two decades and is the school’s urban operations subject matter expert and urban warfare historian, having participated in, planned, executed, and intensively instructed on urban operations for the past seven years. He has served twenty-six years in the Canadian Armed Forces, which included operational tours to the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Afghanistan.”

Even the fighting for this small Ukrainian town highlights some of the phases, challenges and necessities of urban warfare:

1. Use of assets for aerial surveillance of the urban area;

2. Use of mortars in support;

3. The necessity to hide armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) while in the urban defence. The Russians fail to do that here and they pay the price;

4. Use of indirect fires in support;

5. Breaking in and gaining lodgment can be chaotic;

6. High ammunition expenditure;

7. When dismounts are moving “slow is smooth, smooth is fast;”

8. Good to see the Ukrainians using AFVs in support;

9. The necessity of training for close quarter combat;

10. The collateral damage outside and inside a building which makes it challenging to approach and clear;

11. Even small urban areas have subterranean parts (@RichemondBarak, @SapperGeologist);

12. The challenges of communicating in combat; 

13. Be careful with the use of tracer rounds; the enemy will see from where you are firing;

14. Be prepared for enemy counter-artillery fire because now they know you’re in the town. Seek shelter soonest; and

15. The need for all fighters to train for casualty triage and challenging urban casualty evacuation (@Zarelepotec).


Further Comment: Urban fighting remains an important aspect of modern warfare. It has always been important. My introduction to this aspect of warfare was during IOBC at Fort Benning. An infantry captain from the Royal Australian Regiment was the primary instructor. He showed an initial film of urban combat scenes “choreographed” to Petula Clark’s 1964 hit “Downtown.” I can no longer hear that song without thinking of city fighting. I vividly remember his heavily accented refrain “Swisho! Right up the old cakehole!” when describing how to attack armor from basement and second story windows with LAWs, Dragons and recoiless rifles. It was important to ensure we had sufficient backblast area for such attacks.

In the 25th ID we continued to prepare for urban combat. It became more important when our division commander told us about our secondary mission of reinforcing the defense of Europe. The plan was to have our lighter than light companies and platoons hole up in German villages to take on the Soviet armored hordes. What we lacked in weaponry, we tried to make up with an over abundance of picks, shovels and axes.

Major Geroux and Colonel John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at West Point’s Modern War Institute, wrote a good overview of urban warfare just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I’m sure they’ll have more case studies and lessons learned to add once this war is over.



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8 Responses to “Assault of Novoselivskyi” – TTG

  1. Whitewall says:

    Heart pounding video. Ukrainians seem to have benefitted from top notch training. Their movements showed great skill. I was struck by the speed and thoroughness given the wounded. Captured Russians appeared not to know what hit them.

    • Eliot says:

      Kraken is famous for murdering those Russian POWs in Kharkov last spring.

      In their video, they’re in a courtyard, some apartment complex, they shoot the men in their legs, knees, with an AKM at close range. Perhaps two feet. The Russians just bleed to death there.

      The Ukrainians ask them questions as they die.

      – Eliot

  2. Leith says:

    Svatove will be soon to follow.

    Pretty big for a village, 150+ houses plus the dozen or so huge agricultural structures. It wasn’t all SpecOps from Kraken. They had some substantial backup and heavy weapons support from the 92nd Mechanized Brigade, or of elements therefrom. Seemed to be good coordination between the them. They worked together before I believe. Both the Krakens and the 92nd were critical back in September during the Kharkiv counter-offensiive taking Izium, Kupiansk, and other key terrain.

  3. Sam says:

    Vladimir Putin is leading Russia towards revolution, making the same catastrophic military mistakes as Russia did in 1917, warns a leading pro-Kremlin war analyst. His army is at the point of no return where he loses if it attacks and if it retreats, said Igor Strelkov, a former FSB colonel and ex-defence minister of self-styled Donetsk People’s Republic in Russian-occupied Ukraine. ‘Intelligent people have come to the conclusion that, in the current situation, Russia is in a complete Zugzwang,’ he said. ‘It is impossible to keep on defending because it quickly worsens [our] strategic position,’ Strelkov said. ‘And it is impossible to attack, since this is fraught with a quick military catastrophe.’


    The Russian army is apparently preparing a ground offensive. They need to do something to change the battlefield dynamic. Firing a few missiles & drones periodically at Ukrainian infrastructure is not going to cut it, IMO.

    OTOH, Ukraine has an opportunity to actually defeat the Russian army, if they can receive longer range weapons among the next batch of supplies. That would be something completely unexpected and will jolt the CCP-Putin-Ayatollah axis.

    • James Nawrocki says:

      If you take the Tsar’s army of 1914 into battle, complete with the same problems, dynamics, tactics, non-secure communications, deficiencies, and systemic corruption, then one must expect a similar reaction as 1917

  4. Sam says:

    France sending armoured vehicles. “AMX-10RC was originally developed for reconnaissance and fire support. This light wheeled armored vehicle is highly mobile. It is fitted with a powerful gun and is capable of fire support & rapid intervention”


    The Ukrainian army will soon receive the French & American armored vehicles. This will enable higher mobility forces like those in the video to be more effective.

  5. different clue says:

    When I read number 7 in the list of important things in Urban Warfighting . . .
    ” 7. When dismounts are moving “slow is smooth, smooth is fast;” . . .
    I was reminded of an essay by William S. Burroughs called The Discipline Of ‘Do Easy’.
    I will offer a link to it in case it might be considered somehow relevant or useful as a description of an approach. ( If it is not, I don’t mind if it is judged not fit to print.)


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