Zhenya Poddubny says correctly that the Ukrainians Liman and other villages do not take head-on. There are forests and swamps around. They operate in maneuverable groups, up to a platoon, three jeeps, one “Kozak” (something in between our “Typhoon” and “Tiger”). That’s it. And there are many such groups going forward. There is no big collective goal, they do not accumulate in one place. Their comms are reliable (stable closed communication between groups and headquarters, use of large and small UAVs). They inspire fear with their appearance (who knows, maybe it’s a regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine coming towards you).
These groups envelop the villages, block them. The same way the militants in August 1996 took Grozny. They entered the city by “goat paths”, blocked checkpoints in small groups, and that’s it, then the main forces entered, the city of Grozny was taken by militants.
Everything from the fact that we lock ourselves in our bases, do not pierce the entire space around with tentacles, do not have the active defense initiative, give it to the enemy. Here in Chechnya (these wars cannot be compared, I understand) if the regiment stood in the mountains, and its intelligence did not rummage around in the required 5 km distance, that’s it, the militants blocked this regiment, strangled it. This is my vision of the process. If there is a city in front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and operational space around, they will go the same way, in front of the “Cossack patrol” then large groups, but also enveloping the city. And then, figuratively speaking, the bend of the arm behind the back, followed by strangulation.
What to do? Calm down. Who is really interested in the real situation, you will not find the nuances in Telegram or on the Web. I believe that we are doing everything right. TODAY, TO NOT TURN THE COUNTRY INTO A THEATER OF WAR, IT IS NECESSARY TO TURN IT INTO A TRAINING GROUND. We are moving towards this.
Comment: Between this RFE/RL video and the observation/analysis of the Russian war blogger going by the name of Sladkov, we have a good account of Ukrainian tactical operations on the Kharkiv-Donbas front. I don’t know why, but Sladkov ends his lament on a surprisingly optimistic note. But his observations are in line with what I said in a discussion with Leith and Sam yesterday.
“By all accounts the Russians are dazed, confused and shit out of reserves. But they are still dangerous and can inflict losses on the Ukrainians they can ill afford if they’re allowed to consolidate and throw out mine fields. IMO the best bet is to push the lighter sabotage-recon units like the two battalions of the Kraken Regiment into the rear avoiding strong points and tearing up as many command and control, artillery and logistic targets as they can. Use their drones for recon and calling in long range fires. These units have already proved up to the task. The tank and mech brigades can catch up.”
I’m not sure how they’re operating on the Kherson front, probably something closer to the assault on strongpoint Moscow rather than the Cossack predations described by Sladkov. They don’t have the tree cover there, but I’m sure they’re using some appropriate form of combined arms tactics.