“Does Russia face military collapse by 2026? Inside Ukraine’s strategic assessment”

This is an analysis by Tatarigami. The Euromaidan Press describes him as a military observer, OSINT and GEOINT analyst, founder of Frontelligence Insight. They fail to mention that he is a former Ukrainian Army officer. He’s obviously a Ukrainian patriot and wants Ukraine to emerge victorious in this conflict. Even so, his comments and analyses are surprisingly evenhanded.

As tank reserves deplete and production stalls, intelligence analysis points to a critical deadline for Russia’s war effort. Yet Putin’s ability to sustain low-intensity conflict challenges this timeline

Ukraine may be entering the final stages of its war with Russia, with the war potentially drawing to a close by the end of 2025 and early 2026, at least according to Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Directorate of Intelligence. Budanov shared this projection based on intelligence data during the annual Yalta European Strategy meeting, an international platform that puts together prominent Western and Ukrainian figures. As the initial invasion has evolved into an attritional war, understanding the enemy’s will to fight, their resources, and their ability to replace losses becomes critical in order to calculate the trajectory of war. The specific numbers provided by Budanov and backed up by expert analyses provide factual substance to the discussion, making it more valuable for projecting accurate timelines.

Russian military production

Any attritional war ultimately becomes a test of societal endurance, war economics, diplomacy, and the ability to replace losses. As the war drags on, these problems intensify, pushing one side closer to a tipping point where continuing the war worsens their position. Military production and the capacity to replace losses are among the war’s tangible factors that can be calculated and projected well.

One notable point from Budanov’s conversation was Russia’s plan to produce 149 T-90M tanks in 2024. At first look, according to data from the open-source intelligence project Warspotting, Russia has lost approximately 47 T-90M tanks this year – a number notably lower than projected production, which makes it tempting to assume that Russia’s tank production is keeping up with its battlefield losses.

However, this is only a superficial assessment; the reality for Russia is far direr. Russia has been heavily relying on refurbishing older tanks, such as the T-72, T-62, and T-55/54 models, from its Soviet-era stockpiles. Most of its current tank fleet on the battlefield is relying on tanks no longer in production. While this has allowed Russia to preserve more advanced tanks like the T-90M, Russia’s Soviet reserves are depleting quickly, and the tank fleet is on a sharp decline.

OSINT analyst @Highmarsed, who tracks open-air storages and shares insights on X (formerly Twitter), provides a more detailed assessment. He reported that by 6 July 2024, Russia’s stock of T-55s had dropped by 31%, T-62s by 37%, and T-80Bs by 79%, with only 9% of T-72s removed from storage.

While these figures may not be exact, they provide a good idea about the rapid depletion of Russia’s tank reserves.

Additionally, OSINT analyst Naalsio, who tracks battlefield losses, estimates that by 4 October 2024, Russian forces had lost over 539 tanks and 1,830 vehicles in total (including tanks) in the Pokrovsk direction (formerly the Avdiivka direction) since 2023—numbers that far surpass Russia’s current tank production capacity.

Given that since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has lost over 3,000 tanks (information that can be independently confirmed by open-source projects such as Oryx or Warspotting) Russia has lost more tanks than it had in its entire prewar active-duty tank force, as well as and over 30% of its most advanced self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launcher systems.

A report from senior analyst Dara Massicot, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, further details that Russia is expected to exhaust its stockpile of multiple Soviet-era military equipment by 2026.

There are also clear challenges in replacing Russia’s air force losses. Some older jet models are no longer in mass production, and the new jet production is less impressive. For example, Budanov noted that Russia plans to produce only 14 Su-57 fighters in 2024.

That being said, it’s not all bad news for Russia: its Iskander missile production, particularly the Iskander-M, has ramped up significantly. While Budanov didn’t specify exact numbers, this aligns with reports from the ground about Russia’s frequent use of these missiles.

This is a serious problem for Ukraine, as it cannot currently fully protect itself from these missiles. The limited number of Patriot systems cannot fully safeguard cities and the entire frontline. Additionally, ballistic missiles themselves are a problem for most air defense systems.

Mitigating this threat will require a multi-layered approach: increasing air-defense numbers, as well as detection and warning systems. This should go hand in hand with allowing Ukraine to strike across the border with Western weaponry and developing deep-strike capabilities to neutralize these missile storages at a distance. Unfortunately, these factors largely depend on the West and its willingness to sustain investment in the war – something over which Ukraine has only limited control.

But can Russia expand its production further?

According to the same Carnegie Endowment report, Russia’s military equipment production, aside from drones, had plateaued as of early 2024. Further expansion is unlikely unless new factories are constructed or the government takes the significant risk of temporarily halting exports or shutting down production lines to retool and modernize existing facilities.

It’s important to note that we are now at the beginning of October 2024, and even if Russia were to begin constructing modern plants with all the necessary equipment and personnel, it would take well over a year to bring such production online. This means that any significant expansion wouldn’t be feasible before the second half of 2025. Currently, Russia is attempting to bridge the gap between its production capacity and frontline needs with the help of its foreign partners and allies.

According to Kyrylo Budanov, North Korea is Russia’s largest military partner in this regard, primarily due to the volume of artillery shell supplies. He noted that after a North Korean shipment arrives, combat intensifies within 8-9 days and this effect lasts for up to two weeks, showing a direct correlation between artillery shipments and combat intensity.

Given that North Korea has also been supplying Russia from its own stockpiles, it’s uncertain whether Pyongyang can significantly ramp up production to meet Russia’s demands. It’s also unclear how deeply North Korea is willing to draw from its own artillery reserves, especially when tensions in Korean Peninsula remain consistent

Domestic Ukrainian projects have had a significant, yet often overlooked, impact on the war effort

While Western technology receives much of the attention in political, diplomatic, and expert circles, the effect of Ukraine’s domestic production, development, and scaling of homegrown technology has been underestimated. General Budanov explained the importance of Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes deep inside Russia, including Moscow. These strikes have shaken the confidence of the Russian people, undermining the belief that their leadership provides ultimate security and ensures Russia’s military might.

As the war progresses, more Russians from various social backgrounds are questioning why the war is reaching their homes and whether their leadership can truly preserve Russia’s pre-war status as a formidable military power capable of protecting its citizens. But Ukraine’s successes aren’t limited to long-range drone strikes. Two other key innovations have also shaped the course of the war: unmanned surface vehicles (sea drones) and FPV drones.

In the early stages of the invasion, when Ukraine’s already small fleet was unable to resist Russia’s Black Sea fleet, Russian naval dominance seemed unquestionable. That perception started rapidly to change with the successful destruction of the missile cruiser Moskva – the pride of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. But that was only the beginning. The introduction of domestically developed sea drones has since become Ukraine’s surprise weapon, rapidly evolving into a core naval weapon, and despite having a largely non-functional fleet, Ukraine has managed to destroy a quarter of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. More significantly, these drones have denied Russia’s navy the ability to operate freely. Ukrainian grain ships now sail much safer, as any attempt to impose a blockade or attack risks immediate and effective Ukrainian retaliation in the Black Sea. This capability has enabled Ukraine to protect its maritime interests while deterring Russian actions in the Black Sea.

The widespread use of FPV drones – small, racing-style drones costing under $1,000, has reshaped the battlefield. These drones are capable of targeting everything from armored vehicles to advancing infantry and reconnaissance drones and even helicopters. During the artillery shortages of 2023 and early 2024, FPV drones became a crucial tool in the arsenal, often serving as the primary means to engage the enemy at longer distances, with some able to fly up to 20 kilometers using transmitter drones.

Through grassroots efforts, volunteer organizations, and some government assistance, Ukraine has managed to scale the production of drones and standardized munitions for them. While there remains a shortage of drones and a lack of sufficient state involvement in their procurement for military units, the number of drones on the battlefield has surged from just dozens to tens of thousands in under a year, making them an essential part of the war theater.

Investing in Ukraine’s domestic production and pursuing joint projects with Western countries could be one of the most effective paths forward. This approach can help to reduce the political risks and fallout associated with gaining permission to strike deep inside Russia with Western missiles – something Ukraine has already managed to achieve independently, without resulting in over exaggerated fears of nuclear missile launches.

A self-sufficient Ukraine is more beneficial to its partners, easing the political friction in the West over its own dwindling military supplies. This will help Ukraine to take an important role in a changing security and geopolitical environment, where it can serve as a key partner for Europe in the defense area. With its proven expertise and production capabilities, Ukraine will organically contribute to the Western defense efforts through collaborative projects.

Not just about the military

As General Budanov notes, Russian internal calculations suggest that if Russia doesn’t exit the war by the anticipated time frame, it will be unable to claim “superpower” status in the foreseeable future — at least 30 years. Instead, the most it can hope for is regional leadership. Internal Russian analysis predicts only two superpowers will remain: the US and China, a scenario referred to as “The Rise of China” and “The Domination of America,” with no place for Russia on the global stage. This projection isn’t driven solely by war production challenges but also by a deteriorating financial and economic situation, slowing growth, and expected setbacks.

Former French military intelligence officer Pierre-Marie Meunier, analyzing 2023 data from Russia’s Central Bank, highlights a sharp decline in Russian exports. Goods and services exports fell by 29% and 17%, respectively, from 2022 to 2023, while imports rose by 10% and 5%, resulting in a sharp drop of the trade surplus. In September of 2024, Russia raised its key interest rate to 19%, with its inflation rates reaching over 7%.

Meunier paints a grim picture: in a country where over half the population relies on state subsidies, where the poverty rate exceeded 13% in 2021 (even with far lower poverty thresholds than in the West), and where 62% of Russians lack savings or the means to afford more than basic necessities, Russia risks facing a long-term economic crisis reminiscent of the one that preceded the fall of the Soviet Union. It’s fair to say that while sanctions haven’t stopped the war, they are slowly strangling Russia, making it increasingly difficult to manage the consequences of the war.

These mounting problems create potential grounds for future negotiations, which President Zelensky is aiming to leverage through the Peace Summit scheduled for November 2024, as he seeks a diplomatic resolution. However, the timeline suggested by General Budanov might prove more realistic than the November talks, with the situation in Kursk playing an important factor.

The Kursk Factor

Following Ukraine’s successful incursion into Kursk, Russian political elites are facing a new problem. If negotiations do take place, Russia won’t be entering from a position of strength: an autocratic regime appears weaker when forced to negotiate over its own territory. Any regime would seek ways to avoid being seen as weak or incompetent internally, so Russia will try to enter talks from a more favorable position. This suggests Russia may be hesitant to engage seriously in negotiations come November, likely delaying any substantive talks until they attempt to retake Kursk. While Russia is currently struggling to dislodge Ukrainian forces from the area, they are steadily building up troops, preparing for a larger operation in the near future.

While logical, this scenario carries serious risks for the Kremlin: failure to retake Kursk could further damage Putin’s image as a leader who not only failed to defend Russian territory but was also forced to negotiate over it. Despite the state’s propaganda of a powerful Russian army, his inability to reclaim these lands would undermine his internal image.

On the other hand, we must consider the possibility that the importance of Kursk and its impact on Russian elites and society may be overstated. They might simply overlook it until the situation becomes an accepted and irrelevant fact, with Kursk becoming a minor factor in Russian decision-making. This would be especially true if Putin can demonstrate consistent gains in Donbas, pushing further into Ukrainian territory and shifting the focus away from losses elsewhere.

Limitations of this analysis

The analysis can’t be considered full or complete without some self-reflection and acknowledging doubts about the data. While the numbers may seem consistent, they don’t necessarily reflect Putin’s rationale, which could operate on entirely different assumptions, like viewing the West as weak or Ukraine’s government as unstable.

The low number of vehicles and economic difficulties might not be enough to compel Putin to end the war. After all, prior to the beginning of the invasion, many individuals and even some professional analysts questioned Russia’s intentions based solely on the number of troops stationed at the border. They concluded that the forces were insufficient to overtake Ukraine and thus believed that Putin would not proceed with an invasion.

He could very well scale down offensive operations, allowing his generals to consolidate gains. By heavily mining the frontlines and continuing missile strikes, he could keep Ukraine in a state of limbo – too dangerous for normal life or business to recover. With low-intensity combat and reduced military spending, Putin might be able to drag the war out, balancing between war and economics for much longer while waiting for the best possible terms in negotiations.

It is not entirely unrealistic, given that Europe’s trade with Russia’s neighbors, particularly in Central Asia, has been skyrocketing. This trend suggests that Russia may find a path to avoid economic collapse and could continue the war at a lower intensity by leveraging its demographic advantage.

Putin is acutely aware of war weariness in the West and operates under the assumption that Western leaders might lack the resolve and incentives to maintain high levels of aid to Ukraine. Foreign assistance is often an unpopular issue in domestic politics, becoming a frequent target for opposition parties that accuse the government of prioritizing foreign spending over pressing issues at home, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Nevertheless, we can all agree that if the war does not come to an end, its intensity will likely decrease. This means Ukraine needs a long-term plan of action, whether that involves preparing for a potential second invasion or sustaining a low-intensity war.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/10/22/does-russia-face-military-collapse-by-2026-inside-ukraines-strategic-assessment/

Comment: A few days ago, James asked me, “Would you care to weigh in on those who think the tide is turning and the Russians will be at the Dnieper in six months?”

I answered, “If the Russians can keep an army in the field, I do think they can reach the Dnipro in 18 to 24 months. Ukraine won’t get their territory back unless that Russian army collapses. That is reaching the Dnipro west of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. They’re already at the Dnipro opposite Kherson, but they won’t be able to cross it.

My answer was based on the fact that both sides are exhausted. Russia is making slow, steady progress on the Donbas front at a great cost to the Ukrainians, but at a far greater cost to themselves. There are plenty of other factors, as Tatarigami pointed out, but I think it boils down to which side wants it more. Is the will of the Ukrainians to avoid subjugation stronger than Russia’s will to expand their territory. The Russians have already lost the argument on NATO enlargement. Not only did Finland and Sweden join NATO, but even if Ukrainian formal membership in NATO is far off at best, Ukraine will never be neutral. And NATO is more alive today than it was before the Russian invasion.

TTG

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57 Responses to “Does Russia face military collapse by 2026? Inside Ukraine’s strategic assessment”

  1. babelthuap says:

    We are going to find out next week when this ends. If one person is elected it will end immediately and the unraveling of NATO can begin. Western Europe can then slowly return to defending their own turf and deporting the failed solution to their low birth rate problem.

  2. Poul says:

    And a German look on Russia’s weapons production.

    https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/fit-for-war-in-decades-europes-and-germanys-slow-rearmament-vis-a-vis-russia-33234/

    “This report finds that Russian military industrial capacities have been rising strongly in the last two years, well beyond the levels of Russian material losses in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the build-up of German capacities is progressing slowly.”

    And from page 22
    “Up to now, roughly 80% of production of armoured vehicles are retrofits of existing hulls from available stockpiles of Soviet and Russian vehicles. Though when stockpiles deplete, production may be less affected than assumed.
    … Even without any new production lines, Russian production of new tanks would be at 350 modern tanks per year past 2026, but additional production lines may be opened. Production of other armoured vehicles will be less affected as shifts to more contemporary wheeled designs are underway”

    As for artillery: page 23
    “When it comes to rear systems such as artillery and air defence, Russian production is adapting so that reliance on limited stocks is unlikely to cause major bottlenecks in output.”

  3. james says:

    quote from the article “A self-sufficient Ukraine is more beneficial to its partners…” that doesn’t begin to explain the amount of imf funding, not to mention blackrock and friends investment to date into ukraine in earnest the past 10 or more years..

    https://www.reuters.com/world/how-much-money-does-ukraine-owe-whom-2024-06-13/

    if you are interested – john perkins ‘confessions of an economic hit man’ is very relevant here..

  4. Yeah, Right says:

    All of this is predicated upon the idea that Ukraine will continue to receive military assistance from “the West”.

    If they do then Russian losses may continue on into the future as they currently are.
    If they don’t then Ukraine will certainly run dry well before Russia does, at which point their lines will collapse and the war will come to a sudden end.

    Ukraine won’t continue to receive the military assistance that it has become dependent upon.

    Simple as that, because one thing this analysis DOESN’T contain is any estimation of the weapon and ammo production of the West.

    The stockpiles there are already running low, good ol’ Netanyahu is way in front of Zelensky in the queue for what is available, and production is nowhere near close enough to enable the restocking of what has already been shipped off.

    Zelensky is going down to defeat in the same way that Hemingway described going bankrupt: slowly at first, then all at once.

    This war doesn’t have years left in it. It’ll be all over in the first quarter of 2025, and the only question is whether Zelensky manages to get himself to comfortable retirement in Miami, or ends up dead in a ditch on the mad scramble to the waiting jet.

  5. Lars says:

    I have long held that it will come down to economics, US, EU v. RU. This situation is becoming existential for Russia, whose economy dwarfs that of the others. One thing about economics is that once a tipping point has been reached, the fallout can be substantial and rapid, as we have seen many times in the past. This situation will continue until Russia is not seen as a threat to the rest of Europe.

    • James says:

      Lars – have you ever looked at Debt/GDP numbers for G20 nations?

      https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/government-debt-to-gdp?continent=g20

      I suggest you sort from highest to lowest (where of course lowest is better).

      • Lars says:

        After WWII, US debt was sky high, but with a marginal rate of 90%, it steadily came down. Until Ronald Reagan arrived and it has been going up ever since. Public debt can be monetized and if done properly will get results over time. But that only applies to the economies that are able to absorb the process. The US and the EU can, but not many others. China is in the process of doing it now.

        • Fred says:

          Lars

          LBJ all the way! Vietnam and the war on poverty? You must have missed those two things in that foreign land you immigrated from. The EU? Better look again. The ECB has no taxing authority and few assy.

          • Lars Holfve says:

            If you look at a historic chart, you will see that the debt still went down during the Vietnam War. It started to go up around 1981 and has continued to rise., more during Republican presidents than Democrats. Of course that is real data.

          • Fred says:

            Lars,

            So it is not like what Biden has been pumping out for 4 years.

        • James says:

          Lars,

          “My uncle smoked until he was 90 and it never did him any harm.”

          You are the one who wrote “once a tipping point has been reached the fallout can be substantial and rapid”, and that tipping point has generally been one of debt/gdp.

          The fact that Japan has managed to hang in midair Wile E. Coyote style (for what – 15 years???) is truly impressive.

          But you can’t just increase public debt without bound – if you could then Venezuela and the Weimar Republic would be examples worthy of emulation.

          Did you notice which country had the lowest debt/gdp in that list?

  6. voislav says:

    I have a lot of respect for Tatarigami and we largely agree on the deficiencies with the Ukrainian Army, its leadership and the command structure. But when it comes to the analysis of Russian losses, I have a major bone to pick.

    There are numerous sources that agree that Russian tank production is 900-1200 tanks per year, including new T-90s and refurbished older models (T-80, T-72, etc.). Highmarsed analysis shows removal of about 2600 tanks from open air storage. This agrees well with estimated Russian refurbishment rates.

    And yet, he Tatarigami is posting a graph showing Russian storage drop by 7,700 tanks and active tanks only at 900. It’s dumb. You can’t just pull tanks that were sitting in storage for 30+ years and put them into combat. They don’t work. So where is 7,700 tanks coming from? Russians didn’t lose 10,000 tanks because they never had that many tanks to begin with. It’s very disappointing that this kind of loss inflation peddled as facts when you have perfectly good data that shows actual Russian production and refurbishment rates.

    This kind of misinformation is infuriating because it creates a false impression that Russia will run out of war fighting material. This fosters the Western delusions that Ukraine just needs to hold on for a few months and Russia will fall apart like a house of cards.

    We’ve been down this road for 2.5 years. Endless stream of news articles predicting Russia running out of X in a few months. Meanwhile, Russia has greatly expanded its arms production and secured additional supplies from North Korea and Iran. They are producing, what, 4 million shells per year and getting another couple of million from Korea. So, half a mil a month. On the other hand, Europe has done nothing to expand ammunition production. Are they even producing 500K a year? US is producing 400-500K a year. So less than 1 million a year combined. Let’s not even get into armored vehicles, EU hasn’t made new tanks in ages, US is making maybe a 100 M1 a year for export.

    I’ve said this before, but it bears repeating. There has been a massive failure by Ukrainian, US and EU governments to mobilize industrial production for war. Russia for all its warts has actually done so with a reasonable success and is on sustainable footing to wage war for at least 2 more years. What will Ukraine wage the war with? What ammunition? What armored vehicles? And yet, instead of doing something about it, we get peddled fantasies like this.

    • aleksandar says:

      1 -Russian estimated shell production : 2.5 million per year
      Russia stockpile : unknow but around 11 millions year 2021.
      NK estimated shell production : 1 million per year.
      NK stockpile : around 9 millions.
      ( not surprising as NK without a decent Air Forces relies mainly on artillery)
      So 300 000 a month.
      Far more than all western countries together .
      Enough to sustain a 30 000 shells/day rate as you don’t use ARTY all along the front but only on specific zones .
      2 – Note also that Tarigami don’t speak about UMPK+FAB, that are destroying day after day the Ukrainian army in an industrial way.
      3 – Of course, the usual “huge Russian losses”.
      Ridiculous, just look at the videos to see that Russian tactic is classic infantry combat at platoon level and economy of forces.
      4 – Nothing also about Ukrainian manpower crisis that is largely documented.
      5 – Kursk offensive is already dead and 14 of the best Ukrainian brigades destroyed.
      At the end of 2024, there will be simply nothing to negotiate there.
      6 – Relying on Oryx or Warspotting is irrelevant. My friend ArmchairWarlord did a detailed analysis of the first 1000 entries on Oryx site and found a 30% error rate !
      7 – In any case, tanks are no longer a decisive factor in this war.
      It’s all about artillery and infantry.

      I appreciate Tarigami’s comments but he droned himself in Budanov propaganda.

      • TTG says:

        aleksandar,

        With all those stockpiles and production, the Russian rate of artillery expenditure is steadily going down. Either those figures for stockpiles and production are a lot of hype or the Ukrainians are managing to keep a lot of those shells from reaching Russian guns. They’re also taking out a lot of those Russian guns. But you’re right about those glide bombs. They’re taking the place of artillery and seem much more deadly.

        • aleksandar says:

          You give us the reason why Russian rate of artillery expenditure is steadily going down.
          Glide bombs.

          Add Rusian drone production, around 1.4 millions this year.
          And you “cover” short (1 to 10 km) and long range up to 70 km.
          Result is less need for artillery.

          Russian tactic changed.
          No more frontal urban assaults but everywhere cut LOC, bypass and encirclement:
          Selidovo, Girnik, Novoselydivka, Novogrodivka. Oukriansk, soon Velika Novosilka
          Combat in open fields, less need for ARTY.
          So there is no possible correlation between shell production/stockpiles and consumption on the front line.

          Ukrainians and Russians are taking out a lot of guns.
          How many M777 left ?
          But Russians had anticipated a HIC/HIW by buying a dozen machine tools in Switzerland from 2000 to 2010.
          Production outmatch western capabilities.

          • TTG says:

            aleksandar,

            Ukraine received a little over 200 M777s. Of those 53 were destroyed and 43 damaged as of 19 October 2024. The damaged ones are repaired in Ukraine. Altogether the West has sent over 620 artillery pieces to Ukraine including the French Caesar SP howitzer and the Swedish Archer. That doesn’t count the HIMARS. Ukraine is now producing 20 of their Bohdana SP howitzers per month.

        • Fred says:

          TTG,

          Why would a decline in artillery shells matter? According to reports from almost two years ago they shot the lands out of their barrels, without replacement, thus they can’t hit what they are shooting at.

          • TTG says:

            Fred,

            Russian artillery fire was never as accurate as the Ukrainians, even at the beginning of the invasion. With wonky shells from North Korea and wonky barrels, that fire is even less accurate and less effective.

          • Fred says:

            TTG,

            You rather miss the point.

          • TTG says:

            Fred,

            Then what is your point? The Russians have been moving more to older 122mm and 130mm guns as their 152mm guns are worn out and destroyed. They’re even pulling WWII guns out of storage.

          • Yeah, Right says:

            Fred, the latest report from Royal United Services Institute is less than a month old:
            https://static.opensourcecentre.org/assets/osc_ore_to_ordnance.pdf

            It doesn’t claim that there is a lack of replacement barrels coming out of the Russian production lines.

            Indeed, it points out that the Russians have replaced its older Austrian-sourced forges with forges from China.

            The only sop it makes towards the claims that Russia is having trouble with replacement barrel production is this one:
            “Russian companies have historically preferred
            Western machine tools over Chinese equivalents, as they are more precise and higher quality.”

            Well, whoop-de-do.

            Historically-speaking, as we are, American and British consumers preferred their own products over Japanese and German equivalents that were derided as “Jap-Junk” and “Gerry-built”.

            No more, of course.

            Past is not necessarily prologue, and I see no reason why the Chinese are incapable of producing machinery as good – if not better – that anything the Austrians can produce.

  7. d74 says:

    Does Russia face military collapse by 2026?
    Unlikely.
    Figures and arguments based on Budanov and others are worthless.

    Does Ukraine face military collapse by 2026?
    Yes, perhaps before the end of 2026.

    The fate of Ukraine is in the hands of the Russian armed forces. I don’t think it will take any interference from Russian pacifists. No more Minsk I and II.
    The Russian war effort represents around 7-8% of its GDP. It has room to manoeuvre. Russia’s approval of Putin’s policies continues unabated (75 to 85% positive). Western warmongers would love to have even half that score. And it’s not for lack of incensed hype and heavy-handed censorship.

    Barring any new political or military developments, Ukraine is cooked.

    • aleksandar says:

      Before the end of 2025.
      War has his own logic.
      When you start retreating, the main problem is to stabilize the front.
      For this you need a great leader, like Joffre, a line of reestablishment, if possible
      a river or a mountainous area, reserves and excellent coordination at division/brigade level.
      The Ukrainians have none of this.

      • James says:

        aleksandar,

        The Ukrainians can fall back to the Dnipro.

        • aleksandar says:

          Correct, that’s IMHO the only option.
          And as Russian will stop on the Dnipro, this will end this war.

          • TTG says:

            aleksandar,

            I doubt it. It will just make the front line static.

          • d74 says:

            Odesa
            According to some maximalists, this war will have been pointless if Odesa is not reunited with Greater Russia. The strategic advantage is obvious.

          • aleksandar says:

            TTG
            Yes.
            But with his population reduced to 29/30 millions, his industrial sector in shamble, 174 $ billions debt, the loss of Novorussia and Malarussia, the richest regions, all remaining territories at range of Russian ARTY, drones and missiles and nobody to help them, Ukraine will have others priorities than war.
            A new Korean style DMZ I guess.

  8. English Outsider says:

    The chain-smoking Russian Colonel has made another appearance. Frustratingly slow translation but there’s a transcript provided I haven’t yet checked out.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGWw9M1W1t0&ab_channel=DialogueWorks

    Preliminary impressions:-

    Not enough about the sanctions war. That was more important than the military side. “If you won’t talk to Mr Putin and Mr Lavrov, you’ll have to talk to Mr Gerasimov and Mr Shoigu” is all very well, but the crucial talking was done by Miss Nabiullina.

    On the military side, too brief an account of the period just before the SMO. What is said goes with the view that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a pre-emptive attack. Warding off what could have been an impossibly messy Kiev incursion into the Donbass.

    Infuriatingly brief account of the all-important period, February – March 2022. He’s said more on that period in earlier interviews but still very short of detail. Confirms information that’s trickled out since from the Ukrainian side. This was a brief campaign that will be studied in the military colleges for years as an example of how to do the maximum with the minimum.

    Also a key section that illustrates how the Russians do war. Plan for all possible outcomes while aiming for the best. This many pronged approach is I think foreign to our own militaries, who start off with “the plan” but are lost if that plan gets knocked off course. Also a holistic approach, if that doesn’t sound too jargony, that takes into account the diplomatic, political and economic side as well as what’s done at the front.

    Also touches on what’s been obvious since 2022. The Russians focus on avoiding casualties and did not fall into the trap of attempting to take the entire country. Severely logical. They were facing a very large army and all the equipment NATO could give that army. Sit back after the first brief Blitzkrieg and let all the West could throw at them come to them to be destroyed, rather than chasing around the country taking casualties in the guerilla war all in the West assumed they would be facing. And hold most of the force in reserve in case it turned into full direct conventional war with the West.

    Glosses over the fault lines revealed by the Prigozhin episode. Whatever else he was up to, Prigozhin gave a voice to the many Russians who are impatient with the deliberate and careful way this war is being conducted. They want a quick victory followed by a big clean up of the oligarchs, and of corruption and maladministration within Russia. Colonel Trukhan omits reference to the tensions this created, and still does create I think.

    He debunks our favourite myths about the military evolutions seen, putting the various back and forth adjustments to the front line in much needed perspective. Also lets our military know – did they really need reminding? – that storming major cities is a casualty heavy operation and an operation that leads to great numbers of civilian deaths.

    Maybe they do need reminding. One of the big surprises of the war was how wet behind the ears the NATO military is when it comes to understanding how operations on any scale need to be conducted. The “Summer Offensive”, Krynki, Radakin’s fooling around in the Black Sea, and last and worst the incredible Kursk incursion, will also be studied in military colleges in the future as copybook examples of how not to do it.

    All that, though, is already well trodden ground. The part I listened to with particular attention was the end. We still don’t know how the Russians will solve the puzzle of remnant Ukraine. I can’t say Trukhan gives us many clues on that. Nor does he go into the other question that’s been staring us Europeans in the face since 2022. Will the Russians impose reverse sanctions afterwards?

    Seems to be a minor question right now, as we focus more on digesting the looming defeat and start getting used to the savage cost in lives we’ve let our proxies in for. But none of the European economies are in great shape just now and that question of reverse sanctions might just become important later.

    Something of a contrast to Admiral Kirby, this Colonel, and not in the Admiral’s favour. Kirby’s all gloss and PR and information war. Not a lot of gloss about the chain-smoking Trukhan and he’s more interested in fact than spin. Though there was some spin there too, every now and again.

    Couldn’t make out one of the last exchanges. “A discussion in Hell.” A wry allusion to the Wagner “Best in Hell” film? Just to show we’re playing for real?

    • aleksandar says:

      EO
      About Russian planning.

      I have seen some of them, Plan from WII, during the 90′ when we have some good relationship with Russian and it was amazing.
      We have a general framework to adapt for each mission and at the end only one operational plan.

      They planned for everything down to brigade level.
      I remember they have maybe 4 or 5 complete plans for each kind of mission ready to use with minor adjustment.

      When I asked to my Russian counterpart: Why so much plans ?
      He smiled and said : We play chess and we love plan.

      • TTG says:

        aleksandar,

        Back in 1980 during our Infantry Advanced Course, we had to Egyptian colonels who went through all the Soviet military schooling. One was a hero of the Battle of Chinese Farm who stopped the Israeli armor advance with a battalion sized fire pocket. We were being sold the idea of forward defense/mobile defense. We depended on TOW systems to attrit Soviet armor constantly moving them back to maintain stand off distance as the Soviet formations advanced. We all had our doubts and we asked those Egyptian colonels about it. They didn’t think it would stand up against the expected Soviet advances supported by massive artillery. This was long before the idea of Deep Battle.

        • aleksandar says:

          My first Kriegspiel back 80′ when I was a young captain.
          More simple !
          General mission framework : OTAN unable to stop The Red Army.
          Then delay advance, cross the Rhine, tactical nuclear strikes if they try to cross the Rhine, and if necessary strategic nuclear strikes.
          We discovered years later, that the Soviets plan never intended to cross the Rhine to avoid a nuclear war.

  9. elkern says:

    Good news! Russia will collapse within 3-4 Friedman Units!

  10. English Outsider says:

    A Scotsman looks at Trump:-

    “Trump has promised the American people that he will not send their sons and husbands to fight in foreign wars – as, he claims, Kamala will do if she becomes president. And I don’t think he will: now that’s a rare bit of speculation from me. But Trump is a populist politician and his supporters would feel betrayed if he did such a thing. So what! – you might say. Once elected Trump could simply dump his supporters and ignore their wishes. But I don’t think he would or could do that and live with himself. Trump loves being adored – we all know that. Therefore, he would not cope well if his supporters started having a go at him – but I could be wrong.

    “Some say that Trump will be harder on Iran and the Palestinians, others say he will be no different than Kamala. I must say that I am a little concerned about Trump’s connections to Israel and his election commitment to supporting them 100%. But we have to appreciate that for the sake of votes – and maybe money – this commitment may be prudent for someone wanting to win an election. Trump’s number one priority given that he wants to save America (or has been chosen to save America) must be to win. I am trying to look at it from his point of view. When in office, he may be more critical of Netanyahu and I don’t think he will want a war with Iran. According to a report in RT, Trump has told Netanyahu privately to end the war before inauguration day. Trump also criticised the attacks on civilian targets in Gaza. I hope he pulls in Tulsi Gabbard for military advice rather than the neo-cons and I hope he has learned from the past.”

    https://robcampbell.substack.com/p/ukraine-weekly-update-a32

    These are not the high hopes of 2016. Those melted away under Russiagate and the dogged obstruction of the Beltway. But if Rob Campbell’s hopes are realised even in part, we could see the United States coming back off the ropes.

    Europe with it? That was what I looked for in 2016. Older and wiser now.

  11. Jim. says:

    The Question..Here…Does Russia Face Military Collapse by 2026…?

    I Think This is a Very Well Prepared Piece By TTG..for Debate…With 25 Excellent or Good Answers…Depending on Expertise…(Russian Play Book) and/or Data..TTG..

    I am only a Career Analyst/CSI Operator..Exploring Global Events..History..and Religion..And Current and Past Global Leaders…Policys ..and Out comes.. I Learn From Each of You…Col.Lang was Amazing and TTG ..Wears His Own Boots Well..

    My Opinion on This…I Dont Believe Russia Will Collapse..Its Not in Thier DNA..or
    in Historical Fact….I Think Its Possible Donald Trump Will Get Elected..If so..He Will Not Allow It…Ukraine will Lose its…Nerve…And The World is Demanding a Peace Maker…Im sure a Dniper Line is Possible..

    Trump May Likely Let Israel Have their Way With Iran..No Conditions..

    Trump May Likely Terminate the Hutties..and Protect Shipping.. He May Negoiate China Deals without Use of Force or Tarrifs..They Know What He Will Do.. But a Blockade for Taiwan may Be Possible.. I Think We may alot alot of Project X
    and Skunk Works Exposed For the Next Generation Transition…Current Events and
    Global..Ecological Events Will Demand Speed and Action…
    Best Regards
    Jim

    • aleksandar says:

      Sorry Jim but terminate the Houthis is militarily impossible unless you nuke them.

      • Jim. says:

        You Can Terminate By Starvation…Aleksander..Demand
        and No Supply….(Smile)….The Fact is…Israel Recently
        Began An Effective Raid on The Hen Houses..and Fried
        Most of Eggs…and Will Probably Do it Again. Soon
        .Its a WAR….People….Not Potatoes…

        You Can Have Trillion Dollar Wars,,Space Programs…
        Social Services For Out Landers..Non Citizen’s..Two Trillion
        American Dollars…To Maintain…’ Liberation Theology”

        Anyhow…I have a Revelation.,,,This Chapter Will close.
        Like a Book of Destiny..and The Last Chapter…Will Manifest.
        Destiny..
        Jim

  12. Fred says:

    “Ukraine will never be neutral ”

    I can find no perpetual obligation for America to do anything for Ukraine in our constitution. Perhaps another completely safe and secure election, or another series of summers of George Floyd, will give them four more years of money to launder.

    • Yeah, Right says:

      For any country neutrality is just one regime-change away.
      As, of course, is the reverse: any neutral country can be “turned” by a good coup.

      I find it very difficult to believe that when the smoke clears that Zelensky’s government – or its likeness – will still be in power in Kiev.

      But not just a change of government, but a change of ruling-regime.

      After all, who in 2008 would have thought that by the time 2024 rolls around Georgia would be criticized by the collective west for being too friendly towards the Russians?

    • English Outsider says:

      Fred – we in the West are still talking about Korean solutions and the like but in reality it’s terra incognita, how things will finally be resolved. Prediction pointless. Could all collapse next week. Could go on until well past the inauguration. Bits and pieces emerge but in reality we have little useful information on the state of affairs in remnant Ukraine.

      The Russians have. They are all over the place as far west as Lvov. There is some sort of resistance providing them not only with real time information on where and when to strike in the rear areas, but also information on the state of public opinion in the various parts of the country. So they’ll know better than we can which way the cat’s going to jump.

      We can take as a given that the Russians don’t want to occupy the entirety of the country unless they have to. They want to end up with a neutral remnant Ukraine, one released from the domination of the ultras and no longer usable by us as a base for further destabilisation activities. But precisely how they’re going to achieve that they probably don’t know for sure yet and we don’t know at all.

      In the meantime there’s still more grinding to be got through. The heavy duty ultras look to be gun shy, most of them. More likely to clear out to Poland or Germany than stick around to be killed. The Russians will want them dead or gone before the end stage. And there still seems to be plenty of our equipment to be disposed of. Quite a few of our mercs and advisers too. I don’t believe the Russians much care how long that’ll take.

      • Fred says:

        EO,

        The North Koreans engaged in war against the South, they were backed by China and the USSR. That armistice served to prevent enlargement of the war into a global one against those powers. I’m sure the London bankers and the EU would love to entangle the US into bleeding itself dry while they rake in the bond revenue for funding Zelenski’s government and buying all the reconstruction rights. No thanks.

        • English Outsider says:

          Fred – we need a Dr North to disentangle the various strands in the Berlin/Brussels muddle that is the EU. Some time ago I copied to Colonel Lang’s site Dr North’s examination of the EU’s part in the events that led to the Maidan. In my own view Mrs Merkel/Lady Ashton played a considerably more significant role in those events than even Mrs Nuland was to do later.

          But that’s a difficult subject for most Americans to get to grips with. To them, mostly, “Europe” is a sort of blur and they are as little aware of its internal dynamics as they are of the internal dynamics of China. But I believe you have seized upon the main point. That Berlin/Brussels was hoping to use the military and financial power of the United States in order to achieve its regional objectives.

          So far from being the passive object of the policies of the neocons currently in power in the US, as so many Americans insist, in the Ukraine the EU was pursuing foreign policy objectives independent of US foreign policy objectives and, ultimately, quite opposed to those US objectives.

          But using American power to achieve those EU objectives!

          And now that American power has proved entirely inadequate to the task of defeating Russia the Europeans are left high and dry. The US can feed and fuel itself so can walk away from the fiasco in Ukraine, as we have been seeing it doing, without fearing serious damage. Not so we Europeans.

          • A Portuguese Man says:

            I find it hard to believe that the assortment of utter dullest of dull mediocrities that display themselves as ruling the European so-called Union could gather the wits or attempt the foreseeing required for such an enterprise.

            Pardon my French, but they’re all a bunch of wankers.

            Perhaps they were, in aristotelic terms, the efficient cause, but I very much doubt they were the final cause.

            For that they would require some sort of spinal cord.

            I cannot express how much I despise these people.

    • Al says:

      Fred, you must have missed agreement that Britts, USA, aRussia guaranteed protection of Ukraine for giving up Ukraine’s nuke weapons….the 3rd largest amount of nukes, only behind USA and Russia.

      But then Putin rejected the agreement.

      • Fred says:

        Al,

        That agreement was worth the paper it was written on. As the endless expansion of American war obligations in Eastern Europe show. Putin wasn’t there to negotiate it, nor did he reject it. The Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine got a few decades of Western money, then Mrs. Cookie and the National Endowment for Democracy decided to do Barack’s favorite thing: Regime Change.

        • Al says:

          Fred, Putin rejected…he claimed the previous RUSSIAN govt, not his, made the deal.

          • Fred says:

            Al,

            Sure! What piece of paper was that non-expansion of NATO that the prior Russian government agreed too written on?

          • TTG says:

            Fred,

            The non-expansion of NATO was never a written agreement. The agreement guaranteeing “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” signed by Russia, the US and England was the Budapest Memorandum signed on 5 December 1994. Both France and China signed similar agreements respecting the sovereignty of Ukraine.

        • leith says:

          Fred –

          A million Ukrainians took to the streets to protest abuse of power and corruption when Yanukovych dumped a Parliamentary vote of 315 out of 349 for European integration. Instead he got some payola from the Gay Hussar in the Kremlin for closer ties to Russia. Parliament removed him shortly after that by a vote of 328 out of 349, somewhere just short of 94 percent.

          But you’re still calling out the Maidan Revolution as US backed regime change. It’s sad to see that Brandolini’s Law still rules the internet. Getting worse actually. Exactly how many cookies do you reckon it took to influence those Parliamentary votes and the million protesters?

          • Fred says:

            Leith,

            How many dollars were funneled there via NGOs? Perhaps the dogs on the internet can tell us. It is still not our affair nor should we spend a dollar or a life on one of the most corrupt nation on the European continent. I believe the completely honest and ethical government in power and all the corporations whose integrity they ensure were right to hire all those sons of American politicians. Including that artist son of the man who had to be removed from the campaign due to Democracy’s need for diversity. Which will probably get ushered in good and hard in 24 hours.

          • Yeah, Right says:

            leith: “Parliament removed him shortly after that by a vote of 328 out of 349, somewhere just short of 94 percent.”

            What was reason given for even having that vote, leith?

            After all, one would assume that a President can’t be removed on a no-confidence vote, so there has to be some reason by which that President is incapable of performing their duty.

            Care to name what that reason was?

            (BTW, the 328 out of 349 is misleading, since 115 parliamentarians were too scared to be present that day).

          • TTG says:

            Yeah, Right,

            Yanukovych fled Ukraine and ended up in Russia. The Verkhovna Rada voted to remove him for “withdrawing from his constitutional duties.”

          • leith says:

            Fred –

            Which NGOs are you talking about and how much of you bankroll are they using in Ukraine?

            “When you look at Europe as a whole, Russia is the country plagued by financial crime the most, according to Transparency International, scoring 26 out of 100 and placing 141st out of 180.”

            In that same Transparency International scoreboard Ukraine places 104th, much cleaner than Russia. And they improved over last year while Russia’s numbers have gotten worse.

            Hungary consistently ranks among the most corrupt European countries according to various scoreboards.

            Greece has the worst dirty money problem, with 98% of citizens saying corruption was widespread there. Next came Portugal and Malta, with 96% and 95% respectively.

            Albania?

            Kosovo?

      • English Outsider says:

        Both the Americans and the Russians were very pleased to get those nukes in Ukraine out. It was a time when both were hoping to rein back nuclear proliferation. The Ukrainians didn’t have the codes but it was still considered important to get the nukes out of their hands.

        Good thing they did. I doubt any of the parties to the agreement considered at the time the likelihood of a coup that placed a dangerous extremist government in power in Kiev. Nukes in the hands of white supremacists committed to exterminating the Untermenschen would have been a worry.

        As it is there’s risk enough with Kiev, using Western weapons and targeting, shelling and droning nuclear power stations. It was actions like that, and the danger of the use of dirty bombs, that lead one to hope the Russians would get the Ukrainian mess cleared up as soon as possible. As the Black Sun crowd in Kiev play out their version of the last days in the bunker the last thing we want is them getting their hands on nuclear materials.

        What the lunatics in Washington and Berlin/Brussels/Westminster are doing not only condoning but assisting with such dangerous ploys is plain risky. They want another Chernobyl? What with supporting to the hilt genocide and ethnic cleansing in the ME, and deliberately risking environmental disaster with dirty bombs and attacks on NPP’s in the Ukrainian theatre, “lunatics” is the only term that fits them. Time people woke up and realised what the governments of the West are doing in their name.

  13. Fred says:

    “As Russia Advances, U.S. Fears Ukraine Has Entered a Grim Phase”
    .
    .
    .
    “American military and intelligence officials have concluded that the war in Ukraine is no longer a stalemate as Russia makes steady gains, and the sense of pessimism in Kyiv and Washington is deepening.”

    NYT on Friday. https://archive.is/avbh1#selection-4565.0-4565.63

  14. walrus says:

    This argument describes a state of affairs that is never going to be allowed to exist by Russia.

    when they use the word “existential” , i think they mean it
    .
    By that I mean that a nice tight NATO cordon around Russia will not be permitted to exist.

    Ukraine will exist as a buffer state or not at all.

    Arguing otherwise imitates the Japanse expectation that the U.S. would seek terms after Pearl Harbor.

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