"In the post-Cold War world, small countries often get into fights they can’t finish — hoping that big powers will come to their rescue. That happened in the 1990s with Bosnia and Kosovo, which hoped their desperate vulnerability would force Western intervention, as it eventually did. On the other side, the Serbs played the same game, hoping (wrongly, as it turned out) that Russia would intervene. The better part of wisdom sometimes is to tell small, embattled nations and ethnic groups: Swallow your pride and compromise; the cavalry isn’t coming to save you.
There’s a moral problem with all the pro-Georgia cheerleading, which has gotten lost in the op-ed blasts against Putin’s neo-imperialism. A recurring phenomenon of the early Cold War was that America encouraged oppressed peoples to rise up and fight for freedom — and then, when things got rough, abandoned them to their fate. The CIA did that egregiously in the early 1950s, broadcasting to the Soviet republics and the nations of Eastern Europe that America would back their liberation from Soviet tyranny. After the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, responsible U.S. leaders learned to be more cautious, and more honest about the limits of American power.
Now, after the Georgia war, McCain should learn that lesson: American leaders shouldn’t make threats the country can’t deliver or promises it isn’t prepared to keep. The rhetoric of confrontation may make us feel good, but other people end up getting killed." Davod Ignatius
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Countries, empires and revolutionary movements of various kinds have always struggled with each other. It appears to be inherent in human nature that people like to array themselves in rival groups. What were the Warsaw Pact and NATO but such groups?
Unfortunately, there is little interest today in what history can teach. This seems to be because the "scientific" view of the human experience holds that man has "moved on" and is now a different beast than he was a few centuries ago. IMO, humans and their societies are essentially unchanged in the period of recorded experience. That experience indicates that inter-group struggle along a wide spectrum of activity from; agitation through political organization to guerrilla war to armored combat to nuclear war continues to be the reality of human existence and the essence of international relations. That continuing reality points to the always present danger of creeping escalation in such struggle from one point on the scale of activity to another until the ultimate category of nuclear war is reached. Given the number of nuclear "players" there is a danger of reaching that "stage" among countries like Pakistan, India, Iran (someday) etc. Nevertheless, it is the possibility of escalation of struggle between Russia and the United States that remains by far the most dangerous feature of international relations. The avoidance of escalation between these powers must be the principal concern of the wise.
The Russians and the United States both still possess many thousands of deliverable warheads of varying size. An "exchange" between the two countries would result in something like one hundred million dead. This bedrock consideration is too little discussed. The possibility of such a thing should impose a certain caution.
It is one thing to help a country or cause surreptitiously. The more covertly that assistance is offered, the less the danger of general war because of it. The traditional "safety valve" built into such projects is the willingness to abandon the effort (and the client) if the risks become too great. "Plausible deniability" is the story built into the project that allows the sponsor to abandon the effort rather than be trapped into deadly confrontation with a major power. When that mechanism breaks down, there is great danger abroad in the world. I leave it to the reader to provide his own examples of times when this has happened in all its variations.
With the neocon Jacobins and their man, McCain, we have something that purports to approach that possibility differently. Addicted to idea of the "power of the will," they seem to be willing to apply bravado and bluff as a basic operating principle in policy. When confronted with overwhelming brute force, their reaction seems to be to "up the ante" with more and more hostile rhetoric and gestures.
This is a very dangerous game when played against a psychologically challenged opponent armed with a thermonuclear strike ability. States, movements and coalitions have emotionally laden trigger points that can initiate processes impossible to halt. Often these processes work themselves out in ways that political scientists would label "irrational."
We should all be more careful. pl
Sir John Keegan’s book “On War” discussing the motives and pyschology of warfare historically and is in essential agreement with this post. The factor you mentioned, atomic/nuclear strike capability is still unknown as to whether it has altered man’s predilections. Let’s hope so but my guess is the 21st Century will see the arrival of at least the third atomic/nuclear attack. The real history of the post WWII Century appears to be almost certain to have been dominated by weapons proliferation of all types, including atomic/nuclear. So much for US leadership and competence in the certainty of the weighing of history.
A former US president once advised “to speak softly and carry a big stick.” But today, we do strictly the opposite.
It is quite a sorry spectacle to see McCain’s knee-jerk rhetoric when our “assistance” to the Georgians consists of… a few boxes of medical supplies.
The most distressing is that while McCain thinks he is scoring points at home, our adversaries and competitors abroad have all surely taken note.
Just wait for the backlash…
Col. Wouldn’t an exchange of nukes between U.S. and Russia cause significantly more than 100 mil. deaths?
To support the colonel’s reasoning I still remember my grandfather saying the americans spoke out loud to us to reach for freedom and let us down in silence when we did.
Well, I sincerely doubt that the McCain rhetoric on Georgia is going to turn “more careful”, Col. Lang and I’ll bet you don’t think it will either.
This latest development with Russia is going to be presented as the reason for more “strength”—i.e. bellicose boneheaded rhetoric, to be followed up with increasing escalation of confrontation with Russa in Cheney Neocon Admin 2.0. It will be turned into a major theme of the 2008 campaign–who will be “stronger” against the now “evil” Russians.
There is no steam valve or off ramp in the way these neocons present things, and the American militarist people take it for granted that militarism solves all “problems”—yes, even now!
We can’t learn the lessons of the past five years, let alone the “early Cold War”.
Colonel,
Excellent post.
Today listening to Secretary Rice crowing about the missile defense system in Poland, I couldn’t help but to have a shiver of fear. Russia is quite capable of destroying every city in America. It is the height of irrationality to deny this fact and continue to antagonize it for no good reason except to elect John McCain.
One of the (several) frightening aspects about what passes for foreign policy with the neocons is that they don’t seem to be able to distinguish between the Russians and the Iraqis.
That may be because, untouched by any experience with ground truth, many of them were the people in the foreign policy establishment during the twilight years of the Reagan Administration who were busily coming up with the doctrine of “winnable” nuclear war.
They’re going to get us all killed if we’re not careful.
Increasingly, it looks like McCain will win. I cannot imagine a greater disaster for the US and the world. Honestly. Hagee’s dream of mushroom clouds.
Habakkuk mentioned the word “dread”. I second that description and even suggest the possibility of another one. It is what Claude Devereaux in Col. Lang’s novel experienced from time to time — despair.
Sort of wonder if Hillary would have made a better run at this time in history but it is what it is. If she had won, then in a few years, she could have passed on the Democratic baton to Obama who would have gained in experience.
But maybe I am wrong. Sure hope so.
If McCain does win, then perhaps Democrats will at long last become frantic and try to curtail the power of the executive. That’s the glimmer of hope but it is asking the Democrats to do something they have never done. If history is any indication, particulalry that of the last few years, Democrats like an overly centralized federal government and they like an imperial presidency.
And such a strategy of course comes from the playbook of Ron Paul, who has warned us of the structural defects that gave rise to an imperial, even facist, State. I did not vote for him but credit where credit is due. Younger voters seemed to have liked him and, from what I have read, he received more contributions from the USM than any other candidate during primary season.
<"honest about the limits of American power.">
Ignatius is right to raise this issue and I hope it emboldens his fellow journalists to same.
Also, excellent and sobering comment by Col. Lang on Ignatius’ piece. Haven’t thought about blast overpressures and CEP’s in a long while.
Col. : the leaders of the U.S. are treading on ground where even angels fear. Not much from Putin at the moment besides probably anger with the missiles in Poland. At least, I’m bettin’ that he is a more rational man than what leaders one has in the U.S. ‘ Tis true that when all you’ve got is a hammer ( military might ), every problem is a nail.
Russian responses to the New Cold War pushed by the US?
1. The Middle East with Assad’s visit to Russia as an indicator…
“Mr Assad made it clear that weapons sales would top the agenda when he met his Russian counterpart. “Of course military and technical co-operation is the main issue,” he said. “Weapons purchases are very important. I think we should speed it up. Moreover, the West and Israel continue to put pressure on Russia.”…
“The Russians are back heavily in the region, and they are looking to Syria because the other Arab states are following the American line,” said Attallah Rumheen, a professor in Damascus University’s media faculty. Like tens of thousands of Syrians, he graduated from a Russian university. Books on Marxism and Leninism, mainly in Russian, line his library wall.
“For the last decade, the Russians were squeezed in the Middle East; they saw their influence falling and being replaced by the Americans. That is now coming to an end.
“The Russians have money, their economy is strong, and they are united domestically. That is the opposite of the situation in the US.”
Mr Rumheen said he expected to see a new Cold War spreading across the Middle East as the two powers vie for supremacy.
“The situation is heading towards a new Cold War, with a new polarisation of areas under Russian and US influence,” he said. “The Americans and the Russians must start talking properly again, otherwise a return to the Cold War is inevitable. I think the Cold War will return. It will be slightly different from before, but the essence will be the same.”
““Like all countries, Syria is trying to advance and develop and for that it needs to be open to the world,” said Umran Zaubie, a political analyst and member of Syria’s ruling Baath Party.
“Syria wants to co-operate with the EU and has good relations with America, but the Americans have had sanctions against Syria and have tried to block our development. The Russians have not. For that reason, it is obvious which direction Syria must look.”
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080820/FOREIGN/696838560/1133
2. So, we have six months more of Bushism-Neoconism. Then the strong possibility of its continuation under McCain the self-proclaimed “Scoop” Jackson Republican (ie, Neocon).
In this eventuality, we should expect, as McCain’s statements indicate: 1) intensified push for a New Cold War with Russia and 2) continuing emphasis on Israel as a US global “strategic partner.”
Recent news:
Russia freezes military ties with NATO
Russian aircraft carrier group heading to Syria
Russians setting up bunkers and mortars around port town of Poti
Seems like the bear is everywhere in recent news.
I find that Arnaud de Borchgraves comments interesting.
“…the future of NATO, now at stake, not in Georgia, but in Afghanistan…”
He also quotes Anthony Cordesman
As Anthony Cordesman, one of the most astute geopolitical experts in the United States, wrote: “The fighting in Georgia [was] not a warning about some new drift into great power confrontation or a new Cold War. It is a reminder that the world is not shaped by democratic values, international law, good intentions, globalism, rational bargains, or the search for dialogue.”
The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ senior strategic scholar, Mr. Cordesman added: “All of these elements do play an important role, but the classic power politics are just as real as ever. Nation-states still have the guns and missiles. More powerful states will bend or break the rules when they feel it is in their interest to do so and when there is no opposing power bloc that can pose a convincing threat.”
Full Article here:
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/21/from-tbilisi-to-taliban/
The Jacobins have certainly gotten us into a Laurel and Hardy ‘Fine Mess’.
I would dearly have liked to have heard the late General W. Odom’s thoughts on the developments in Georgia and the Caucasus. He was a staunch opponent of the neocon madness.
I was found it very interesting that the language spoken in Ossetia is apparently from the Iranic language family.
http://www.cogsci.ed.ac.uk/~siamakr/Kurdish/map.jpg
S.D.
I think the apparent trend favoring McCain reveals a lot of scary aspects in our body politic, especially a lack of understanding of the fact that, if McCain “wins” it may really be that the “Neocons” will continue to pull the strings behind the scenes regardless of McCain’s presence, and that could portend a continuing erosion of everything.
While he harps upon Obama’s failure to recognize the “right decision” and “success” of the surge, this fails to recognize the “here today, gone tomorrow” realities of human affairs — note, for instance, Russia’s “peacekeeping” operation in Georgia.
The fact is, both candidates for President will, in large part, ultimately only be as successful as the quality of their appointed staffs and their effectiveness in overseeing them. This demands that the ideological environment and “bully-wimp” relationships reflected in the “W” era must be avoided at all costs.
To get out from the US newsmedia censorship-propaganda bubble, this is of interest:
“The principal conductor of the London Symphony Orchestra and artistic director of the Mariinsky Theatre, Valery Gergiev, has led a concert in Tskhinvali. The performance was staged next to the destroyed parliament building in the bombed-out capital of South Ossetia.”
For video of the performance and remarks by Gergiev:
http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/29339/video
Right now, for all intents and purposes, NATO is a paper tiger, with the exceptions of the French, Canadians, and British.
The idea that Afghanistan is some sort of NATO mission is a convienient lie to the foreign ministers of countries that have troops that simply take up space on a well guarded base in Kabul, Bagram, or Kandahar. As far as I know, the above nations I named are the only ones that can fight with zero restrictions. All the other nations in the “alliance” have restrictions placed on them that severely cripple any practical use. Examples include no patrols/fighting at night, no fighting except on the base (guard duty), or no fighting period (support).
I don’t understand the thrust of a number of comments here to the effect that this business in Georgia puts the U.S. in a huge mess or reflects some major blundering on its part or etc.
While of course it may present some challenges to the U.S. and while the U.S. may have made some mistakes as regards same, it seems to me at least that by far the clear, overwhelming and enduring significance of what’s happened is that it simply seems to have been a huge and maybe even a monumental blunder by Russia.
After all, what did it get for its little invasion? (Which might, after all, be seen as being its first real significant international “coming out” action after going tits-up in the form of the Soviet Union?)
Maybe—maybe—they’ll take or get little Ossetia and/or Abkhakzia. But in the meantime what have they gotten otherwise other than just absolutely confirming or inflaming the historic fear and hatred of it by its neighbors and Europe and etc. based on the idea that in its new form the new Russia is no different from the old Russia (or indeed the Soviet Union) in just fundamentally and essentially being a predatory imperialist power? And I don’t see how in the world this does anything but hurt Russia terribly and constrict it ever more in its relations with its neighbors to the use of mere force or threats of force. (Which would be serious enough alone, but is even more problematic for it given its now tremendously truncated—i.e., post-Soviet—form, and the massive expansion of NATO that has taken place all around it.)
I just read that before the invasion the clear majority of public opinion in Poland was very much against the installation of those NATO missiles, and that now, overnight, this has simply and absolutely switched 180 degrees in response. And I have no doubt that the same has also simultaneously occurred with the public opinion on in all of the Soviet Union’s former satellites—including not only those who already wanted to join NATO, but also those who maybe did not want to before but sure as hell will now. And it can hardly have helped the Russian image in Western Europe either, I can’t imagine.
So how does this do anything but get Russia the eternal thanks of the Ossetians in exchange for fanning the always and anyway just-underneath-the-surface fear of its neighbors about its fundamental nature? And how does it do anything other than make its beneficial relations with those neighbors—including its immensely food and oil-rich ones—ever more dependent on exercises of mere raw power? And this at a time when Russia’s raw power other than what it possesses with its nukes is hardly very impressive.
Not smart I don’t think. Indeed, a huge huge blunder on Russia’s part that I suspect will haunt it for at least a decade or more and seriously constricts its freedom of future action. Maybe even so much of a blunder that it’ll make the U.S.’s blunder in Iraq look like a mere hiccup.
Cheers,
1. Pat Buchanan talks straight about Randy and the Neocons and McCain in his national column:
“Now Scheunemann is the neocon agent in place in McCain’s camp.
“The neocons got their war with Iraq. They are pushing for war on Iran. And they are now baiting the Russian Bear.
“Is this what McCain has on offer? Endless war?
“Why would McCain seek foreign policy counsel from the same discredited crowd that has all but destroyed the presidency of George Bush?
“Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence … a free people ought to be constantly awake,” Washington warned in his Farewell Address. Our Founding Father was warning against the Randy Scheunemanns among us, agents hired by foreign powers to deceive Americans into fighting their wars. And none dare call it treason.”
2. TIME magazine honestly and boldly reports on Israeli military aid to Georgia:
“the impression that Israel had helped bolster the Georgian military was one the Israeli Foreign Ministry was anxious to avoid…”
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1834785,00.html
3. Doug Bandow reviews Bacevich on new book:
“If there is one principle that seems to mark neoconservative thought, it is that there are no limits to American power. So long as the American people are united, so long as they exhibit the necessary will, world domination will come naturally, even effortlessly. Anyone dissenting from this consensus obviously is a defeatist or traitor, someone who hates America and blames America first, who hopes to see American forces defeated on the battlefield….”
“The pervasive unreality underlying U.S. foreign policy is evident in the Bush Administration’s and especially John McCain’s pronouncements regarding Russia and Georgia. Over the last couple decades the U.S. has bombed, invaded, occupied, and/or vanquished Grenada, Panama, Haiti (twice), the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq (twice), creating the illusion of invulnerability. So it was only natural when Russia responded with overwhelming force against Georgia’s foray into South Ossetia that Washington attempted to order Moscow about. Indeed, the U.S., still occupying Iraq and having recently detached Kosovo from Serbia, proceeded to lecture Russia on its responsibilities to respect state sovereignty and Georgia’s territorial integrity, and not to invade other nations.”
http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=13336
4. Veteran journalist Eric Margolis opines on Condi’s little Caucasian war (remember Neocon-ish Madeleine’s little Balkan war? Condi as Madeleine wannabee):
“The Bush administration appears to have pulled off its latest military fiasco in the Caucasus. What was supposed to have been a swift and painless takeover of rebellious South Ossetia by America’s favorite new ally, Georgia, has turned into a disaster that left Georgia battered, Russia enraged, and NATO badly demoralized. Not bad for two days work. …If not directly behind Georgia’s invasion of South Ossetia, Washington had to have been at least fully aware of Saakashvili’s plans. The Georgian Army was trained and equipped by US and Israeli military advisors stationed with its troops down to battalion level. ..Who in Bush’s or Cheney’s office approved this stupid adventure? Why did the very smart Israelis get sucked into this imbroglio?
“…Amazingly, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a supposed Russian expert, even publicly assured Saakashvili that the US would “fight” for Georgia. Washington’s latest fiasco falls squarely into her lap.
” ..President George Bush, VP Dick Cheney and Sen. John McCain all resorted to table pounding and Cold War rhetoric against Russia. McCain, whose senior foreign policy advisor is a neoconservative and was a registered lobbyist for Georgia, demanded that the US and NATO “punish” Russia and put it into diplomatic isolation.
Unfortunately, the indignant John McCain’s could not even properly pronounce “Abkhazia.”…
“America’s neocon amen chorus demanded a confrontation with Russia, chanting their usual mantras about Munich, appeasement and the myths of World War II….
The US’s most important foreign policy concern is keeping correct relations with Russia, which has thousands of nuclear warheads pointed at North America. Georgia is a petty sideshow. US missiles in Poland and radars in the Czech Republic are a dangerous, unnecessary provocation that is sowing dragon’s teeth for future confrontation.”
http://www.lewrockwell.com/margolis/margolis120.html
5. On this last point on US missiles in Poland, former Senator Sam Nunn has just pointed out that in his view the commitments of the US to Poland under the new defense treaty EXCEED our commitment under the Nato Treaty. I haven’t read the fine print, but if this is true, this is an extraordinarily reckless move by the White House and the Senate should reject the treaty. [If it is in treaty form and placed before the Senate]. Was someone trying to lock us into a 1939 situation parallel to the British and French guarantees to Poland so as to automatically trigger a world war??? The Nato Treaty allows a measure of flexibility in policy.
Clifford Kiracofe,
You have probably already seen the article in the NYT headed ‘U.S. Sees Much to Fear in a Hostile Russia.’
The opening paragraphs:
‘The president of Syria spent two days this week in Russia with a shopping list of sophisticated weapons he wanted to buy. The visit may prove a worrisome preview of things to come.
‘If Russia’s invasion of Georgia ushers in a sustained period of renewed animosity with the West, Washington fears that a newly emboldened but estranged Moscow could use its influence, money, energy resources, United Nations Security Council veto and, yes, its arms industry to undermine American interests around the world.
‘Although Russia has long supplied arms to Syria, it has held back until now on providing the next generation of surface-to-surface missiles. But the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, made clear that he was hoping to capitalize on rising tensions between Moscow and the West when he rushed to the resort city of Sochi to meet with his Russian counterpart, Dmitri A. Medvedev.’
(See http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/world/europe/22policy.html?th&emc=th.)
Payback time for Israel perhaps, among other things?
Actually, the article puts things rather stupidly. The Russian economy, although it has been growing, is still a fraction of the size of the American, let alone the combined economies of NATO. What the Russians are clearly not going to do is repeat the catastrophic overinvestment in the military of Soviet times.
The least worst reconciliation of the competing demands of avoiding getting involved in a ruinous arms race and also avoiding been left hopelessly vulnerable to U.S. military power is a combination of reliance on nuclear deterrence and attempting to finance weapons development by exports.
Many of their natural export markets are countries which, like them, are trying to find counters to American (and/or Israeli) military power without bankrupting themselves.
So far, the Russians have been restrained — as over the sale of the Iskander to Syria — by concern not to antagonize the U.S. But if appeasing the U.S. gets them nowhere, why not be hung for a sheep as a lamb?
There is also an excellent article by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett entitled ‘Wrong on Russia’ on the National Interest Online site. It brings out well what I take to be two fundamental facts:
‘Moscow continues to view partnership with America, and the West more generally, as their country’s best strategic option. But this partnership, from a Russian perspective, must entail give and take, not simply acquiescence to American dictates and unilateral U.S. initiatives.’
(See http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=19606.)
The Leveretts also bring out the fundamental fact that European energy dependence on Russia is increasing, and that the notion that there are simple ways of escaping this is patent nonsense.
For this among other reasons, there are deep doubts in much of ‘old Europe’ about American policy towards Russia. You could in the end be left with very friendly Poles, but Germans and French who have no confidence in you whatsoever. Meanwhile, you will have no non-military options against Iran — and if you choose to exercise the military option, you (and we) may be left trying to fight a war in Afghanistan without supply routes.
Even in Britain, where in general we prefer replaying DVDs of old second world movies to thinking, there are some deep underlying anxieties emerging.
David Habakkuk:
Excellent commentary, as always! Thanks so much for your thoughts here.
And about this:
The Leveretts also bring out the fundamental fact that European energy dependence on Russia is increasing, and that the notion that there are simple ways of escaping this is patent nonsense.
As autumn and winter arrive, those nonsensical beliefs have a way of disappearing when confronted with the importance of Russian supplies of oil and gas to the personal and economic desires of Europeans, e.g., staying warm or simply having a job.
Time, and the weather, are on the Russians’ side, as others who entertained imperial ambitions have learned the hard way.
Yeah but, guys …. Okay Russia’s got its oil card. But they can’t *drink* the damned stuff. So the use of it as a weapon or card or whatever is real limited, isn’t it? In fact using it to any big degree seems to me may very well hurt the Russians more than the Euros, and certainly so in the longer run.
The Russians wanna stop oil exports to Europe? Okay, Europe hurts some. Maybe more than just some, for awhile even. But what the hell does it do to the Russian economy? What would the Russian economy look like without its oil revenues? Can an entire economic system run on domestic vodka sales? And to boot it would just persuade the Euros to move ever more to other sources of oil, to defend the oil-rich former Soviet states all the more resolutely, to distrust the Russians more and more, to lessen the EU’s will to do favors for Russia, and on and on and on.
Russia has shot itself in the foot big-time with Georgia. Got itself a nothingburger (“Ossetia forever!”) in exchange for what? Raising if not confirming the historic huge fears of all its neighbors and Europe that it’s still its old, dangerous, imperialistic self that’s gotta be contained.
(Although, I hasten to add, that this don’t mean we should be cheering, and in fact we may well ought to be trying to figure out how to … invite the Russians somewhat out of the mess they’ve made for themselves without their losing face and getting even more knarly.)
Cheers,
P.S. And Clifford, how can missiles to Poland “exceed” our NATO obligation to Poland? The absolute central animating feature of NATO is its members’ mutual defense clause obligations. I.e., that all will regard the attack on one member by another (non-member) as an attack on oneself. Thus I’m confused.
Cheers again,
Great analysis from Joshua Landis. It’s consistent with the Habakkuk, Prof. K line of reasoning.
http://joshualandis.com/blog/?p=835
BTW, no one mentioned, best I can tell, that Russia has a rich historical connection to St. George as well.
David Habakkuk,
Yes, indeed. Flynt is quite correct. Europe and the United States need to develop constructive relations with Russia. So just what is preventing this?
How was the Russian economy developed in the 19th century? Through European investment: British, French, Belgian etc. Down to the Bolshevik seizure of power, Russia had growing economic development precisely BECAUSE of its extensive COMMERCIAL and FINANCIAL relations with Europe and the United States.
Let’s recall the excellent work of Count Witte, a truly great man. In my travel to Russia in the last decade, I have met many who recall Witte.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Witte
As I have pointed out in a different thread, the US had excellent relations with IMPERIAL Russia during the 18th and 19th century. We even bought Alaska from them. Yes, we had problems with the old Bolshevik masters of the Kremlin but since 1992 we are in the post-Soviet era.
We also need constructive relations with China. Which is to say we need the major powers — US, EU, Russia, China, Japan — to reach some arrangements. One can recall (whether we approve of disapprove) the Concert of Europe, as a mechanism of major powers for cooperation on matters of mutual interest. A “G-5” one might say. And this would mean dispensing with (or at least just ignoring) Bilderberg-ism, Cercle Pinay-ism, and Trilateral-ism which “permeate” certain elite circles around the globe.
Energy security is a core issue and cooperative arrangements can be made to everyone’s benefit and profit. I would like to see US corporations and financial institutions involved in Russia, China, Iran and wherever else they can make a profit and enhance America’s economic position in the world.
I will again emphasize, IMO the reason the United States and its foreign policy is in the situation we find today is owing to dangerous geopolitical fantasies which have permeated the foreign policy establishment both Republican and Democratic. Such neo-Mackinderish fantasies have been promoted in particular by Brzezinski and his circle as well as by the Neocons; and there is overlap…Wolfowitz having strongly endorsed Zbig’s “Grand Chessboard” book.
Isn’t the Neocon agenda, as we find it clearly expressed in Commentary Magazine and the Weekly Standard, for example, the following?
1) New Cold War with Russia in order to enhance Israel’s role in the Middle East and internationally as a global strategic partner of the US.
2) Isolation of Iran in order to prevent Iran becoming a rival to Israel and a balance to its design for regional hegemony.
3) Gradual building toward a New Cold War with China and even a shooting war.
This is where the United States are presently headed, IMO. This is not going to change until the pro-Israel Lobby, which dominates US foreign policy, is either shut down or at least brought very firmly to heel.
Some convictions in the present AIPAC spy case would help as would requiring AIPAC to register as a foreign lobby.
And as you indicate, there are problems in the British polity leading to support of the Neocon neo-imperial agenda. Which is to say there is a British Neocon factor which loops back to the US and to the extremist Right in Israel.
Once elected, just what is the next President of the United States going to do with the pro-Israel Lobby is the fundamental question, IMO.
Eisenhower circa 1956? [For which see, David Neff, Warriors at Suez. Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981].
If the answer is nothing, I would expect shifts over time in the global balance of power to America’s disadvantage.
Is it any wonder that Russia and China and others are clubbing together in the SCO? Is it any wonder that Japan and China are reaching certain understandings, including joint action on energy security?
Just how long are Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and Japanese going to go along with the American Cowboys, its Sheriff-in-Chief, and its Israeli posse?
Here is a thoughtful piece by Helena Cobban:
…”The global architecture that’s emerging will be very different from the cold war. That was a contest between two big powers with clashing visions of how the whole world should be organized, and it centered on a very costly – and risky – nuclear arms race. The emerging framework will probably be anchored by the three large powers and by four others (Europe, Japan, India, and Brazil). And in today’s more globalized world, raw military power has become much less important; economic and “soft” power, more so.
Here’s the good news: The interests of the world’s leading powers are deeply entwined. China and Japan hold large amounts of US debt; Russia supplies much of Europe’s energy needs; markets, investments, and production systems criss-cross national boundaries….”
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0822/p09s03-coop.html
“And I don’t see how in the world this does anything but hurt Russia terribly and constrict it ever more in its relations with its neighbors to the use of mere force or threats of force.”
There is a lot of truth in what you say. But on the other hand the russians cannot just sit back, let down their allies (again) and watch passively the USA encircling them.
Public opinion in most of eastern Europe would remain intrinsecally hostile to Russia regardless of what the russians would or would not do. And the american policymakers would not accept anything but unconditional surrender.
“The Russians wanna stop oil exports to Europe?”
They don’t, get it?
It is the possibility of such the strument of pressure. And in any case Russia isn’t the northern Saudi Arabia you seem to imagine.
“invite the Russians somewhat out of the mess they’ve made for themselves without their losing face and getting even more knarly”
That is not going to happen and was never going to happen. The US and its local allies have always been committed to encircle and put under the thumb Russia, regardless of what the russians would do.
TomB:
The Russians wanna stop oil exports to Europe? Okay, Europe hurts some. Maybe more than just some, for awhile even. But what the hell does it do to the Russian economy? What would the Russian economy look like without its oil revenues?
Russia’s total exports are in the neighborhood of a third of a trillion dollars, and that includes more than their exports of fossil fuel supplies. The Russian government already has twice that much in readily-accessible financial reserves in Russian banks, so they can survive reduced oil and gas exports for plenty long enough to cause serious troubles for Europe.
And if Russia stops exporting oil and gas to Europe, it will do a lot more than “hurt some”. Virtually no industrialized European country has any substantial fossil fuel reserves (save for hard-to-use German coal), and hence the “hurts some” could potentially include “thousands of citizens freezing to death”, which isn’t considered a great way to impress the voters.
Europe has precious little in the way of alternatives to Russian oil and gas supplies to work with, either. France gets a lot of its power from nuclear energy (tho the high fractions quoted often overstate the actual amount delivered, thanks to 2nd Law considerations), but that won’t help with automobiles or trucks, or process heat for industry, or even for heating homes and businesses on a large enough scale.
And France is the exception in Europe as far as developing alternatives to fossil fuels. Most of Europe’s industrial and agricultural heartland has become very dependent on Russian energy supplies, and if Russia controls the BTC pipeline (they already control virtually all others), then Europe will hurt from lack of supply much more than will Russia.
In the long run, the EU nations can wean themselves from these energy imports, but it won’t be cheap, and with recessions looming in many European nations, expensive new infrastructure for importing energy from other regions will be a tough sell.
The obvious solution for the Europeans is simply to treat the Russian nation and its government with the respect and dignity it deserves as an important player on the world stage. How hard would that be, compared to the alternatives?
<"The obvious solution for the Europeans is simply to treat the Russian nation and its government with the respect and dignity it deserves as an important player on the world stage.">
Cieran,
Precisely and that goes for us too. Mutually beneficial commercial relations can promote better overall relations and understanding. Economic autarky is an impossibility for any state. As I understand it, there are also pipelines to Europe from Algeria and from Libya.
TombB and All,
Per the Poland missiles issue, I found the Sam Nunn quote in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution 18 August which indicates his concern over commitments (very long URL):
“Just in the last few days, there was an article in the paper that said we had given Poland military assurances beyond the NATO commitments. That raises real questions for other NATO members. If one member has NATO plus further military assurances by the U.S., what does that say to the other NATO commitments? I don’t understand that one, and Congress needs to ask some real questions on this, because – if it’s accurate – we are basically committing to military action in instances that are rather unclear at this point.
“My point is that Russia and the U.S. are missing a fundamental opportunity and creating the possibility of real future conflict. Not immediate, but future conflict.”
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/shared-
blogs/ajc/politicalinsider/entries/2008/08/18/
nunn_on_the_russiangeorgian_co.html
Sidney Smith,
Note the Russian Order of St. George:
“The Order of St. George, Imperial Russia’s highest exclusively military order, was instituted in 1769 and came to be considered among the most prestigious military awards in the world, ranking just below the Order of St. Andrew the First Called. The order was awarded to officers and generals for special gallantry, such as, personally leading his troops in rout of a superior enemy force, or capturing a fortress, etc. Before membership in the Order could be granted, a candidate’s case had to be investigated by a council composed of Knights of the Order. The Order of St. George’s distinctive ribbon — three black stripes on an orange background — was so familiar and carried such prestige, that Stalin borrowed it for a military decoration during World War II, despite the fact that these were the traditional colors of the Romanov family. The order came in four classes, awarded sequentially for individual acts of gallantry. The highest classes were rarely awarded.The St. George’s Weapon was an additional award associated with the Order of St. George, though rarely given . An officer could be bestowed with a gold saber, inscribed “For Gallantry” and marked with a small enamel St. George cross and with the black and orange St. Geroge’s ribbon for the sword knot. High ranking officers, such as generals or admirals could receive the St. George’s Weapon with inset diamonds as an added distinction. The gold weapon was an independent award, not an extra class within the order, but holders of the golden weapon were considered holders of the order.”
“The Cross of Saint George. Associated with the Order of Saint George, but for enlisted men and NCO’s, the Cross of Saint George came in 4 classes. Like the Order of St. George, the St. George cross was awarded for acts of distinction under arms. An enlisted man or NCO would be awarded the 4th class cross for his first brave act. A second notable act could then bring him the 3rd class cross, etc. The first class and second class were in gold, the first class with a bow on the ribbon. The third and fourth classes were in silver, the third class marked by a bow. The ribbon was the same as for the order of Saint George.
Over two million Saint George Crosses were distributed during the Great War and before the abdication of the tsar., going to soldiers, nurses and members of the Red Cross. Commanders in the field could award the St. George Cross on the spot.”
“The St. George Medal. Awarded for merit in combat. Associated with the Order of St. George, but ranking below that of the the St. George Cross.
The St. George Medal came in four classes, like the cross. Gold medallions for 1st and 2nd class (shown). Silver medallions for 3rd and 4th. A bow on the ribbon denoted 1st class and 3rd.
The medal was awarded for merit to other Allied soldiers as well as Russians. British Corporal Waller, for instance, was awarded the St. George medal 1st class for his presumed role in shooting down German Ace Max Immelmann in June 1916.”
http://www.gwpda.org/medals/russmedl/russia.html
Marcello, Cieran, All:
Okay, yeah Marcello, I know that Russia don’t wanna stop its oil and gas exports, my comment to that effect was made rhetorically. Indeed my point is that I doubt it would do so in any big way at all since I think it would in the long run hurt Russia much more than it would hurt Europe.
Cieran: You’re right that Russia is doing better economically (lots better) than I thought, so thank you for the prod. Certainly since its financial meltdown in the late ’90’s it’s really done alot which is great. But it still owes a mountain of debt to the IMF alone (another way its pips could be squeezed), and the falling price of oil alone has gotta be hurting the hell out of it.
Moreover I think I’ve read that a full 40% or so of its *entire* GDP comes from its oil and gas sales, and more than 50% of its federal budget revenues come not from typical income or sales taxes, but instead from custom duties and taxes from its energy sector. And while of course, as you note their exports “includes more than their exports of fossil fuel supplies,” my recollection is that the latter constitute about 60% or so of all their foreign trade income.
Plus of course any trade war with the West would involve *more* than just their oil and gas, so by cutting off same to the West the West could then decimate even *more* than 60% of its foreign trade income and even more than 40% of its GDP.
Ergo, I continue to maintain that Russia’s oil weapon is a double-barrelled thing with a single trigger, with the one barrel admittedly threatening some significant damage for Europe, but the far bigger barrel aimed right back at Russia’s own forehead. Thus, I bet they don’t use it and indeed might not even want to suggest that they would.
(And I would note that I just saw a news report that since its invasion of Georgia Russia’s stock market took a good tanking and some huge amount of foreign investment capital there—on the order of tens of billions, which is a big deal for Russia—took hasty flight elsewhere, with such investment of course being extremely important to Russia given its particular circumstances lacking lots of tech ability and etc.)
——————————
Just to be provocative and to continue this fun and informative thread I’d also advance another thesis: That no, contrary to some of the comments and suggestions here, the West’s moves with NATO and otherwise vis a vis Russia have been very just and wise.
After all, THE question in the wake of the meltdown of the Sov. Union was whether the new Russia was going to be really new, or was it simply going to revert to old Russia’s (and Soviet Russia’s) expansionist ways?
But now, the argument can seem to go, no, for some reason that immense, horrible history somehow has to go down the memory hole, and we have to pretend that Russia is no different than Switzerland.
But what did Russia do after its empire fell? Did it immediately or even since ask for NATO membership thereby affirming it’s belief in the territorial integrity of its neighbors? Hardly. (Even though such membership would pose absolutely no problem whatsoever to Russia reaching a *peaceful* agreement for the reordering of borders with its neighbors if it wanted to try.)
Instead from the very get-go it opposed all expansion of NATO, with one strong strand of obvious logic therefrom being that no, in fact it certainly *doesn’t* respect that territorial integrity.
So of *course* it made sense to take precautions against Russian agression via expanding NATO and otherwise. And to call this a “humiliation” for Russia or etc. can seem a tough argument. It was, after all, Soviet Russia who for 50 years or so didn’t just humiliate an innumerable number of its neighbors, but crushed them absolutely, inflicted an absolute holocaust on many, and moved heaven and earth to stamp out their national characters.
Plus, just how is it “humiliating” anyway to do what NATO membership does which is merely to strengthen the territorial integrity of its members via its mutual self-defense clause?
That is, what is this argument saying? That somehow to avoid “humiliating” Russia the West has to tell it that it’s okay if it once again invades and crushes its neighbors?
Can sound a bit like what was tried with Hitler when Great Britain and France and etc. told him (without even inviting Czechkoslovakia to the meeting!) that it was just fine and dandy to go ahead and take the Sudeten.
And what of the “encirclement” of Russia by NATO moves and etc.? Well, hell, I think one could argue again with some reason, why do we have to ignore history? There’s a *reason* we aren’t encircling Lichtenstein or Australia, for example: They haven’t acted in the past as Russia has acted for a very very long time.
And it further strikes me that one could argue with a good deal of logic that unless one believes that somehow our “encirclement” *caused* Russia to invade Georgia, well what ELSE does that invasion show other than that indeed Russia still DOES have designs on its neighbors and that it is INDEED willing to use force to realize same?
So isn’t it a rather difficult argument to be saying that the West has been altogether way too suspicious of Russia’s aggressive impulses just now when … ta da … Russia has just got done proving that it does *indeed* still have those agressive impulses?
If anything it seems to me that those who pushed for the expansion of NATO can now claim some considerable prescience concerning their evaluation of how Russia would act in the wake of the Soviet implosion.
———
I dunno how much of the above argument stands up, but at least some it seems to me. And I’d again reiterate that I think this Georgia thing could be a real opportunity for the West. Of course it has to express its displeasure. (And of course I suspect that NATO membership for the Ukraine is now beyond question.) But what an opportunity to say to Russia “hey, how does Ossetia or the Ossetians or indeed any other land or people you covet really help you nearly so much as good relations and trade and investment and etc. with us helps you?”
E.g., put the arm on the Georgians to meet the Russians half-way on Ossetia and Abkhazia or at least deal with the Russians in good faith. Show Russia that it can indeed be a regular state of Europe. Hell, maybe even invite ’em to join NATO.
Might be a very good opportunity in fact given that if things were ever destined to get rough between the West and Russia, at least with this Georgia business so far it’s only been on a small scale that nobody has to lose face or big interest over.
Cheers,
TomB:
A couple clarifications from your note:
But it still owes a mountain of debt to the IMF alone (another way its pips could be squeezed), and the falling price of oil alone has gotta be hurting the hell out of it.
Russia doesn’t owe the IMF anything.
Russia cleared its problematic IMF loans years ago, and is now one of the world’s most important creditor nations. Its economic performance since its 1998 loan default days is one of the most spectacular national rags-to-riches stories in economic history.
Ergo, I continue to maintain that Russia’s oil weapon is a double-barrelled thing with a single trigger, with the one barrel admittedly threatening some significant damage for Europe, but the far bigger barrel aimed right back at Russia’s own forehead. Thus, I bet they don’t use it and indeed might not even want to suggest that they would.
Since Russia has already used that weapon (e.g., to punish the Czech republic for ABM deployment talks with the U.S.), you would very likely lose that bet!
And as far as energy supplies serving as as both a crisis and an opportunity, that is always the case for a nation that exports energy resources across territories beyond its control.
For example, one of the main threats to Russia’s economy comes from the possibility of terrorist attacks on its far-flung pipeline infrastructure, a low-cost form of warfare that is hard to stop without the Russian military do a lot of Iraq-style COIN operations abroad.
But that observation applies to any nation’s energy supplies (it even applies to U.S. Gulf oil production, with threats caused by weather), so there’s nothing inherently Russian about it.
Finally, about your assertion that the falling price of oil is hurting Russia…
I would suggest that your perceptions of the Russian government are about a decade stale, i.e., things are very different today than they were a decade ago when Russian bond defaults caused the LTCM debacle (which put at risk much of the U.S. financial sector).
Under Putin, Russia has put its economic house in remarkably good order. There is even a multi-billion-dollar rainy-day fund for use in hedging against oil prices falling to normal levels (and if I recall correctly, that stabilization fund was what was tapped to pay off the IMF debt, since oil prices haven’t been at normal levels for a long time!).
Russia’s government and its people have made some great decisions (and some great sacrifices) to insure that they aren’t ever again held hostage by international financial institutions, and their place in world economics is an important one, on a trajectory that is likely the exact opposite of that of the U.S.
In economics, ten years can be a long time…
Cieran,
‘The obvious solution for the Europeans is simply to treat the Russian nation and its government with the respect and dignity it deserves as an important player on the world stage. How hard would that be, compared to the alternatives?’
The answer is very much easier, and not simply from the point of view of energy security. If the disintegration of the Ukraine is to be averted, then this can either by the U.S. backing away from confrontation with Russia — or ‘old Europe’ distancing itself from the U.S.
Such a strategy was recently recommended by the veteran American foreign affairs commentator William Pfaff. Based in Paris for many years, he is both an American patriot and a good friend to Europe. He wrote:
‘Forget Washington and approach Russia with a proposal for a new and constructive relationship with Europe, with arbitration and resolution of its problems with Poland, Ukraine and Georgia in the same way that similar issues have been handled inside Europe. It would take a very brave Europe to do this, but the U.S. on its present course may leave it with little choice.’
(See http://www.williampfaff.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=336.)
On the question of energy dependence, an interesting issue is how far it is possible for Russia — looking longer term — to diversify its exports.
Discussing recent talks in Beijing between Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and his Chinese counterpart Vice Premier Wang Oishan in an article in Asia Times last month, the former Indian diplomat M.K. Bhadrakumar quoted a commentary in China Daily:
‘Without getting into details, China Daily merely took note of the talks as “a good beginning” and commented, “It seems that a shift of Russia’s energy export policy is under way. Russia might turn its eyes from the Western countries to the Asia-Pacific region … The cooperation in the energy sector is an issue of great significance for Sino-Russian relations … the political and geographic closeness of the two countries would put their energy cooperation under a safe umbrella and make it a win-win deal. China-Russia ties are at their best times … The two sides settled their lingering border disputes, held joint military exercises, and enjoyed rapidly increasing bilateral trade.”‘
(See http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JG30Ag01.html.)
In a slightly earlier article, Bhadrakumar noted the importance of diversification to the East in the energy diplomacy which Medvedev has been pursuing, if anything, even more robustly than Putin.
‘Soon after taking over in the Kremlin in May, Medvedev ordered the expeditious completion of the first stage of the Eastern Siberia Pacific Oil Pipeline (ESPO) by end-2009. The ESPO has a vital role in Moscow’s efforts to balance its oil export strategy between Europe and Asia-Pacific. Moscow hopes to target Asia-Pacific as the export destination for one-third of its oil exports by 2020, as compared to 3% currently.’
(See http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JG19Ag01.html.)
I simply do not know whether this degree of diversification is feasible within this timescale. But obviously, it is an issue with major geopolitical implications.
The Heritage Foundation (Washington DC) is an indicator of Republican Party Russia and Eurasia perspectives. Follow their house Russia “expert” Ariel Cohen at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/
Cohen can also be found at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. The well connected and well funded center is located in a very nice building in Jerusalem. I had the opportunity some years ago to exchange views there with its founder, the late Prof. Dan Elazar. Ambassador Dore Gold is the current head.
“Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security at The Heritage Foundation. He is a member of the Board of Advisers of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.”
http://www.jcpa.org/
<"or 'old Europe' distancing itself from the U.S.">
David Habakkuk, Cieran,
Pfaff is clear minded and realistic.
Yes, given the present political situation in the US, the logic is for “Old Europe” to reach the appropriate arrangements with Russia. Why? Their American partner is delusional and dangerous.
It may well become more evident to Americans irrespective of November, that the dominant neo-imperial faction in the foreign policy elite desires at this stage: 1) a new Cold War with Russia, 2) expansion of strategic cooperation on a global basis with Israel, 3) incremental moves to a new Cold War with China. The world at large already can see this.
Are Old Europeans going to be so stupid as to go along with this American agenda? Perhaps not over the long term…Bilderberg-ism and Cercle Pinayism being passe and no longer conducive to European interests.
Dr. Kiracofe:
I find your analysis here to be both thoughtful and accurate. And as far at this:
It may well become more evident to Americans irrespective of November, that the dominant neo-imperial faction in the foreign policy elite desires at this stage: 1) a new Cold War with Russia, 2) expansion of strategic cooperation on a global basis with Israel, 3) incremental moves to a new Cold War with China.
And with those desires financed by borrowing money from some of those same countries, to be paid back, with interest, by our children and grandchildren.
So when GOP talking heads refer to “family values”, it’s best to assume that those generational debts must be what they have in mind.
David Habakkuk:
Thanks for the William Pfaff link. It’s an excellent read.
And one point of clarification that I should have made on an earlier comment, but didn’t… when I wrote that Europe should treat Russia with due respect, I absolutely did not mean to imply that the U.S. need not follow the exact same advice.
We certainly should…
I’ve seen too much recent evidence in the corporate media of people living in the past re: the Russian nation. The Soviet Union was a dangerous foe, but Gorbachev was no Stalin, and eventually, we need to come to live in the present, not the past.
Heck, my favorite car and my favorite bike were both made in Japan. If we were to treat that great nation as if it still possessed the government it suffered under in WWII, the world (not to mention my garage) would be a greatly diminished place.
We’ve gotten past Hitler and Hirohito… it would be good to get past Stalin as well, and start living in the world that we inhabit instead of the world we fear that we inhabit.
IMO, Cieran makes a very important point vis a vis a new Cold War with Russia and China. They currently finance the US Treasury. I don’t believe we have as much flexibility as the neo-imperialists in both parties may lead us to believe. Note that the US Treasury will be going to these same “adversaries” hat in hand as they bailout Wall Street and the GSEs. And that goes for the Arabs too!
Maybe the epic battle in the future is going to be between the Department of Defense and the Department of the Treasury???
Personally, I think all the arm-chair imperialists and zionists who inhabit the DC think-tanks ought to “start living in the world that we inhabit” as Cieran suggests. They will have to sooner than later.
Zanzibar:
Maybe the epic battle in the future is going to be between the Department of Defense and the Department of the Treasury???
After I read that, I started laughing and just couldn’t stop. Excellent work, Zanzibar!
Reminds me of the scene in Dr. Strangelove where President Muffley says “Gentlemen! You can’t fight in here! This is the War Room!
Cieran:
I am amazed that Russia has liquidated that IMF debt and again concede that the more you prod me to look the more impressed I am with Russia’s economic performance since its crash in the late ’90’s. Wonderful thing; glad for the poor Russian people.
But c’mon, foreign investment in Russia last year was still at only some paltry $52 billion, and as I noted before I heard a report that just since this Georgia thing some $10-$20 billion of same took flight. (With however much more now deciding not to go in at all of course.) And while it may have been stockpiling some dough from oil revenues, it’s clearly still just a developing country when compared with the EU economy, the U.S.’s, or etc.
Plus, if anything, that (still only one) decade’s worth of progress from basket-casedom would seem to me to make Russia all the more hesitant to endanger it’s progress by using its oil card big time vis a vis the EU or NATO. (Although one can’t discount that its progess so far has indeed got it feeling its oats and has itself contributed to what its done in Georgia.)
But anyway using its oil weapon (in a still limited way, no?) against the Czechs is one thing, using it against almost the entirety of Europe in a big way is another given all the economic cards held by the West in any such economic war. (The G8, the WTO, the OECD and etc., etc.)
And their using it would not be like the OPEC thing where it was a concerted action by any number of different countries: If Russia and the West came to drawing serious economic conclusions due to Georgia or otherwise and Russia did have to contemplate using it’s oil as a weapon, there would be few if any other oil producers could it count on to act in concert with it and it would I suspect be essentially alone.
So I think I’d still make that bet that they wouldn’t use it in such a “big-time” way, although given the difficulty defining that maybe the better way to put it is that I think using it on their part would have to be one of their very very last choices.
Not that I think this is going to get tested as I suspect that the fallout from this Georgian thing is going to come not in some single concerted reaction from the West, but instead in a number of different ways.
And I don’t think I’m reading you to say that you are betting that they *will* use that oil card to combat any of same, right? So I suspect if there is any difference between us it will never get tested.
Maybe then the broader question is this: If Russia is determined to continue/repeat/whatever with its other neighbors what it did with Georgia and get seriously at odds with the West over same, whose economic (or for that matter military) hand would you rather be holding, Russia’s, or the West’s?
Regardless of the answer to that though the situation still seems to me to be a damned difficult thing. I agree entirely that there’s a neo-con claque out there in Washington just loving the idea of a new Cold War with Russia which is beyond stupid. From the moment the Soviet Union fell I thought that we ought to bend every effort to help the poor benighted people there. But at what point do we look the other way at the Russian government’s invasions of sovereign democratic states in a manner reminiscent of what the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany did before? We are always (rightfully) told not to fool ourselves that others are like us. So at what point do we say “that’s right, Russia isn’t like us and it isn’t engaged in forcible revanchism out of just or even long-term relatively benign reasons that will have a sensible stopping point”?
Cheers,
Cieran,
‘we need to come to live in the present, not the past.’
I think you hit a rather important nail squarely on the head.
Both Americans and Europeans are having to face a bewildering array of new problems — of which energy security is one of the most important and most difficult.
Against this background, for you — and us — to get involved in a new Cold War over the fate of South Ossetia and Abkazia is simply lunatic.
What is alarming about all this, moreover, is not simply the element of living in the past. It is also what seems to be an increasingly chronic inability in the U.S. political system to set priorities in a reasonably rational fashion.
Anatol Lieven is perhaps the best British foreign affairs commentator — perhaps partly because of his weird ancestry (Baltic German and Irish Catholic.)
A good while before the crisis over Ossetia blew up, Lieven cited Roosevelt, Eisenhower and Richard Nixon as examples of American leaders with a clear understanding of the need to set priorities, and choose between unpleasant alternatives. This ability, he suggested, seemed to have gone by the wayside.
‘Consider, for example, [Lieven wrote] that at a time when the U.S. is facing crises of truly vital importance in the Middle East, it is also drifting toward a dangerous confrontation with Russia, a key player in the Middle East, over … South Ossetia.
‘What next, we wonder? Massive U.S. involvement in a Chilean-Argentine conflict over control of the Beagle Channel? A huge commitment of U.S. energy and resources to help Paraguay recover the Gran Chaco?’
(See http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2006/north_korea_isnt_our_problem.)
Do not think, incidentally, that I am indulging in British condescension. The problem is quite as bad in London as in Washington — both the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, and the Tory leader and likely next Prime Minister, David Cameron, have been grandstanding over Georgia with an enthusiasm worthy of John McCain himself.
But what we do matters very much less than what you do!
Cieran,
‘we need to come to live in the present, not the past.’
I think you hit a rather important nail squarely on the head.
Both Americans and Europeans are having to face a bewildering array of new problems — of which energy security is one of the most important and most difficult.
Against this background, for you — and us — to get involved in a new Cold War over the fate of South Ossetia and Abkazia is simply lunatic.
What is alarming about all this, moreover, is not simply the element of living in the past. It is also what seems to be an increasingly chronic inability in the U.S. political system to set priorities in a reasonably rational fashion.
Anatol Lieven is perhaps the best British foreign affairs commentator — perhaps partly because of his weird ancestry (Baltic German and Irish Catholic.)
A good while before the crisis over Ossetia blew up, Lieven cited Roosevelt, Eisenhower and Richard Nixon as examples of American leaders with a clear understanding of the need to set priorities, and choose between unpleasant alternatives. This ability, he suggested, seemed to have gone by the wayside.
‘Consider, for example, [Lieven wrote] that at a time when the U.S. is facing crises of truly vital importance in the Middle East, it is also drifting toward a dangerous confrontation with Russia, a key player in the Middle East, over … South Ossetia.
‘What next, we wonder? Massive U.S. involvement in a Chilean-Argentine conflict over control of the Beagle Channel? A huge commitment of U.S. energy and resources to help Paraguay recover the Gran Chaco?’
(See http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2006/north_korea_isnt_our_problem.)
Do not think, incidentally, that I am indulging in British condescension. The problem is quite as bad in London as in Washington — both the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, and the Tory leader and likely next Prime Minister, David Cameron, have been grandstanding over Georgia with an enthusiasm worthy of John McCain himself.
But what we do matters very much less than what you do!
Cieran, Clifford Kiracofe,
An updated version of an interesting commentary by Jérôme Guillet dealing with Europe’s energy relations with Russia has just appeared on the European Tribune website.
He is an investment banker specialising in the financing of energy projects, who wrote a thesis on the independence of the Ukraine, focusing particularly on the gas relationship between the Ukraine and Russia. He certainly has his own axes to grind — as the projects he finances are in the alternative energy sector. But he is well informed.
His basic argument is that Europeans — and above the British — prefer to bluster rather than think seriously about problems of energy supply and security in a world where oil and gas supplies are dwindling.
In particular, he argues that the enthusiasm for liberalising energy markets is acutely counterproductive, because it encourages the construction of gas-fired plants, as the initial costs of these are relatively low and they are thus easier to finance.
(See http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2008/8/24/101813/460.)
A key question is begged by a passage an article in the Economist Guillet is attacking:
‘Yet dependence cuts both ways. Europe may depend on Russia for half its gas imports, but Russia is dependent on Europe for the bulk of its export revenues. Repeated threats by the Kremlin to divert the flow of gas to China mean little without pipelines that it would take many years to build. Switching off gas to Europe will never make commercial sense for Gazprom. The fear in some EU countries is that commercial interests may one day become secondary to political ones.’
If the problem is that pipelines take years to build — rather than that the locations of the reservations in relation to potential markets mean that very significant diversion of exports towards Asia is uneconomic — then the Economist is being extremely short-sighted. It would then be possible for Russia — by pursuing a mercantilist energy strategy — to shift the balance of dependence in relation to Europe significantly in its favour.
I do not know whether this is so.
In fact, there have been few signs — so far – that the Russians want to use energy as a political weapon against Europe. To treat an aspiration to make Ukrainians and Byelorussians pay market prices as a political move is frankly fatuous.
A relevant question however is what might happen if a messy crisis develops in the Ukraine. The risks of this are I think very great — particularly because of the fundamental fact that the borders of the Ukraine, as of Georgia, are the product of arbitrary acts by Soviet leaders. Why the decisions of the ‘Great Teacher and Leader’ about borders should be regarded as having the status of holy writ in Washington and London frankly baffles me — although of course the inclusion of the Crimea in the Ukraine was the work of Stalin’s much milder successor, Nikita Khrushchev, unlike the inclusion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia.
<"'Yet dependence cuts both ways. Europe may depend on Russia for half its gas imports, but Russia is dependent on Europe for the bulk of its export revenues.">
David Habakkuk,
Autarky is not a possible option whether it be hydrocarbons, raw materials, or whatever.
While there are many out there whipping up hysterical doomsday “scenarios” relating to resource denial, I think some calm and some calculation is more appropriate. Such scenarios, of course, are used to support the New Cold War with Russia and tensions with China.
Looking at the history of world commerce we can note that the ancient Egyptians traded with the Indians by land and by sea, the Roman empire with China, and etc. It is difficult to separate long distance trade from the history of man of whatever era.
Energy security is a complex issue. Again I would say simply that in a multipolar environment it behooves the major powers to come to some mutually beneficial arrangements rather than go to war (possibly nuclear) over it.
For example, I was at a small high level meeting several years ago of US, Chinese, and Japanese scholars and officials exploring issue areas for cooperation. A dinner speaker, and former very high level US official, suggested the peaceful and orderly development of North Sea resources by the various countries as a model for the South China Sea and other areas in Asia. This made a good impression all round and I note recent Chinese-Japanese initiatives in the energy field.
It is logical for the EU and Russia to work out mutually beneficial arrangments in this sector.
No question that Ukraine is a dangerous potential flashpoint. The Europeans should think the matter through and come to some understandings on the matter with Russia. For their own good, both should ignore the cowboys and geopolitical narcisists in Washington. Pfaff is correct.
Cieran,
While I loved your line about our need to live in the present and not in the past, I wonder: Shouldn’t this also be true of Russia too then? (In terms of its trying to re-draw the maps of the present into the maps of the past?)
Indeed, by going into Georgia isn’t it Russia that has by far shown much more of a desire to return to the past than the West has with the EU, NATO and the OECD and etc. trying to bring all those countries like Georgia, Armenia, the Ukraine, and even the Baltic States into the Western fold which is a very very new, “present” thing?
David Habakkuk wrote:
“A relevant question however is what might happen if a messy crisis develops in the Ukraine. The risks of this are I think very great….”
David, can you expand on why you think this is so? I think a lot of people are hoping that this Georgia thing was just a … spur-of-the-moment angry reaction by the Russians to the dumb move by the Georgians in Ossetia as opposed to the start of a programmatic expression of a deep revanchist spirit.
Do you think we’ll see such a move/crisis in the Ukraine soon? Would make sense for the Russians if they really wanna do it to start that fire now before Ukraine is accepted into NATO, wouldn’t it?
I can hardly imagine it, but boy what you say is worrying.
Cheers,
Tom B: The Crimea is the place to watch for, a limited russian operation there is entirely possible. Look for signs of a maskirovka, possibly some russian-ukrainian person getting killed, the eastern crimean russians asking for protection against some sort of threat, etc. Propably just after the election in the US would be my guess, if it comes at all.
Has anyone found any references to what the Georgians were actually thinking before moving into S. Ossetia in the first place? There must be some force-assessment procedure somewhere. Wtf happened there?
TomB:
While I loved your line about our need to live in the present and not in the past, I wonder: Shouldn’t this also be true of Russia too then?
Two points in regard to this:
First, Russia is clearly not living in its Soviet past, regardless of what the usual corporate media pundits suggest. Russia’s current government may be reasserting traditional spheres of influence, but exporting Marxist revolution via the guns of Cuban troops is not likely to be in the cards anytime soon.
The Russians have moved on to more western modes of influence.
Second, Russia itself is a greatly different country than it was only a couple decades ago, and the process of recovering its rich culture is a wonder to behold, to anyone who cares to notice. I couldn’t help but be moved by those crosses that were worn during competition by some of the Russian athletes at the 2008 Olympics.
What they showed (to me, at least) is that Russia is letting go of much of what was ugly about its past, as it recovers some of what was so beautiful.
I’d suggest that our best strategy would be to help them.
David and Clifford:
I am greatly enjoying chasing down the articles and associated principles you are suggesting, And as someone who has worked on energy topics for a couple decades (both supply and demand), I am struck by how it all seems to come down to which countries have a coherent energy strategy, and which ones don’t.
I’ll go a step further (after reading the Guillet essay) and note that all countries have energy strategies, but in some (most notably the U.S., but also many European nations) that strategy is not derived from any set of prioritized goals (e.g., energy independence), but is instead assembled in an ad hoc manner from purely tactical considerations, e.g., which forms of power production have the simplest capital requirements or licensing processes.
As Sun Tzu once wrote, “tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat”.
What we need to do is as David H. suggests, namely to prioritize our national goals, so that we may choose a path out of the current dilemma. Only by setting national priorities can we truly consider the hard choices that are required. And only by prioritizing our desires can we honestly assess the real-world ramifications of our choices, e.g., the distinct possibility of our current carbon emissions compromising the lives of all of our descendants.
Unfortunately, the act of making such difficult choices is the definition of real leadership, and we have precious few left in our governments who are capable of such feats. In western democracies, we tend not to elect candidates who tell us what we don’t want to hear, and thus we’ve done a fine job of ridding our nations of leaders, just at the point where we may need them most.
Cieran, fnord:
Cieran wrote:
“Russia itself is a greatly different country than it was only a couple decades ago….”
Obviously, and thanks again for getting me to read up on how well they’ve been doing economically. I would still suggest however that however changed its nature or form what is going to be focused on is whether its actions are different from the past.
I suspect (and indeed hope) that the rap it gets from this Georgia misadventure will be overblown as Russia has—in the main—certainly acted since the fall of the S.U. more than responsibly. But I think that that rap will be there, especially in its former satellites and etc. and will take a long time now to subside.
I didn’t notice those crosses on their athletes and like you think that’s an amazing, touching thing in light of history. And did you see that Putin himself said some very nice things about Solzhenitzyn in the wake of the latter’s recent death? To point out just how seismically the culture of Russia has changed at least as to internal matters I don’t know that anyone need to point to anything more than that. I thought that was just simply a great thing and was glad I was alive to see it having read The Gulag Arch. and etc. so long ago.
fnord:
Between you and David you guys could scare the hell out of anyone. Why the Crimea? The oil?
One thing I don’t like is the idea that this Georgian thing might seem to very much help McCain. Do the Russians really wanna be doing that? I doubt it and suspect it’s yet another aspect of what I see as the blunder of its moves with Georgia.
Cheers,
Cieran, Clifford Kiracofe,
I very much agree with Cieran’s point about leadership.
It is also I think worth reflecting on the effects of the collapse of standards in the mainstream media. It is significant that Jérôme Guillet’s polemic focuses on an article in the Economist. Once I would have expected the Economist, or indeed the Financial Times, to discuss the problems of European energy security seriously. These days, they don’t.
So while once the ‘fourth estate’ might have pushed the politicians towards thinking strategically, today it does not.
As to Clifford Kiracofe’s the point about the alternative to a sensible cooperative approach being war — quite conceivably nuclear, I absolutely agree. And this is all the more so, given the way that the massive superiority of U.S. conventional power is pushing other states to rely on nuclear ‘deterrence’.
TomB,
Why the Crimea? Again William Pfaff is useful.
‘In Ukraine, the problem is between a culturally and historically Orthodox and Russian-speaking Ukraine, and a westernized and Uniate Catholic Ukraine, whose ties are to Poland and Lithuania. Westernized Ukraine is trying to use NATO to help it dominate Russian Ukraine. This again has war built into it, and NATO must stay away from a conflict that is an unresolved and possibly irresolvable internal Ukrainian problem.’
(See http://www.williampfaff.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=334.)
Again, the promise of NATO expansion is destabilising, not stabilising.
Actually Pfaff oversimplifies. If the division was as simple as he suggests, the two halves could simply split — as happened with the former Czechoslovakia. As it is, between the clear opposite poles of the Crimea (ethnically as well as linguistically Russian, only part of the Ukraine because of Khrushchev’s whim) and the Western Ukraine (ethnically and linguistically Ukrainian, never under Russian rule before 1939) there a large territory where divisions criss-cross in complicated ways. So a split could be seriously messy — if I may practice a small bit of traditional British understatement.
Just as I thought. Russia will proceed to make various diplomatic move designed to make Europe question the use of NATO. They will make sure NATO is a costly hassle and useless for europe.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080825/116266781.html
Medvedev says Russia ready to cut ties with NATO
President Dmitry Medvedev warned on Monday that Russia could sever all ties with NATO amid a standoff over Russia’s response to Georgia’s offensive in breakaway South Ossetia.
NATO suspended cooperation with Russia last week, and said “business as usual” could not resume until the country withdraws all troops from Georgia.
If NATO is not willing to cooperate with Moscow, “we will take any decision, up to terminating relations entirely,” Medvedev told Russia’s envoy to the alliance, Dmitry Rogozin.
“Cooperation is above all in the interests of NATO, not Russia,” he said.
—
Next up, the G8. People act like G8 means something. Watch out. Russia is 9th largest economy in the world and now has reasonable grasp of it’s surrounding. It also located right between Asia and Europe. They certainly can create their own Free trade Agreement with everybody next door and have instant global presence controlling 60-70% of global good transaction. Trade agreement with central asia, half of middle east and China alone will put them bigger than Europe. Combine with rest of Asia, latin america and Japan, they’ll be bigger than EU+US combined. They also have the resource, economic growth and capital to create their own financial center.
(translation: Russia can say: We don’t need no stinkin’ G8)
Economy is about transaction & activities. And when there is no growth, there is no transaction. There is no money to be made in recessionary economy.
———
See: 2007 GDP list. (2008 will include european/Japan recession and BRIC growing at 6-9%)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)
forget to include this IMF GDP growth map.
(NATO = no growth, according to that map. or Bush has screwed up US and its allies economy by way of sub prime, expensive oil and banking crisis.)
Trying to slice off high growth area of the planet from European and US economy amounts to shooting one own foot.
Wait until the Russian is calling the G8 bluff and create coordinated macro economic policy with China via SCO. (highly unlikely, but something to think about, before any pundits think G8 informal meeting as strong enough to withstand actual economic alliance)
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO&lang=en
“But c’mon, foreign investment in Russia last year was still at only some paltry $52 billion, and as I noted before I heard a report that just since this Georgia thing some $10-$20 billion of same took flight.”
IIRC at the beginning of this year the russians had over 150 billions of dollars in stabilization funds from excess oil revenues. To put it bluntly they have more cash at hands than places to throw it at without backfiring. To the extent foreign investements are necessary I suspect it is more for know how, tech and such in some sectors.
Of course its GDP is still one sixth or so of the USA (purchasing power adjusted)per CIA figures but I don’t think anybody here is arguing that they are some sort of economic superpower. They are recovering and they have good energy cards, that’s it.
Speaking of which while Europe can get hydrocarbons from others places, such as that heaven of democracy officially known as the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, it is not like we can snap the fingers and get pipelines laid overnight.
That being said I still belive that shutting the valves is going to remain a nuclear option of sort: it is not going to be used but it’s there.
“(NATO = no growth, according to that map. or Bush has screwed up US and its allies economy by way of sub prime, expensive oil and banking crisis.)”
Most Europe has been somewhat stagnant for many years, Bush isn’t at fault here. Nobody is anxious to waste scarce resources because the american pundits think every day is 30/09/1938, every foreign leader who does not fit their agenda is Hitler reborn and every american ally is a paragon of moral virtue standing up to evil incarnate.
Personally I am not going to lose sleep if, say a traditionally russian portion of Ukraine goes to Russia.
Russia has too many issues (China, just to name one) to make T-90s rolling into Warsaw and Berlin a serious possibility.
David Habakkuk, All
1. One could point to the 16th century British “Muscovy Company” chartered in 1555 and then develop the theme of Russian-European economic relations over the past 5 centuries (and almost 4 centuries with the US).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muscovy_Company
But here I would simply point again to the economic integration of Russia with Europe from the 1860s down to the Bolshevik seizure of power. Specifically financial and industrial relations.
I would also underscore the legacy of Count Witte which lives in the minds of Russian intellectuals with whom I have spoken in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhny Novgorod. We can also recall the Stolypin reforms. So the issue of Russian economic modernization and cooperation with the EU and its economic integration into a broader “European” space has a history already when approached from a broader context.
2. What is causing tensions in US-Russian relations thus impairing European security? We need to look closely at the “Anti-Russia” Lobby in the United States which overlaps with the Neocons and pro-Israel Lobby.
Prof. Andrei Tsygankov of San Francisco State has a forthcoming book on this topic. As he correctly points out,
“…In addition to the support coming from the U.S. government, one must not overlook the role played by anti-Russian groups within the American establishment. Unlike the George Bush administration, anti-Russian groups did not pretend that they considered Russia a partner in security relationships, and they presented Russia’s behavior as incompatible with American values and interests. These groups never concealed that enlargement of NATO was crucial for controlling the Eurasian region with its vast resources and potentially powerful geopolitical challenges to American domination. The anti-Russian lobbyists and sympathetic politicians, such as Vice President Dick Cheney and Sen. John McCain, always saw the alliance’s original purpose as that of containing Russia. While comparing the growing Russia with Hitler’s Germany, the lobby in fact pushed for an expansionist revolutionary policy for the United States, thereby provoking the Kremlin….”
“Today, the United States continues to prop up Saakashvili’s regime without addressing Russia’s interests. Washington is bent on bringing Georgia to NATO and isolating Russia from the energy infrastructure in the region. The lobby has succeeded in influencing the official perception of the Kremlin’s policies and articulating a highly distorted image of Russia in the American media: as a power that is relentlessly autocratic, has no regard for civilian lives and is only interested in restoring its domination in the Caucasus. Russia should draw the necessary conclusions by pressing for a strategic presence in the region and greater international recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.”
http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2008/08/lobbying-for-wa.html#more
3. It is logical for Moscow to now shift away from the NATO relationship and place emphasis on the EU and OSCE.
IMO, it is quite positive that the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner, Thomas Hammarberg, has been in Ossetia this week.
http://www.coe.int/
David:
Thank you very much. Do you know anything about just how important the Crimea is to Russia in terms of its naval fleet in the Black Sea?
Curious:
Actually I think the WTO is next. I just read something that Russia has just renounced at least some of the agreements they had been urged to enter into to help their WTO application along. Pretty clearly a defiant jutting of the jaw.
Marcello:
This is gonna be interesting, no?
I still think Georgia was a big blunder for Russia though. Especially because if anything while it might seem to prove an easy win for it with Ossetia and Abkhazia, it should have started first with what I suspect would be its far bigger prize of the Crimea and areas of the Ukraine.
E.g., okay, maybe because of the hope that it’s not now going to launch some huge revanchist program and because Georgia acted so stupidly the West is not going to do much about Ossetia and Abkhazia, and maybe even pressure Georgia to come to terms with the Bear. But because of what’s happened you have to suspect—to some degree at least—that this will make the West all the more excitable and etc. when and if Russia starts to make noise or moves in Ukraine or the Crimea. Maybe speed up NATO entry for Ukraine or just be willing to react more strongly than it does about Georgia or etc.
In other words maybe Russia should have started with its big prize first; in essence demanding the West ignore or lean on one (little, dumb, non-sympathy-inducing) state like Georgia is one thing. Asking it to do the same with another (big, non-dumb, sympathy-inducing one) like Ukraine right *after* it has just got done taking a chunk or two out of Georgia would seem to be another.
Cheers,
Marcello:
They are recovering and they have good energy cards, that’s it.
This is true, and in the near term outside know-how is essential for Russia to more fully diversify its economy.
But we should not underestimate the technical skills of the Russian nation. They have suffered under some awful cultural constraints (e.g., the destruction of Soviet biological sciences expertise under Lysenko, or the rejection of modern information technology systems under late Soviet administrations), but those limits on Russian scientific and technological skills were self-inflicted wounds which are rapidly healing, and it’s likely that we’ll soon enough see a whole host of interesting technological marvels come from Russia, and that these will create plenty of robust export opportunities for their nation.
I’ve been lucky enough to work with a variety of Russian technical experts, and have been consistently amazed at how good they are at what they do (and this is what I do, so I have a pretty good idea of what “best and brightest” means in various nations, including the U.S.)
Russian skills at innovation have been hampered by Soviet-era government policies that rewarded political connections over technical competence, but as those political constraints are removed over time, we may come to wish that we hadn’t encouraged Russia to embrace free-market approaches, since we will increasingly be competing with them in the marketplace. I suspect that the recent improvements in the Russian economy may yet turn out to be only the first act in a longer and much more interesting story.