"From the time that Iran halted the suspension of its centrifuge manufacturing efforts and its adherence to the Additional Protocol, the IAEA’s knowledge of Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing complex has degraded dramatically. U.S. and other intelligence agencies appear to have only partial information about Iran’s centrifuge complex and its ability to reconstitute its program following an attack. Iran’s decision to disperse and keep secret several of its key sites further hinders the development of a full picture of its centrifuge complex. Considering the modular, replicable nature of centrifuge plants, we conclude that an attack on Iran’s nuclear program is unlikely to significantly degrade Iran’s ability to reconstitute its gas centrifuge program." Abright et al
Albright knows his business.
If it is his judgment that it would be this difficult to severely damage the centrifuge enrichment program, then it is probably so.
This analysis places the putative Israeli onslaught against these facilities in sharp perspective. The Israelis lack the capability for this.
Only a full fledged US air campaign would have any chance of doing the necessary degree of damage to that complex of facilities. Such a US campaign would involve hundreds if not thousands of strike sorties plus many, many more support sorties.
Then, there is the issue of whether or not available targeting intelligence is adequate for the job.
Think deal. pl