Navies spend more time (ideally) preventing conflict in the first place, but if that fails, the big effort is protecting their own side’s logistics and/or denying the enemy theirs. History is littered with examples of combatants who overreached their supply chains or failed to ensure theirs were adequately protected. Field Marshal Rommel is the ‘go-to’ for the former and it’s hard to look past the Battle of the Atlantic for an example of a war-defining logistic struggle.
And so it is today in the contested maritime domains of the Black, Red and China Seas. In each case, a battle for sustainability is playing out as forces there seek to disrupt or preserve freedom of navigation.
In the Black Sea, Russian attempts to disrupt Ukraine’s food exports and hold the world to ransom have failed. Grain and other exports through the humanitarian corridor in the west are on the rise as the Black Sea Fleet is driven further and further east by the Ukrainian threat. The Ukrainians’ innovative use of uncrewed surface vessels (USV) dominates the headlines but this is to overlook how many different types of attacks Ukraine has conducted. Only yesterday a Russia vessel which went aground in the Dnipro Estuary last year, and since used as a listening post, was struck by a cruise missile (exact type unknown). For now, Putin has no answer to much of this and has sacked not only the head of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet but now, it appears, the Russian Navy commander-in-chief too.
Some even more significant things have been happening outside the media spotlight. Throughout the war in Ukraine, the transport ship Sparta-IV and the tanker Yaz have been central to Russian logistics shipments into the Black Sea. Sparta-IV is one of a series of Russian-owned ships that have previously brought artillery and S-300 air defence missiles from the Russian base at Tartus in Syria to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea.
These vessels are sanctioned by the UK, Ukraine and the US for “delivering maritime goods on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defence” but until recently this has had no effect. Turkey, which could deny passage of the Bosporus Strait under the terms of the Montreux Convention, has chosen not to. RUSI research shows that Sparta-IV made six runs to and from the Black Sea in 2023, including prolonged periods with her Automatic Identification System (AIS) system switched off – behaviour often associated with smuggling and illicit activities.
But then last month both the Sparta-IV and the Yaz unexpectedly turned around as they were approaching the southern entrance to the Bosporus. They returned to Tartus and are now heading to Russia via the Baltic. This is a huge delay, and then one must consider the onward overland journey necessary to get their cargoes to the theatre of war. Materiel landed at Novorossiysk had just a hundred miles to go to the Kerch bridges and the battlefields. What was a fairly simple piece of shipping becomes a continental odyssey.
Initially it was assessed that Turkey had finally denied permission to pass through but on closer analysis, it appears that in fact the USV threat in the Black Sea is now so high, the Russians don’t believe it worth the risk, even with a military escort.
As ever, the problem is wider than just these two ships. There are believed to be at least 69 ships on the US sanction list and by the time you get to ships suspected of smuggling grain and oil out of the Black Sea, the list is longer still. But Sparta-IV is one of just a handful of ships smuggling weapons: forcing her not to enter the Black Sea is as significant as the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva way back in April 2022, maybe more so. Whilst the Moskva strike was an embarrassing operational and tactical failure – and totemic – the effect now is strategic. Moskva showed Russia’s shortcomings in fighting in the maritime domain. The inability to protect its logistics now could, over time, affect Russian ability to fight in all domains.
Comment: This is the result of a well planned, sustained Ukrainian campaign to deny Russia freedom of access in the Black Sea with the ultimate goal of liberating Crimea. The first part of this plan appears to be working. The Black Sea Fleet have largely vacated Sevastopol and are no longer operating in the western half of the Black Sea. The grain corridor established by Ukraine seems to be working well. While the Black Sea is certainly not denied to Russia as a sea LoC, access is being limited.
I think the author is a little too over-exuberant with his claim that Russia is losing the logistic war. They have made great strides in converting to a war economy and have arranged logistical allies (Iran and NK) with interior lines. And they’re still managing to obtain Western technology needed to keep their war machine going.
John Minehan voiced a similar opinion earlier today about Russian logistics.
But the LoCs into Theater remain vulnerable and that vulnerability has increased as the Ukrainians have had success against the Black Sea Fleet. Those successes also indicate that Russia lacks support in the occupied territories.
All the Ukrainians need to do is get HIMARS systems close enough to the LoCs into Theater to control them by fire, then the Russians collapse.
The Russians excel at the Recon/Fires Complex, but still have not been able to successful develop a Recon/Strike Complex on the Operational level. In 2003, the US dropped the Iraqi grid in 3days, the Russians have not been able to do this in 2 years.
What else has Ukraine been doing in their war against Russian logistics? Since day one they have been hitting Russian supply and fuel vehicles. Given the Russian reliance on railway supply, this is a smart strategy. Another smart strategy, which they have not fully implemented, is to target the electrical grid powering Russia’s rail system. Unlike the Ukrainian railways, which can operate fairly effectively with available diesel locomotives, the Russian rail system in their western theater, is reliant on their electric locomotives.
Ukraine is currently targeting Russian refineries. That’s also a good strategic move, although it seems to be more aimed at the overall Russian economy rather than depriving the Russian military of necessary POL. We’ll see if they can stick to that plan.
TTG