Telenko on artillery logistics – TTG

I cannot begin to overstate the battlefield shift in the logistical “correlation of forces” this tweet thread represents. Ukraine is trading artillery shells 1-to-1 at Bakhmut and half of AFU shells are Western 155mm caliber. The highest single “Russian artillery shells in a day count” that Ukraine has provided in the current war for Russia is 65,000 shells in May 2022 as Siervodonesk and Lysychansk were over run. AFU was only shooting about 1,000 shells a day at that time. AFU is currently shooting between 4,000 and 5,000 shells a day in all Ukraine.

The straight up change:  Russia is only shooting one shell a day in Bakhmut for every 13 it was firing in its May 2022  Siervodonesk and Lysychansk offensive. AT BEST. Furthermore, besides the Russian thermite incendiary rockets, we are not seeing anywhere near the scale of cluster munition use from the Russian Army that we saw in the May 2022 Siervodonesk and Lysychansk offensive.

Industrial base observation: A cluster munition artillery shell has less explosive filler, the expensive chemical part, than a unitary artillery shell. Sixty odd fuzes, copper liners and submunition bodies displace over half the explosive by volume of a 155mm shell. Old US 155mm shells with 64 cluster munitions were three times more effective on a shell for shell basis than a new production unitary 155mm shell and used less than half the explosives. Lots of little bangs are simply more cost and combat effective than a single big one.

Russian rockets have about 1/9th the submunitions of an equivalent size Western one and 152mm shells 2/3 to 1/8th a 155mm, industrial Q.C. reasons. So we should actually be seeing an increased percentage of Russian cluster shells. We aren’t. We ought to be seeing a bunch of Russian 152mm 3-O-13 or 3-O-23 cluster munition shells. No one has reported any recently in Western social or corporate media.

Filling empty 152mm cargo shell bodies with pre-made cluster munitions is a far safer and less skilled operation than pouring molten explosives. Especially if you are using the older 3-O-13 type cluster munitions that fit eight to a 152mm shell.

We haven’t seen this in a year of fighting. Instead Russia is buying old North Korean artillery munitions. The Russian artillery manufacturing base is looking as or more ‘supply constrained’ as the Western one. Particularly when it comes to artillery shell cluster munitions. Either Putin is saving a “Sunday punch” of cluster munitions…which unlikely. Or we are looking at the protracted aftermath of a complete shut down of Russia’s 152mm shell cluster munition manufacturing base.

There are implications in this further Western intelligence miss regarding the Russian Artillery munitions industrial supply chain. As in, what ELSE is Western intelligence missing in Russian artillery logistics?

Comment: This is the work of Trent Telenko, a retired DOD civil servant. The focus of most of his posts is the logistical aspects of the the war in Ukraine. I assume his DOD career was in logistics. His twitter threads are insightful. I recommend going to the source to see his embedded graphics and supporting references. In this thread he references the interview with the commander of the Ukrainian 45th Artillery Brigade. Wiz linked to that interview yesterday and it is well worth reading by itself.

The overall conclusion in Telenko’s articles is that the Russians are facing serious logistical challenges to their future conduct of this war. Their truck fleet has been decimated and their stocks of ammunitions are not as limitless as many would like us to believe. The antiquated manual nature of their logistics system exacerbates these problems as does the Ukrainians’ smart and deliberate targeting of that logistics system. A lesson all are learning from this war is that no one has an industrial base to adequately support this kind of war.


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53 Responses to Telenko on artillery logistics – TTG

  1. cobo says:

    Sorry, my fingers just can’t keep my mouth shut:
    1. “A lesson all are learning from this war is that no one has an industrial base to adequately support this kind of war.” Good, we are given a heads up. Re-arm, re-industrialize, and get ready for much more war.
    2. From Zerohedge this morning, “Blinken Warns Ukraine Against Seizing Crimea In About-Face” – it looks like America (our government) is contemplating running out on another commitment, another ally, another military embarrassment. From my subconscious, the jaguar didn’t climb down the tree of life from heaven for nothing. The East Europeans will not quit, and the rest of NATO will oblige, it must.

    • fredw says:

      “Re-arm, re-industrialize, and get ready for much more war.”

      That is probably not the right prospect. The weapons being used up are mostly not the weapons that we would expect to use in a “real” war. 155mm shells with a 50 km range? Useful these days for a constrained battlefield. Doubling that range would render most of what Russia is doing impossible. A western military would be destroying most of Russia’s logistics before the material got anywhere near a battlefield. As they would ours to the best of their ability. We might need to produce some more of those weapons for the short term. But the real fear of shortage seems to come from the thought of providing some of the weapons we might actually want to use ourselves. We are generous with obsolete weaponry that we never expect to use in quantity anyway.

      If Russian stubbornness somehow manages to pull this out, then there might be some serious armament building. Otherwise, who would want to follow the Russian example? China might attack Taiwan simply to destroy TSMC, but otherwise no. 100 miles of sea is enough to make an opposed invasion extremely difficult. The 21-mile English channel has been successfully crossed against active defense only twice in the last thousand years.

      • Bill Roche says:


        • fredw says:

          OK, I am interested. The only other incident that I considered was the glorious revolution of 1688. That was an invasion, but it was notable for its lack of actual fighting. No opposition to the landing and no actual battles. James’ military disintegrated without much effort on William’s part.

          • Bill Roche says:

            Caesar, William, D Day. A crossing goes both ways! Fred, I know knowing about any crossing in 1688. Help pls.

          • fredw says:

            I will reject Caesar for two reasons: first that he falls outside the “last thousand years” timeframe and second because his invasion was defeated. He didn’t write it up that way, of course. Superior Roman military organization enabled him to brag about individual victories, but both his invasion attempts ended with his army back on the other side of the channel within a month. A ferocious British defense and some almost as ferocious British weather earned the Brits another century of independence. They agreed to tribute payments that as far as we know were never actually paid. (A common pattern for Chinese dominance also.)

            The actual Roman conquest of Britain 98 years later followed the more usual colonial process: 1. Make your first move at a time when the natives are disorganized. 2. Establish a foothold. 3. Expand the foothold over a period of decades fighting one tribe at a time as each tribe experiences hard times.

          • Bill Roche says:

            Fred I win!!! there were still three. Say, help me out on this 1688 invasion. The Spanish were what 1590(??) but your at 1688.

            PS you know the Roman name for Britain. From the sunny climes of southern Europe it was quite appropriate. Makes me think, imagine if the Pilgrims/Puritans (they were not the same) had sailed from Italy instead of England, fcknnn brrr.

          • fredw says:

            ON 3 November 1688 (13th by the old calendar), William of Orange landed 15,000 troops and armament for 20,000 more at Torbay in southwest England after adverse winds had prevented the English navy from interfering. James had an English army of 19,000 at Salisbury by the 19th, but they did not seriously challenge the Dutch. In fact, three regiments sent to make contact just defected. James was unpopular and had no ability to negotiate. As had been the case with his father, nobody believed that he would abide by any concessions he might make.

            So it was indeed an invasion and a successful one at that. But I don’t think that we could claim that it overcame an “active defense”.

            My point is just that “successfully crossed against active defense” is harder than it sounds. The historical record indicates that it is a lot harder. The eventual Roman conquest of Britain, and what we know of the coming of the Saxons, has a different feel for me from the events of 1066 and 1944 which attacked and precipitated the collapse of whole systems. The defense against the Romans came in pieces, which meant that it lasted a lot longer but was never as dangerous to the invaders. It feels more like the British takeover of India: years and years of waiting for the Mughals to decline enough to be vulnerable followed by decades of taking pieces of India one at a time.

            Taiwan is not a conglomeration of independently operating pieces. When it was, they got pushed around by the Chinese, the Portuguese, and any other military power that came along. If they elect to conduct an “active defense”, they will have considerable advantages from their geography.

          • Bill Roche says:

            You always learn something on the Col’s site. Tnx.

    • TTG says:


      I think the ZeroHedge headline is misleading. It appears that Blinken is just not actively encouraging Ukraine to take back Crimea, but is leaving the question to the Ukrainians. We don’t know how Putin would react if he is about to lose or loses Crimea. I wouldn’t be surprised if Putin is sure what he will do either. Anyways, reconquest of Crimea is not going to happen anytime soon.

      • cobo says:

        It’s up to Ukraine, yes. But Ukraine will be hung out to dry if the West leaves it twisting in the wind, undersupplied. The US isn’t its only benefactor, but we have the deep pockets, and we need to reindustrialize badly. My two points are both in play: 1. use this wake-up call to rebuild our industrial base, 2. whatever ‘we’ do, the Eastern Europeans aren’t going to let this go down the way the Russophiles want. How that reality churns through the politats and bureaucrats – we’ll see. The jaguar, leopard, lion is here

        • English Outsider says:

          Cobo – the original SMO is now almost unrecognisable. War has its own momentum and that is nowhere truer than in this one.

          Before the SMO kicked off the Russian aims were modest. Get Minsk 2 implemented. That would have left the Donbass in the Ukraine but protected.

          Those aims failing, the recognition of the self-declared Republics was a signal saying to the West “Hands off the Donbass. Attack it and we shall come to its defence under article 51.”

          Didn’t work. Then the SMO itself. Originally that was a response to the increased shelling of the Donbass and to the threat of incursion by the Kiev forces. In its first phase the SMO also ran parallel with various attempts to arrive at a settlement.

          That ended with the failure of the Istanbul talks. Now we’re seeing various other factors come into play. To list those factors in no particular order but with the most important last:-

          – the Russians have taken note of admissions by Poroshenko, Merkel and Hollande that the West had never intended to implement Minsk 2. The West merely agreed to Minsk 2 to gain time to get the Kiev forces into fighting shape.

          From this they have drawn the conclusion that there is no settlement with the West possible. It would not be held to. So they have to sort out the Ukrainian problem by themselves.

          – the sanctions war. I think Putin, who is an extremely cautious man, was scared of those sanctions. Many other Russians too. Now that it has failed the Russians have nothing to fear and a considerable amount to gain from the continuance of the sanctions war. With that we in the West have lost our most powerful negotiating tool.

          – the provision of longer and longer range weapons to Kiev has also altered the picture. Not just right now – all that is “too little too late”. But the Russians can expect that if remnant Ukraine remains an unofficial NATO enclave, that provision will come to something.

          Merely the talk of providing F16’s and longer range missiles leads to the fear that the Russians could have on their border a country hostile to Russia and in receipt of massive Western military support.

          That leaves the Russian with a problem. Occupy remnant Ukraine and that’s cost and trouble. Don’t occupy and it remains a serious threat. None know how the Russians will solve that problem but you can see that the mere existence of that problem leads to a massive extension of the modest aims of the original SMO.

          – on the purely military side the SMO has expanded from its original nature to increasingly a straight war with NATO. NATO ISR assistance greatly enhances the fighting capabilities of the Kiev forces. NATO equipment is replacing original equipment. NATO personnel is deployed in theatre in increasing numbers.

          Given the escalation of the conflict, if the Russians wish to defeat this NATO/proxy opponent they must use greater force. This we are now seeing and presumably we’ll see more of it.

          – the last and to my mind the most important factor is the mood of the civilian populations on the respective sides.

          Gauging the determination of the various Western peoples to see this war through is difficult. I think most of us in the West believe the Russians to be in the wrong and believe therefore that they should be “punished” – but many are apprehensive about the blowback from the sanctions war and would like to see the war ended for that reason. Am I right in thinking that in the States there is an increasing body of opinion that the Ukrainians should be abandoned to their fate and the West should now focus on China? I pick up hints of that but you’ll obviously be more in touch.

          On the Russian side, however, there’s no doubt now as to the popular mood. Many reckon the Putin administration has been and is too cautious. Russian casualties now amount to some 20,000 and there’s now a feeling of “in for a penny, in for a pound”. They wish to see the arc from Kharkov to Transnistria secured and some wish for more. And they want to see the Kiev regime out.

          The future course of that SMO, and therefore the future of Ukraine, will now depend on whether Putin, risk averse and cautious as he is, will be able to resist such popular pressure. Maybe also on whether he and his administration now wish to.

  2. KjHeart says:

    Question: When Col. Faydyuk is talking about anti tank weapons…

    the text is about one third of the way down the article, under the section titled ‘Zaporizhzhia direction, weapons, and lack of ammunition’

    “(I): By the way, what do your anti-tankers work with?

    (O) Rapiras, Stugnas, Corsarys, and later we received Javelins. Among the smaller ones, we have Milans [light anti-tank missile systems of French-German production with a range of up to 2 kilometers].”

    Is he (Col Faydyuk) talking about the Carsar (Le Corsaire) anti-tank missile system?

    This one?

    Thanks in advance for your answer.


    • TTG says:


      He’s talking about the T-12 Rapira, a 100mm smoothbore towed anti-tank cannon. It was designed in the 60s an was incredibly effective. Every Soviet, Russian and Ukrainian artillery group had a Rapira battalion. I know it has indirect fire sighting capability, but I don’t know what kind of ammoo is available beyond the armor piercing rod round.

  3. Al says:

    “And another one bites the dust..” Queen, 2010

    A Russian military official in charge of financial provisions for the military district blamed for the Kremlin’s worst losses in Ukraine has been found dead after a nasty fall from a St. Petersburg high-rise.

    Marina Yankina, head of the department of financial provisions for the Western Military District, was found dead on a sidewalk on Wednesday morning, according to multiple local reports

    • Bill Roche says:

      The Byzantine Turks used to give their unsuccessful gen’ls the “silk scarf”. Not sure what I’d like; the push, the knife, the scarf, the poison. You know its coming, just not when. What if Putin wants to give you a big promotion. Can you just say “No tnx Vladi”; and move on?

    • KjHeart says:

      found this on twitter – it is food for thought – no way for me to verify though

      “Russia: Marina Yankina, head of finance for the Western Military District in the Defence Ministry has been assassinated by defenestration (out the window) in St. Petersburg. General Gerasimov embezzled millions in this district and is likely eliminating witnesses.”

  4. Peter Hug says:

    Someone could make a lot of money by introducing the Russians to the concept of a “pallet” and a “forklift”. Apparently this has not yet been done. I suppose “containers” will remain something to discuss in the future.

  5. Whitewall says:

    I caught this in the Telenko thread:

    “Let’s be clear.

    Russians aren’t “poorly trained, poorly led, poorly equipped.”

    They are untrained, not led, badly equipped.

    And they can’t change any of that. But they will keep throwing bodies into the morass.”

  6. Eliot says:


    “we are not seeing anywhere near the scale of cluster munition use from the Russian Army that we saw in the May 2022 Siervodonesk & Lysychansk offensive”

    “A cluster munition artillery shell has less explosive filler – the expensive chemical part – than a unitary artillery shell.”

    “we should actually be seeing an increased percentage of Russian cluster shells.

    We aren’t.”

    The claim could certainly be true, Russia may have production issues, but Telenkos logic is wrong. He states that cluster munitions are easier to produce, and so they should makeup a higher percentage of the rounds that Russia uses. The fact that this is not true, that their numbers aren’t increasing as an overall percentage, is evidence to him of production issues.

    Logically, that’s backwards. Having production issues would push Russia to increase the manufacture of less expensive shells, which they could produce in greater numbers.

    “Instead Russia is buying old North Korean artillery munitions.

    I’m not a secret squirrel, and maybe this is an established fact for people in the know, but I haven’t seen any documentation of it. Also, if true, how have we established that’s old? And if the Russians are buying it, then why are they firing fewer shells overall? The DPRK has massive stocks of artillery ammunition.

    He’s making an internally inconsistent argument.

    Is it not possible that the number of Russian fire missions have dropped for other reasons, unrelated to ammunition shortfalls, such as the slow down in Russian operations overall as they prepare for their next offensive.

    – Eliot

    • TTG says:


      Cluster ammunition is very effective, more effective than traditional HE ammo. If the Russians intend their new offensive to be successful, they’d be expending a lot more artillery and a lot more cluster ammo. The Russians are already in their next offensive. Why are they willingly losing thousands of men and only making gains measured in yards without adequate artillery support? Two reasons. Their production lines can’t keep up with the need and their supply system can’t move the needed ammo to the front.

      Captured Russian ammo is marked with the date of manufacture. The Ukrainians are finding less and less of old stockpiles and are now finding ammo of recent manufacture. That means the stockpiles are running out. The DPRK is obviously not emptying their massive stockpiles of ammo for Putin. If they were, perhaps the current Russian offensive would have better artillery support.

      Having said that, I also have trouble following Telenko’s every point made on cluster ammo. But I get the gist of it.

      • Al says:

        Stalin referring to mass assaults, “quantity becomes quality”. Came across that somewhere recently.

      • Bill Roche says:

        My reading suggests America got Britain and Russia through the years ’39- 42. Thereafter their own production picked up the load. In the soviets case the Yak 9 and Tupalov 34 were good weapons BUT, the soviets were never masters of production. Good old capitalist industry was the arsenal of democracy and it simply out produced the Japanese and Germans. American know how, capital, labor, and the factories were there to over whelm the enemy. Despite my giving Russians credit for some awesome weapons they have produced since ’45, is it possible they still don’t have the ability to “knock that production out” the way American factories do?

        • wiz says:

          Bill Roche

          US society and it’s factories were safe, protected from Japan and Germany by two great oceans.
          Soviet factories had to produce while the country was being invaded by the greatest invasion force in the history of warfare, their land occupied, their soldiers and civilians killed and captured.
          Many factories had to be dismantled, transported a great distance and assembled again. Nearly sixteen million Soviet civilians and over 1,500 plants were moved to areas in the middle or eastern part of the country by the end of 1941.
          Considering the circumstances they did a pretty good job.

          • Bill Roche says:

            I thought the greatest invasion force in the history of warfare was D Day. Not so? But back to the original question, do you think that communists Russia would have survived the first two years of war w/o American manufacturing? Certainly the communists had enough oopmph to abuse the Finns and the Poles but do you think they could have held on against the Germans w/o American arms. That was the issue.

          • wiz says:

            Bill Roche

            if you look up Soviet military industry production levels in 1942, which I’m sure you wont, you’ll be able to answer your own question.

            Also, it was not just the “communist Russia” that stood in the way of close to 4 million Axis soldiers during the operation Barbarossa, but the people of the USSR. Millions of Ukrainians, Belorussians and other Soviet peoples perished along with the Russians fighting that invasion.

            Even if people like you forget their sacrifice, many here in Europe do not.

          • Bill Roche says:

            If you’d like you can read Leith below. Oh and while you are in reverence to the Russian communists remember the Americans and British were pressing east across western Europe to Berlin. Russia fought for Russia. America and Britain fought for themselves and for freedom; a concept unimportant to Nazis and Commies.

          • wiz says:


            again with the communist Russia ?
            Look up Soviet Union, it is much more than just Russia.
            It is amusing having a “discussion” with someone interested only in twisting and turning your words just so you can demonstrate your intense dislike for Russia.
            You totally ignore Ukrainian contribution and sacrifice, reducing it to be just “communist Russia”. That is insulting to most Ukrainians.
            I suspect you care little about your Balts and Slavs and Fins in general.

            The fact is I never tried to play down the US role in WW2. It is immense.
            I just pointed out that your theory how “Good old capitalist industry was the arsenal of democracy and it simply out produced the Japanese and Germans” and that the “soviets were never masters of production” etc has a serious flaw.

            German and Russian industrial facilities and societies were being actively destroyed while the US was untouchable.
            Despite that fact, both industries produced a great amount of war material and equipment, many of which were very good.

          • Bill Roche says:

            Only reading what you post makes it impossible for me to know your mind. But I suspect you have a difficulty accepting the power of American capitalist industry which defeated Germany and Japan so long ago. I’ll conclude by saying w/o American industry Germany would have won in Europe and Japan in Asia. American industrial might prevented that. I suspect you are a socialists. Capitalism may offend you but it still works.

          • wiz says:

            Bill Roche

            You actually said something I can agree with.
            Without US industrial support (and the UK helping secure the convoys), the USSR would have likely lost to the Axis (Germany, Italy, Romania, Hungary) invasion. Maybe not completely lost, but would have lost a big chunk of territory and been unable to push them back.

            What I will add is that without an enormous human sacrifice of the Soviet peoples as well as their industrial prowess, all that industrial might would not have been able to prevent Germany victory in Europe and by the 1950s the US would probably have to face a Nazi Reich armed with nukes.

        • Burt says:

          On that tangent, the Russians made good use of the P-39 Airacobra, which the US and British considered an inferior aircraft. It performed very well in the cold and at low altitude and the Russians loved the cannon firing through the prop hub. Just to give an idea of the low altitude performance, a modified P-39 beat P-51s, P-38s, and Corsairs in the first postwar Cleveland Air Races. Greg’s Airplanes and Automobiles has a good video on this. Cue it up at about 35 minutes in for the explanation of P-39 use on the eastern front.

        • Leith says:

          The Yaks were good after they finally built it from aluminum. Before that the pilots hated it as it was fabric on a wooden frame and the shellacked fabric frequently caught fire (NOT always from enemy action) or shredded during high speeds. The green wooden frame, un-primed, occasionally deformed in flight. That anecdote was reported by Brit mil historian Tucker-Jones. Don’t know about the Tupelovs.

          By the way aluminum from the US made up 80% of Soviet wartime production. And 50 to 80% of steel for Soviet WW2 armored vehicles was also US lend lease.

          Per Russian historian Boris Sokolov:
          “Foreign aid accounted for 57.8% of the wartime production of high-octane aviation fuel in the USSR.
          400,000 Lend-Lease trucks, jeeps etc were received in the amount of 150% of Soviet domestic production.
          Lend-Lease rails, ties, locomotives, and freight cars accounted for over 97% of Soviet wartime production.
          53% of all ordnance and small arms ammo produced in the USSR 1941-1945 was made using Lend-Lease explosive materials.
          Lend-Lease made up around 30% of amchinery and Tools for Soviet war production. (However Sokolov points out that the American made machinery was more intricate and greatly expedited mass arms production. Without which it would have been impossible to produce the amount of weaponry and materiel needed for the Red Army.”

          Even Zhukov agreed. But that was before Putin and his Western fanboys started understating it or denying it ever happened.

      • JamesT says:


        Please allow me to offer an alternative explanation for why the Ukrainians are finding ammo of recent manufacture.

        If you are a leader in Russia and you order your subordinates to manufacture 1 million widgets they will come back and say “done”. This being Russia – maybe they never got made or maybe they are of poor quality. But if you order them to produce them and send them immediately to the front, then you find out how good a job they are doing.

      • Eliot says:


        If Russia has production issues, and cluster munitions are cheaper, more effective, and easier to produce, you can make more of them, they should logically make up an increasing proportion of what Russia fires.

        Because they are not, then there must be logically be a different explanation.

        – Eliot

        • TTG says:


          They could be having problems producing the submunitions. Whatever the reason, the munitions are not making their way to the front lines where they’re needed.

      • Eliot says:


        “ The DPRK is obviously not emptying their massive stockpiles of ammo for Putin.”

        Pyongyang has very few ways to earn foreign currency, and they always need money, I can’t imagine a scenario where they would pass this up.

        – Eliot

  7. JamesT says:

    On this topic a pro-Russian commentator writes:
    “It is so much easier to have a factory that can make 500 tanks a year only make 5 a year for many years and then suddenly ramp up to 500 when war breaks out, then it is to try and expand a factory that makes 5 tanks a year to 500. We are seeing this play out right now, where Russia kept many of its large Soviet munitions factories running at a loss, largely as a job creation scheme. But now with the war they were able to quickly ramp up production to a tenfold increase in short order, with further increases to come still.”


    Maybe this is disinformation but it is plausible to me that they never shut down their big Soviet munitions factories, they just ran them at reduced production levels … while keeping the tooling around just in case.

    • TTG says:


      Of course maintaining the industrial capacity to produce large amounts of arms and munitions would make it easy to surge that production. I’m not sure the Russians maintained that capacity, at least without the assistance of Western technology. They’re having trouble refurbishing their old tank stocks. Modern electronics and sights are not available due to sanctions. The Soviet war machine was produced solely in the USSR. The current Russian kleptocrats relied on Western technology to create the facade of an invincible Russian war machine. I find it appropriate that such a thing is called a Potemkin village.

  8. walrus says:

    I worked n an Ammo factory as an engineering student.

    While I have great respect for American “can do” culture. there is an unavoidable time lag in installing new production capability.

    The bottle necks are : = cartridge brass production capability – assuming some ammo still requires them.

    – about a 5000 ton hydraulic press for the 155 cartridge line. These aren’t sitting on a showroom floor. Cycle time is maybe thirty seconds per case, so you need more than one.

    – shell filling capability.

    Everything else should be relatively easily sourced.

    • TTG says:


      The quickest way to increase production is to hire a second and third shift and to fill each of those shifts to full capacity. I know that’s being done at US arms and munition plants and I believe Russia is doing the same.

    • Fredrick says:


      A 5,000 ton press for the filling the forged and machined shell? Seems like a bit of overkill, but at least the production is twice what the British have on their forging line.

  9. Al says:

    – first class of 635 Ukrainian fighters has finished a five-week advanced U.S. training course in Germany on sophisticated combat skills and armored vehicles [Bradleys and Paladins]
    -additional training is already underway at the Grafenwoehr training area, and will involve about 1,600 more Ukrainian troops
    -another battalion of Ukrainian troops began training on the Bradley fighting vehicle two weeks ago, and a field artillery battalion started instruction on the Paladin. Those two units total about 710 troops.
    -a Stryker battalion will start training next week, involving about 890 troops.

  10. Another view of this issue:

    Ukraine is burning through ammunition faster than the US and NATO can produce it.
    Inside the Pentagon’s plan to close the gap

    • TTG says:

      Keith Harbaugh,

      As the article says, we are upping our production to meet the demand, 500% in one munitions plant’s case. Others are doing the same.

      • Fred says:


        what was the total ammunition production pre-war and what does 500% increase at one plant equate to? What does that make the total production output? How does that compare to actual usage. Does the press report any of those numbers?

        • TTG says:


          Look at Keith Harbaugh’s linked article. It focuses on the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant. That plant is producing 11,000 155mm shells a month on one shift. They will ramp up to 24/7 operations. “The Army is planning a 500% increase in artillery shell production, from 15,000 a month to 70,000” with expanded plants, new plants and increased operations mostly at Scranton apparently.

          Europe is doing the same thing. A new Ukrainian-Czech plant is already producing 82mm mortar shells of a Ukrainian design.

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