1- Never trust a recruited foreign asset (spy). What you are supposed to do is to persuade the asset that you trust him. You are not supposed to actually trust him. A certain talent for acting is desirable. It is being said on television that the CIA at Khost were exposing themselves as they did in the hope of solidifying his belief in them. This is both childish and naive. It is not possible to truly know what is in a man's heart, specially on a given occasion. What he is, must be judged by endless testing of the reliablility of his response to control and vetting of the information product of the operation.
2- Never let the asset direct what is going to happen in the operation. This man called for a meeting. The meeting should have happened when and where the case officer wanted and never the other way around. What one strives for in these relationships is control over the asset. The asset must never be allowed to think that he is running the show. The media keep referring to this man as an "informant." City police departments have "informants." They give you information. You give them money, end of story. They are not under your control. Agents like this man are supposed to be under the absolute control of the agency involved. If they are not…
3- Never bring a recruited asset into any permanent operational facility, much less your base. First of all you should not start trusting him. Secondly, in running this asset you are striving to create a certain view of the universe in the asset's mind. Who you are, individually and collectively, how powerful you are (or not), where the facility is located, how it is laid out, what your people look like. These are all things that should not be available to the asset. CIA apologists are now saying that they had to meet him at Khowst because there are no other places. RUBBISH! You do not allow circumstance to dictate what you will do. This man could have been flown to another country for de-briefing. If necessary, the army could have been asked to secure a hilltop for a few hours so that he could have been debriefed in tents. there are many possibilities.
The facts seem to be that an excess of pro-active enthusiam and a hunger to be "in on the kill" caused this.
Our absence of real skill now seems to made us a menace to ourselves. pl