"If the Hizbollah can extend these advantages, if it can add shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles to its arsenal and bring down a few Israeli helicopters and jets, Israel could quickly lose its unchallenged control over Lebanese skies. Israel’s daily and wanton violations of Lebanese airspace would also come to an end.
The Hizbollah offers Israel a new kind of asymmetric warfare: it combines low-tech guerilla tactics with sophisticated missile and communications technology. Understandably, the Israelis find these Hizbollah achievements hard to digest. What the world witnessed in Lebanon in July 2006 were events that contain the potential for shifting the balance of power in the Middle East. Earlier, the Iraqi insurgents had demonstrated that they can make an occupation – even by the world’s greatest power – very costly. Now, the Hizbollah had shown that a disciplined guerilla force, with access to advanced missiles, can repel the most powerful invading army. " Alam
See my talk at the Miller Center on September 11, 2006. I would differ with Professor Alam only in his description of the force that fought the Israelis in 2006 as "a guerrilla army." A "guerrilla army" employs guerrilla tactics, that is, it fights a war of the "ants against the elephant." It seeks to inflict long term physical and spiritual attrition on a conventional enemy through ambush, raiding and similar operations. It nearly always seeks to avoid becoming decisively engaged.
Hizbullah, as it was in Lebanon in 2006, was not a "guerrilla army." It was an army in the process of metamorphosis. pl