Received this from "Got a Watch." Interesting.
Pat Lang
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"My conclusions, tentatively, on the Lebanon "war""
-the main battle tank (and indeed most armored vehicles) are increasingly vulnerable to modern weaponry…the balance has shifted in favor
of infantry firing missiles, and this trend can only continue unless some new light-weight impenetrable armor can be devised.
-the same can be said for the helicopter gunship, as evidence by the recent US cancellation of the new gunship program over vulnerability to missiles
-both of these factors point to the increasing importance of infantry over more advanced systems, which is a boost for less well equipped guerrillas
-the power of "Air Power" is vastly over-rated by western militaries, and they will no doubt continue to rely on it more and more, which is why any campaign in Iran is doomed to failure before it starts (also because bombing infrastructure only angers the population and stiffens resistance)
-western military doctrine in general sems to be moribund, preparing to fight the next WWIII on the WWII model..witness the US obsession with locating military bases all over the world to "encircle" future enemies like Iran, China etc.
-popular movements like Hezbollah can not be defeated by any kind of military force…they may be suppressed, but they will rise again unless the geo-political reasons for their having come into existence are not addressed
-the leading cause of modern Islamic terrorism is 60 years of bad foreign policy by USA/UK…or to put it more bluntly, when you go into other peoples countries at will to interfere, you only make more people angry at you – I read that Osama founded Al-Qaeda in 1982 because he saw on TV the Israeli devastation of Lebanon. How many new Al-**** have been created by the last month’s events, I wonder. (I am not excusing religious fanaticism, but more than religious differences are required to motivate suicide bombers, there has to be perceived "unjust" action from the other side too
I have more thoughts, will assemble them for a future post – keep up the good work people. Too bad nobody in Washington in a position of real influence seems to be listening. In short, IMHO America as a nation has lost its way, mistaking aggression for wise policy. Wise might be someone who can recognise a situation that they do not like but have to accept for the sake of future stability." Got a Watch
This sounds pretty much right on to me..
My Impression nowis that Both Major political Partys in the united states have been “Hijacked” by Our own “Extremist” Special interest Groups who Gain Power so they can Use the resources of the american (And British) Governments so they can achieve thier Own Political Objectives..
Then they use Propaganda and Spin to sell thier Product ..to the Average American or British Citizen..and then Waste Our Resources to carry Out Policys that keep putting america in a Worst position..
As I have said before…we need to take Our Country Back…See the TRUTH..which is only really exposed on Web sites like this..
And understand the CAUSE and EFFECT..On all Sides of World Affairs and Foreign annd Domestics policys and Actions..
which Cause REACTIONS..
– The MBT has always been vulnerable to well equipped infantry. That is why it must also be supported by its own well equipped infantry, which in turn help suppress the infantry adversary. However, the main battle tank is not very useful in a small battle space which is dotted with well prepared fortifications manned by trained and equipped infantry and possibly protected as well by mines.
– The cancellation of the RAH-66 is not evidence of the increasing superiority of infantry tactics and advanced weaponry over modern helos. It is only evidence of the failure to transform cubic meters and tons of surveillance electronics into a package that is small enough and lightweight enough to put into a vehicle the size of an attack helicopter. Helos are still effective against tanks that have no air defense. They are not very effective (and are rather vulnerable) against infantry.
– “the power of ‘Air Power’ is vastly overrated…” depends on what your definition of “power” is. Or more accurately it depends on what one’s definition of “target” is. There is no doubt that any modern air force can deliver tens of thousands of pounds of high explosive on an area (target). The problem comes in delivering a small or medium package of explosive to a target that may be from one to a few square meters in size.* “Air Power” is dependent on the promises of salesmen from defense contractors who assert that their smart weapon can fly in the window of a bad guy and kill him but not his wife and two year old child. Yes that is an exaggeration but I hope you get the point. “Smart” bombs and missiles are as much a promise as a reality, and even in the reality they are simply too indiscriminate and frequently inaccurate. I will agree that Air Power from heavy bombers to attack bombers is pretty useless in the modern MOUT space, or even in the suburban/rural Israeli campaign in Lebanon. But that 60 year old doctrine will work in the cases for which it was devised. (Setting aside the moral arguments, it is especially effective against soft civilian infrastructure.) So I would agree with the premise that “strategic bombing” as it came out of WW2 and went into the Cold War is a concept that must be retired and not used in modern urban warfare against mostly civilian populations.
– “popular” movements are, for the sake of this argument, more accurately described as insurgencies or armed uprisings by indigenous populations. And they are more effectively countered with good intelligence (sigint and humint) that feeds into good policing. (And I agree with you that in some cases they can also dealt with by alleviating the factors that cause them. Which includes defining “good” policing.)
*There is still huge argument about whether “area” or “strategic” bombing is effective in persuading an enemy to concede defeat. (I personally believe it is only effective in reducing the resistance of structures, but not people, though it did seem to work in Serbia.)
The author highlights the reason our foreign policy in the ME is a disaster: We don’t ever talk to the Arabs about what they want. We just want to tell them what’s wrong with them. Imagine you had a relative like that. Would you invite him over after a while?
Maybe it’s not completely impossible that some long term good can come out of this conflict.
It’s been a long time since the Arabs have had a legitimate Pan-Arab Leader. Assuming Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah avoids assassination, he will have assumed considerable prestige in the eyes of the most intractable foes of Israel. Is it too much of a stretch to assume that Nasrallah will have gained sufficient credibility to potentially help broker a peace agreement with Israel on behalf of both the Syrians and the Palestinians?
Is it not fair to say that, in their day, both Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin were considered giants on the Middle Eastern stage–in large part because of their military accomplishments?
Perhaps we should at least consider the possibility.
The post says: “-popular movements like Hezbollah can not be defeated by any kind of military force…they may be suppressed, but they will rise again unless the geo-political reasons for their having come into existence are not addressed”
Many “popular movements” disappeared after the cold war when soviet support was no longer available. Without Iranian and Syrian support Hezbullah would not be any more significant than any other militia in Lebanon.
The post says: “the power of “Air Power” is vastly over-rated by western militaries, and they will no doubt continue to rely on it more and more, which is why any campaign in Iran is doomed to failure before it starts (also because bombing infrastructure only angers the population and stiffens resistance)”
Air power when used as support for special forces is still the most powerful weapon on the battle field. When a guy on the ground can pull a “trigger” and the result is a 500-2000 pound bomb, that is hard to defend against. Gps guided artillary and rockets will soon be as powerful.
The post says: “-the leading cause of modern Islamic terrorism is 60 years of bad foreign policy by USA/UK…or to put it more bluntly, when you go into other peoples countries at will to interfere, you only make more people angry at you ”
Islamic terror is a continuation of Islamic agression that has been going on since the inception of that religion. Islamists want to convert the world and they will not stop until they are successful. This predates US and UK foreign policy and has nothing to do with it.
This philosophy you have that terrorism is caused by victimization of poor people by evil imperialists is wrong. When Israel gave up terroritoy in Gaza and left Lebanon they did not get peace they got missile attacks. How do you explalin that?
“the power of “Air Power” is vastly over-rated by western militaries, and they will no doubt continue to rely on it more and more”
What happens if somebody finally develops a cheap, effective surface-to-air missile defense? Will F16s become the Merkavas of the sky?
A friend sent this article from the Guardian which backs up GaW on occupation as a driving force in suicide bombings.
Tanks are becoming like the old joke about LSTs–instead of being the abbreviation for, “Landing Ship, Tank,” their nervous crews called them, “Large, Slow Target!”
Is it really only 60 years of bad policy? Can’t you trace some of the bad policy all the way back to the division of the Ottoman Empire by the British?
A Peace to End All Peace : The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0805068848/sr=1-13/qid=1155584690/ref=sr_1_13/102-5846652-0734530?ie=UTF8&s=books
You know Pat, it’s an indictment of just how out of touch Americans and their Govt is with the people they’ve been crushing under their boot heels for the last 50 odd years, that the last two points you’ve made above count as some sort of revelation.
(B-B-But they hate us for our *freedoms*!)
The US would have been well advised not to dissolve the 6th and 7th LID’s. Ah well, evil Clinton … no, that’s unfair – all of DC colluded for that. They were dissolved because they couldn’t be justified by bringing high tech pork to bipartisan Senator’s districts.
Whatever, these units would serve the US very well in today’s environment, better than, say, a squadron of F-22 fighters, probably at a lower price.
Light infantry is what the US currently lacks especially for counterinsurgency operations. And as Hezbollah has ably demonstrated they can be highly effective against much heavier mechanised forces when used with sound tactics and when terrain and armament are skillfully utilised. Not to mention their utility as a leadership pool for the rest of the army.
But sell that as transformation: ‘The soldier of the future will be moving by march, with his rifle and bayonet!’ The RMA folks would be shattered.
Paratroopers aside, large formations of light infantry is what the IDF is lacking, too. They are focused on mechanised maneuver warefare, and have to fight in difficult terrain that woud require light infantry. Lebanon isn’t the Sinai.
In Lebanon terrain favours the defender, and Hezbollah had ample time to learn by heart their sectors of fire, their tank traps, obstacles, mine fields, kill zones etc. So the tank is suddenly obsolete? Again, or still? I have heared the swan song of the tank so often that I wonder why militaries are still using them. How again went that joke? “I don’t believe in missiles, said the tank.”
However, the US Army seems to have put them to use effectively in Iraq. I think the Israeli problems aren’t about tanks being obsolete, but about using them stupidly in unfavourable terrain. In earlier wars the IDF demonstrated that combined arms teams of infantry, fire support and tanks are effective in countering ATGM. Industry slogans nonwithstanding, it isn’t exactly as if a quantum leap in missile technology changed everything.
On the issue of the future importance of infantry in a world where missiles make armored vehicles and aircraft unsurvivable, there’s a pretty good book, Invasion by Eric Harry. Invasion is set around 2020 during a Chinese invasion of the US. Harry’s thesis is the same – infantry defend the US all the way to the Potomac. It’s a very credible scenario and a good read despite some potboiler plot elements (a soldier who’s the daughter of US president and a cousin of a Chinese leader).
I often think how our current incompetent leadership’s mistakes will weaken us vis ‘a vis China into the future.
Here’s a link to the book:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0515128422/sr=1-1/qid=1155585955/ref=pd_bbs_1/104-4083727-9868710?ie=UTF8&s=books
It seems to me that the US has, through some curious devolution, developed a foreign policy that in many respects can best be described as ‘juvenile’. To no small extent it seems to resemble the maturity of its chief executive. Its excessive reliance on belligerence, refusal to engage with its perceived enemies, simplified and unsophisticated view of the world, all resemble the actions of a person confused by almost everything other than his own physical strength.
Got a Watch writes:
“the power of “Air Power” is vastly over-rated by western militaries, and they will no doubt continue to rely on it more and more, which is why any campaign in Iran is doomed to failure before it starts (also because bombing infrastructure only angers the population and stiffens resistance).”
Wasn’t this clear by late 1945? I once saw a documentary about the Allied bombing of Berlin, which far exceeded anything that a country could get away with today. The city functioned right up to the end, and the population never turned against Hitler. Indeed, the rumor in Berlin towards the end was that Hitler would return from the Alps to do something for Berlin.
So why does the belief in air power persist?
God, I have learned a lot on this blog in the past month!
I felt like I had a chance of understanding what was going on because of SST-06.
Thanks, Col. Lang, you’re a national treasure!
From Amos Harel
“Reference to the battle in the Wadi Salouki area is relevant here. In the early morning hours the battle ended successfully: A tank force crossed the river and climbed the steep hills to join an advanced infantry force in the push toward the Litani…. The first tank to cross the wadi was destroyed by a massive mine, and its crew was killed. Eight other tanks suffered anti-tank missile hits. Among the two dead are two company commanders. A battalion commander was seriously injured. The division describes this as “a historic achievement.””
I would not say the MBT is obsolete, just that Israel has forgotten that the role of armour is not to protect infantry but instead to break through the enemy line and then exploit in his rear.
In a war like Lebanon, with no front line to break through, the traditional “shock” value of heavy armour is irrelevent.
Sounds about right. Well put. Next question: What are the strategic moves available to the main players? Obviously, the underdogs learn the lesson of Lebanon and invest in soldiers, dispersed bunkers, tank killing missiles, etc. And the overdogs try to figure out a response. Obviously. But let us think boldly. Here’s a try. If Israel is willing to live in peace with the 1967 borders (and loss of water rights, etc.), here’s an interesting move. Build the fence on the legitimate borders, bring in the UN as a policeman with power to parol and to prevent missiles, with the promise to empower the Palestinians defensively: let them have (supervised) military forces with bunkers and anti-tank and anti-helicopter weapons.
At the same time, Israel makes clear it can and will do a Lebanon again, and worse, on the Palestineans if attacks are not stopped. Tying itself to the mast, Israel gives the Palestineans something they don’t want to lose, retains the ability to destroy it, and so provides conditions for peace. Too bold, probably. Other ideas?
This point of view is unassailable in its logic; why any credible power broker at the national level can’t understand this(here I include the so called “Chicken Hawks”)is beyound my ability to comprehend.
It is equally frustrating to hear over and over again the POTUS and other senior officials promise the American people that we will “stay the course” to win a war waged on a tactic (terrorism). How will we ascertain the time of our victory? Will it be after we’ve killed all those we mistrust and fear? Is this within our American values, not to mention plausibility.
Keep up the good work!
Colonel (Ret) graduate of the Air War College
Billmon, attack helicopters were made redundant in this stage of conflict with Hezbollah, I expect if the ceasefire breaks and the IDF continue their cowardly strikes,,,,,,manpads will deploy.
The French appear to be saying that Hezbollah will have to retreat to North of the Litani and begin disarming before anything else happens following 1701, such as Israel withdrawing its troops or FINUL coming in.
Huh? What on earth can prompt them to think that that is remotely possible?
There is a large measure of never-never land in 1701.
I don’t think the discussion of battle tanks should stop any time soon.
If GaW’s thesis is correct, and if we may assume that the FARC guerrillas in Columbia have been studying; the Lebanon situation, we may predict that they will be deploying these tactics successfully in the near future.
“God, I have learned a lot on this blog in the past month!
I felt like I had a chance of understanding what was going on because of SST-06.
Thanks, Col. Lang, you’re a national treasure!” – meletius
I second that sentiment. There’s more discussion that informs and helps lay folks like me understand the military-political issues in the ME on this blog than definitely compared to our corporate media. Kudos to PL for providing a forum for “nuanced reality-based” discussions.
I regularly see references to the Serbian air campaign as a counter to the inefficacy of strategic bombing.
Now, I remember reading “somewhere” that Slobo threw in the towel not because of infrastructure destruction but rather the following:
A large KLA force assembled and entered Serb-controlled territory. Serbs massed their armour in response which was promptly vaporized from the air. Slobo realized that repetition of this tactic would leave him with no army. However, discussion of this event was muted because the U.S. was not supposed to be coordinating with the KLA. So, we are left with the myth of Gen. Clark’s non-casualty victory.
Can anyone clarify…with references?
I suppose when the US supported soldier is without the benefit of air support 10 to 20 meters below ground in a defensive tunnel equipped with blast doors, drop offs, segmented power ventilation and numerous side exits he just might realize he is there as an invader, not a liberator or defender. The lessons of Cu Chi have been learned.
As someone who was trained not only to fight, but to teach counterinsurgency operations I have a few comments.
First, this is a great Blog!
Back to insurgents, terrorists or popular movements. Before you can deal with such people, you have to know what makes them tick and how they are supported.
A British ex policeman said it elsewhere in the context of the recent British terror plots “Only a community can stop terrorism” and he is right.
Mao said it in his little red book;- something like “the guerillas are like fish that swim in the sea of the peasants” or suchlike, meaning that geurillas are indistinguishable from the general population.
My point is that insurgents or terrorists cannot and will not operate in a vacuum. They require at least the tacit support of the general population of their region, and preferably active support.
The population provide everything the insurgents need; camouflage, intelligence, communications, logistics, cover, medical assistance and transport. Without a general population the insurgency cannot continue.
The mission, therefore, of a counterinsurgency campaign is to deny the insurgents the support of the population.
Against this test, the reasons for the successes and failures of military campaigns since WWII is blindingly obvious.
Look no further than Lebanon. The Israelis believed bombing would make Lebanese turn on Hezbollah, the reverse occurred.
On a tactical level. A successful campaign requires that you support the community (ie the general population) in a manner that gives them permission not to support insurgency.
In Malaya this was done by ensuring that each village was defended and that a curfew was in place each night (which automatically solves the rules of engagement problem, anyone moving at night is a bad guy)in this manner it was possible to isolate the insurgents from their potential supporters as well as deliver some of the benefits to them that western civilisations promise (medicine, security, jobs etc., all that hearts and minds stuff).
While this strategy was pushed very hard to America in Vietnam, they refused to adopt it, possibly for political reasons. The upshot was that the Army went home each night to their firebases or whatever, leaving the locals to the tender mercies of the VC.
In addition, the American propensity to see things as black or white was (and is)a huge handicap, they became totally frustrated when the village they had cleared and medicated by day became a source of VC at night.
Fast track to Iraq. It’s obvious that nothing was remembered about Vietnam, or learned. American troops simply took over Saadams palaces in Baghdad, built armed camps away from the cities to which they retreat each night except when carrying out pointless “search and destroy” sweeps, which don’t and can’t work.
It is worth noting however that the Army is putting the finishing touches to a new counterinsurgency manual – the first in 25 years. It’s on the web.
So back to tanks and airpower.
Can you win friends in the community with air power by area bombing and or taking down the homes of twenty families to kill one insurgent? No.
Can you win friends in the community with MBT’s doing the same thing? No.
Can you win friends in the community by retreating to your base each night for cocktails, leaving the city to the tender mercies of the police and militias? No.
Can you win friends in the community by reviling their culture and calling them ragheads? No.
Can you torture or abuse them into liking what you stand for? No.
So what happens when insurgents are able to access fire and forget anti armor and anti air missiles? Israel just found out the hard way.
I would guess that somewhere, someone is working on an “open source” simple anti air missile, the aeronautical equivalent of a Katyusha, probably made with a CCD from a camera and a simple computer chip.
Once this technological “trickle down effect” occurs, the balance between armor, artillery, air and good old fashioned infantry is going to have to change radically in favor of more infantry – and not mechanised either.
akjwltjslker,
How brave, comments like that with a false name and false email address. I’ll let the naive Anti-Islamic comments slide, but I will answer your question,”When Israel gave up terroritoy[sic] in Gaza and left Lebanon they did not get peace they got missile attacks. How do you explalin that?” just in case you sneak back to read it.
they left Gaza and closed it down. They closed the Rafah crossing and severly limited access to Israel, something most Palestinians depend on for income. They continued their policy of “targeted” assasinations, targeted meaning the guy we meant to get and anyone within a 10meter radius. They also control the supply of water to the area which they frequently cut off. Effectively, Gaza is the biggest open prison in the world.
Lebanon, I won’t bother expalining it, I’ll let UNIFIL do it: “Israel have breached the blue line and sovreignty of Lebanon on an almost daily basis since 2000”
In his speech to parliament, Mr Olmert said Hezbollah’s “state within a state” and “terror organisation” in southern Lebanon had been destroyed.
However he added that the group’s leaders would “not be left alone”.
“We will continue pursuing them anywhere, all the time and we do not intend to apologise or ask anyone’s permission,” he added.
Olmert seems to be reiterating their policy of “assasination”. It would then imply that HA leadership including Nasrallah will have to remain underground. It seems to me that Olmert is signalling that this is not a real cease-fire. And I speculate a break to reassess and enable the IDF to come up with better tactics now that they have a better understanding of HA tactics and defensive positions.
While Nasrallah had this to say.
“We are today before a strategic, historic victory, without exaggeration,” Nasrallah said. He called Monday “a great day.”
He declared that it was the “wrong timing” for a public discussion on disarming the guerilla group, saying the issue should be done in secret sessions of the government to avoid serving Israeli interests.
The UN resolution states that “there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon.”
“This is immoral, incorrect and inappropriate,” he said. “It is wrong timing on the psychological and moral level particularly before the cease-fire,” he said in reference to calls for the guerrillas to disarm.
“Who will defend Lebanon in case of a new Israeli offensive?” he asked. “The Lebanese army and international troops are incapable of protecting Lebanon,” he said, flanked by Lebanese and Hezbollah flags.
But Nasrallah said he was open to dialogue about Hezbollah’s weapons at the appropriate time. And he credited his group’s weapons with proving to Israel that “war with Lebanon will not be a picnic. It will be very costly.”
Nasrallah said the “massive devastation and destruction” inflicted upon Lebanon during the monthlong war reflected Israel’s “failure and impotency.”
Clearly HA have no intention to disarm and are in fact using the “defense” of Lebanon argument to prevent Lebanese dirty laundry from being hung out in the open. Note his point about “secret” deliberations. How this plays out will provide a good indicator of the Saniora groups political strength and if this conflict has strengthened or weakened HA domestically? And how long will it take the IDF to be ready to relaunch their Lebanon campaign?
My conclusion is that cheap, extremely numerous and often very accurate missiles are changing the face of war. They have lots of fire power and don’t require expensive vulnerable infrastructure along with large specially trained human resources. They are not so expensive that losing a small number is unacceptably costly.
With nothing more than Katyusha’s a non-state guerilla army without any airforce at all was able to shut down northern Israel, from the air, without actually holding any ground on the Israeli side of the border. Without a Navy or Air Force they were able to put an enemy ship out of action. A force without armour stopped one of the best tank forces in the world.
$200 million buys a stateless force enough missiles to defend itself successfully in a month long war with a first world military. Or it buys the US/Israel a small number of hand built fighter planes incapbale of making a militarily significant dent in the above force. Who’s getting more bang for their buck?
The efficency of mass manufacture and cost of IT systems are only improving. In the future we can expect cheap, mobile and easily hidden anti-aircraft missiles, GPS guided Katyusha equivalents, and don’t forget the longer range more accurate missiles Hezbollah did not actually use. The weapon systems in a conventional military are starting to look irrelevant.
After keenly watching this conflict what sorts of weapons do you think small states with limited budgets like Venezuela are going to buy? The world is going to become a dangerous place for first world conventional militaries.
Oh and bunkers.
Everyone can afford to build deep concrete bunkers these days. If you have hilly or mountainous terrain and you build deep bunkers you can protect yourself from air power without air defenses of any kind.
Makes you wonder what a war with North Korea would look like.
“the main battle tank (and indeed most armored vehicles) are increasingly vulnerable to modern weaponry…the balance has shifted in favor
of infantry firing missiles, and this trend can only continue unless some new light-weight impenetrable armor can be devised.”
Disagree.The tank vs antitank weapons match is actually more balanced now than it was in the late 60’s when light and simple HEAT warheads (RPG-7 and Sagger ones) could rip apart practically any tank from any angle.The infantry with missiles thing is exactly what I was reading in military articles of the 70’s.The answer was better tactics and composite/reactive armors.
HEAT remained effective but it was not killer it used to be.
Besides what is the alternative to the tank? Infantry throwing itself at machine gun nests?
Ok I am exaggerating here but I hope you get the point.4GW is light infantry job, but if the shit really hits the fan you will want armored support.
What concentrated Slobo’s mind re Kosovo was the beginning of movement toward building up ground forces to intervene.
Walrus:
While being second to none in my admiration for British counterinsurgency methods, The British already had the bulk of the population behind them, in that the insurgents were ethnic Chinese in a largely Malay population. What was also clear was that decolonization would take place when the insurgency was defeated, which gave the political elite a stake in supporting the British.
I suppose it would sound defeatist to this administration, but linking US withdrawal to the defeat of the insurgency in Iraq may have a similar effect.
Mo,
I read the original ignorant comment you are commenting upon and felt a surge of anger and disgust that must be a fraction of what you feel.
In Australia, some of us try not to “argue with a mug” — invincibly stupid folk whom it would take a lifetime to persuade of anything, especially if it conflicts with their Koolaid-driven conventional “wisdom”.
Col. Lang’s splendid blog is mainly for those, I think, who are allergic to Koolaid.
I cannot begin to give chapter and verse to the esoteric dicussion of tactics and military philosphies of the past and present (G. Armstrong Custer is obviously the revered example).
All I know is that in my life experience from Steveson/Eisenhower to today, our knowledge of the past is corrupted by the “can do” spirit of America.
Today I watched the president speak and found his comments about the “root causes of the conflict” to be short-sighted, uninformed, if not ignorant!
Next time he goes to his ranch he should read anything by Barbara Tuchman.
Warren G. Harding needs a companion.
great comment, Walrus
Air power is great for terrorizing people. 15,000 houses destroyed. Random cars and civilian convoys blown up. If you think Israel was using air power mainly to go after Hizbullah rocket launchers, then it would appear that air power has failed. But that is not what happened here. The main goal was to do another ‘shock and awe’, and terrorize the Lebanese into submission.
Anywhere you happen to be, we will blow you up at random. That is the message. That is how Israel uses air power.
As a Lebanese, I am praying for the day Russia or China floods the world with effective anti-air missiles, like they flooded the world with AKs and RPGs.
-Nabil
It seems to me that air power, MBTs and infantry all still have their place in modern warfare. The issue is about using them wisely, rather than inappropriately.
Shock-and-awe looks awesome on TV but is an excellent way of fuelling insurgency and terrorism. United States and Britain have conveniently forgotten the lessons of World War II. Neither the London Blitz nor the bombing of German cities turned people against their governments or reduced their will to fight. The U.S. rediscovered that in Vietnam.
I can’t help wondering if interservice rivalry is a important factor in this, with air forces promising quick and easy victories while armies worry about troop casualties. And you can always trust the politicans of any country to fall for it.
Hopefully, the Lebanon affair makes terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda that target civilians looks like wimps.
It looks like there is going to be no guerilla war in southern Lebanon. Not because Hezbollah doesn’t want one, they still want to hurt the Israelis. Rather because the Israeli army has already pulled most of its forces back behind the Blue Line.
This from Robert Fisk in southern Lebanon:
Israel’s mighty army has already retreated from the neighbouring village of Ghandoutiya after losing 40 men in just over 36 hours of fighting. It has not even managed to penetrate the smashed town of Khiam where the Hizbollah were celebrating yesterday afternoon. In Srifa, I stood with Hizbollah men looking at the empty roads to the south and could see all the way to Israel and the settlement of Mizgav Am on the other side of the frontier.
–clip–
Indeed, last night, scarcely any Israeli armour was to be seen inside Lebanon – just one solitary tank could be glimpsed outside Bint Jbeil and the Israelis had retreated even from the “safe” Christian town of Marjayoun. It is now clear that the 30,000-strong Israeli army reported to be racing north to the Litani river never existed. In fact, it is unlikely that there were yesterday more than 1,000 Israeli soldiers left in all of southern Lebanon, although they did become involved in two fire-fights during the morning, hours after the UN-ceasefire went into effect.
Any suggestions as to what the Israelis were up to over the weekend. Where they trying to persuade the world that they had won a major victory by reaching the Litani in the hope that with no western journalists present to dispute it, the west would believe them?
zanzibar,
I was a bit surprised at the speed which both Israel and Hizbollah accepted the UN resolution. It was obvious that the IDF would not be successful at its stated goal, but its doubtful that Israeli high command would have given up that dream so soon. And Hizbollah’s cabinet ministers in the Lebanese government also voted in favor of the resolution, which makes Hizbollah subject to the government’s command. Which makes me wonder whether Siniora is playing a double game; telling Condi that he’ll require Hizbollah to disarm, and telling Hizbollah that he won’t.
—
Marcello, question about your comment: would not gun nests, etc. be as vulnerable to air support as they would be to tanks, with the added benefit of presenting far less of a target?
I am not at all anything close to a military expect, so please forgive me if I am being very naive, but I can imagine a case where the infantry’s real purpose is to wander the ground finding places for the air force to blow up. I wonder if this was done by Israel over Beirut by spies wandering around marking buildings. In a real battlefield, though, this might be effective?
BR.
One might point out that the nationalist wing of the Serbian politics (one might be tempted to say lunatic fringe, but as I understand it, they make up 1/4 to 1/3 of the Serbian people) thought Milosevic was a traitor in cahoots with the Western imperialists who stabbed Serbia in the back by giving in when unnecessary. Not necessarily defending this position, just that perceptions differ closer to the ground, even here.
It’s déjà vu. Sort of.
“Most people are aware of the curious struggle which arose during
the Federal war between the guns and armor of iron-plated ships.
The result was the entire reconstruction of the navy of both the
continents; as the one grew heavier, the other became thicker
in proportion. The Merrimac, the Monitor, the Tennessee, the
Weehawken discharged enormous projectiles themselves, after
having been armor-clad against the projectiles of others. In fact
they did to others that which they would not they should do to them–
that grand principle of immortality upon which rests the whole art
of war.
Now if Barbicane was a great founder of shot, Nicholl was a
great forger of plates; the one cast night and day at Baltimore,
the other forged day and night at Philadelphia. As soon as ever
Barbicane invented a new shot, Nicholl invented a new plate;
each followed a current of ideas essentially opposed to the other.”
http://www.online-literature.com/verne/earth_to_moon/10/
Olmert and Bush remind me of an old Jimmy Buffet song, ‘Twin Sons of Different Mothers’. Both of them talking basic nonsense today. HA will not disarm. It would be suicide. After all this time and they still fired off 250 missiles into Israel on Sunday???
It’s déjà vu. Sort of.
“Most people are aware of the curious struggle which arose during
the Federal war between the guns and armor of iron-plated ships.
The result was the entire reconstruction of the navy of both the
continents; as the one grew heavier, the other became thicker
in proportion. The Merrimac, the Monitor, the Tennessee, the
Weehawken discharged enormous projectiles themselves, after
having been armor-clad against the projectiles of others. In fact
they did to others that which they would not they should do to them–
that grand principle of immortality upon which rests the whole art
of war.
Now if Barbicane was a great founder of shot, Nicholl was a
great forger of plates; the one cast night and day at Baltimore,
the other forged day and night at Philadelphia. As soon as ever
Barbicane invented a new shot, Nicholl invented a new plate;
each followed a current of ideas essentially opposed to the other.”
http://www.online-literature.com/verne/earth_to_moon/10/
Wombat, you are quite right about the British in Malaya.
Australia used a similar strategy with some success in Vietnam.
Which reminds me about IED’s and the Infantry definition of a road. “Something you walk parallel to and one hundred yards from.”
I wish American troops in Iraq would get out of their Hummers and trucks and rely on shoe leather. They would be a lot safer and more effective.
Walrus & Mo, great posts. Pat, thanks for the great learning forum.
It appears one reason we in the US do poorly with insurgencies is we do not know our own and its history. Which is really curious since one of Mao’s heroes was Washington.
Our Revolutionary War popular books consist of the stories of a handful of founding fathers. In ones soul one knows that the rebellion was far deeper than the story of a few of the Continental Congress or document signers. Sabastian Haffner wrote when one reads ordinary history books, “you get the impression that no more than a few dozen people are involved, who happen to be ‘at the helm of the ship of state’ and whose deeds and decisions form what is called history.
“… It may seem a paradox, but it is nonetheless the simple truth, to say that on the contrary, the decisive historical events take place among us, the anonymous masses. The most powerful dictators, ministers, and generals are powerless against the simultaneous mass decisions taken individually and almost unconsciously by the population at large… Decisions that influence the course of history arise out of the individual experiences of thousands or millions of individuals.”
Having read the first three chapters of the well-researched, Unknown American Revolution, by Nash, here’s an observation. (Full disclosure: some reviews are uncomplimentary to its conclusions – which I haven’t reached and are beyond the point here.) What is useful for a soldier and policy maker is the level of local violence, long time frame of the violence and the varied issues driving those acts. It appears the real value of the local militia was not to combat the British soldiers, but rather to violently protest and combat the British civil administrators. Methods used ranged the gambit: demonstrations, ransacking, riots, hanging in effigy, springing their kind from the governors’ jails, intimidating the governors’ sheriff(s) to preclude enforcing the governors’ rule or the British law, performing a “house – pulling” on the local stamp act administrator(s) and others, intimidating locals who supported the crown, and using the poor mans IED – fire. In most instances, the heavier the governors’ hand or the King’s, the more strident was the backlash. Classic death by a thousand cuts. When the local pulpits echoed and amplified the grievances – analogy to the Iraqi mullahs and local Iraqi militias becomes inescapable.
“but I can imagine a case where the infantry’s real purpose is to wander the ground finding places for the air force to blow up. I wonder if this was done by Israel over Beirut by spies wandering around marking buildings. In a real battlefield, though, this might be effective?”
Of course it is already done.SF with designators for air dropped guided munitions is the favorite of Rumsfeld.My take is that while such thing has its own place it is not the final word in warfare.
Planes have response times of several minutes at the very least, bad weather can hamper them etc.
A tank advancing with infantry is immediately there and can engage things like machine guns nests with direct fire as soon as they pop up.The infantry on the other hand can protect it by flushing out ATGM teams.
It is possible that the tank might be going the way of the battleship.
But they have said this so many times that I will not believe it just because they say so.
Unusual method of preparing for combat high command?
“MKs demand Halutz resign for selling off stock as war loomed”
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/750789.html
When Israel gave up terroritoy in Gaza and left Lebanon they did not get peace they got missile attacks. How do you explalin that?
Simple. Half a loaf is not better than one! Half-measures will not get the job done. What Israel needs to do is quit playing games and vacate all occupied lands.
it seems that the idf in lebanon and the us in iraq and the us in new orleans seem to have experienced the same problem – poor leadership – in each case initiatives with sufficient resources led by people who were not up to the task of getting it done
pbrownlee,
Yes I try very hard to avoid arguing with people like that but its hard not to. However, he did pose a question and I thought it would be rude not help educate the poor chap.
The one good thing to come out of Israel sticking their hand into the Lebanese Hornet’s Nest is that they’d discovered how futile their vaunted wall is. The problem has always been that if they truly desire to give the Palestinians a viable state then a wall is simply a waste of money. And if they don’t, then a wall will be totally inadequate to make Israelis feel safe. The wall isn’t a solution, but a means to EVADE a solution.
When France was contemplating the Maginot Line as a possible solution to the problem posed by an unfriendly Germany, a cautionary voice was that of Gen. Adolphe Guillaumat. As early as 1922 he warned: “It is dangerous to let the false and demoralizing notion spread that once we have fortifications the inviolability of our country is assured, and that they are a substitute for the rude labor of preparation of wills, hearts, and minds.”
In other words, the best wall in the world can’t compensate for a lack of guts on the part of its defenders.
First, I know your name from a legion of admirers and former colleagues (yes they can be one and the same) but we have never met I think. I enjoy your site very much and thank you for the opportunity to contribute.
The continuing debate on the future of armour on your site is interesting. Indeed, the debate takes me back more than four decades to when I was a young officer in the Australian Army.
In those days we had to take a number of promotion exams on a variety of topics such as administration, military law and military history, etc. You completed a set of exams to fit you for for promotion to Captain and another set for promotion to Major. A particular focus of our military history studies was the North African campaigns of 1941 and 1942, it was a fertile subject area for the purpose (Vietnam perhaps being too current and certainly too incoherent).
I recall clearly that, in the case of armour, I seem to have learned two lessons. As a Lieutenant I learnt that the best thing to kill a tank was another tank. A year or so later, as a Captain, I learnt that the best thing to kill a tank was an anti-tank system, e.g. the German 88 mm AA Gun 18, the Spitfire of the Desert Air Force, and a brave, well led, equipped and trained infantryman to name but three examples.
Why there should have been such a change over the period of a year or so in the lessons we were supposed to draw from our studies of history is not clear. Maybe it was the result of some arcane debate within Army Office, or maybe it was simply the inevitable effect of the posting cycle within the Education Corps. Anyway, for what its worth, IMHO, both approaches kill tanks, but perhaps the anti tank system, whatever it might be, kind of wins out in the long run. In particular, a properly trained, led and motivated soldier, adequately equipped and armed for the task and who knows how to use the ground he is given remains the deadliest thing on the battlefield, especially as far as tanks are concerned.
Bringing all this back to the south Lebanese battlefield leads me to think that maybe we have all been looking too much at the hardware and not paying enough attention to the human dimension. It would appear that something has changed in the past half dozen years and Hizbullah has emerged as a trained, disciplined and motivated soldier able to hold his own, for a time at least, against well respected forces, i.e. well respected in the western tradition.
The latter qualifier is important. Military forces do not exist on a continuum common to all. Culture and history are vital components almost overlooked as we try to shoehorn all forces into common set of of organisations and bahaviours – but culture and history do make a difference. Western forces have evolved over the centuries to share a style of war fighting that is unforgiving, murderous and industrially efficient – inheritors of the phalanx and its discipline and also the right to question courtesy of the Reformation. The Levant on the other hand has an entirely different history where military forces often broke off battle to fight another day rather than to seek a risky all or nothing in an appalling meat grinder confrontation (the industrial slaughters of the Somme or of Paschendael are inconceivable outside the context of western armies in conflict with one another). Similarly, religion can force certain behaviours and mindsets. After the they lost all at the 1571 Battle of Lepanto, perhaps the single greatest defeat suffered by Islamic forces at the hands of the West, the Turks, rather than find out what had led to the catastrophe, preferred instead to conclude that Allah was not on their side that day. Meanwhile the countries of the West spent generations studying and deriving lessons learnt from that same battle.
Hizbullah, of late, has gained our western respect because it has operated well in terms of our own western standards. Why have they operated so well? I expect that combinations of advice/support from Iran and Syria will form part of the answer but certainly not all of it. There is something else out there and we have not yet identified it (and I do not believe that Iran or Syria are qualified to impart the relevant lessons).
Who knows, maybe is it is simply that globalisation has led to a globalised approach that borrows overmuch from the western resource thus forcing Hizbullah to adopt western means. Maybe its something weird like Stasi (or whoever) advice and a HA willingness to adopt a winning strategy (only kidding).
The key is to ask what happened to the human material in all of this. Forget the hardware, at this point the minutiae of Merkava design or IDF doctrine are just mechanics. Finding out what led the IDF to place itself in a killing box and what led the HA to set up that box, then use it properly and basically survive is a much better question set.
Regards
Wow! Thanks for posting my (somewhat)un-informed ramblings as a topic…an honor for a first post for sure! I will have to carefully consider the content of my posts for factual accuracy before I post, lest I embarass myself.
Perhaps I should have qualified my remarks on tanks and choppers by saying that in a full-out modern battlefield, they still have their place…except I don’t see large scale open ground battles breaking out in the near future, as there are very few (or no) militaries outside NATO who could sustain one. Unless China vs USA or Russia vs NATO or something similar breaks out (sure hope not). Even if the USA invades Iran, the battle will most likely look more like Lebanon today than Fulda Gap. Not that these weapon system should be scrapped, but they must assume to be less effective, and to be of very little use in urban/guerrilla wars such as Iraq/Lebanon where the insurgents can be assumed to have effective portable AA missiles. The American army in Iraq has had to scale back helicopter operations from what I have read, due to the threat posed by (Soviet-made or copied) AA missiles. And I did read somewhere the new Army chopper was cancelled in part (cost overruns also a factor) due to perceived severe vulnerability to the new generation of Soviet AA missiles, which were said to be able to ignore all current counter-measures – Soviet military technology has continued to advance, and their new missiles have been rated by some experts as having tilted the balance in their favor. Maybe the USA/NATO can develop effective counter-measures, but as of today, I am calling the missile as having the upper hand.
I did not mean “Air Power” is obsolete, or will fall out of use – just that its effectiveness is in question in the types of conflicts that are being fought now. Air power cannot capture or hold ground, win hearts and minds, or destroy insurgents dug in deep. The failures of air power can be clearly seen in Lebanon now, and Iraq (Fallujah). If the enemy will come out of their foxholes, form up and advance in formation across open ground, then air power wins. Why can’t they just fight like men, dammit? I have more counter-points to the reply posts, many good points there, that’s for sure. Will post again, have to go now. Thanks for posting!