A two-part series in the New York Times (Feb. 28-29) gives details, some new, some not, on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's role in the 2011 decision to join France and England in attacking Libya. Ostensibly to protect civilians threatened by Qadafi, the joint venture under a UN resolution, ended in the death of Qaddafi, the failure of an interim government, the emergence of militia fighting, the entrance of ISIS, and today–chaos. That is the first installment.
The second installment goes on to describe the after-life of this failure: efforts to pull Libya back together, the increasing inattention by all parties, except the Libyans, to the growing disorder, failed efforts to rein in the militias, and the long-term consequences for the ME and Africa of the dispersal of Qaddafi's armory to Islamic forces.
What may be of particular interest here are the sources for the story, the influence (or lack thereof) by other Obama Administration officials, the role that Clinton and her deputies played in the decision, and the somewhat surprising, at least to me, claim that there was little official intelligence about Libya available as decisions were being made. Much of the "information" is said to have come from news stories.
I realize that many here are not Clinton fans. Be that as it may, what interests me is how the story lays out the decision and its aftermath.