"Support for the proposed influx of troops to Afghanistan, however, comes as Americans are about evenly divided about whether the war there has proved to be worth its costs. They also split 50 to 41 percent on whether it is essential to win in Afghanistan to succeed in broader efforts against terrorism.
Nearly four in 10 who said the war has not justified its costs back the new troops, signaling that some people may expect better results after the troop levels rise. (Among Democrats, that number is closer to 50 percent.) While most Americans opposed Bush's early 2007 decision to send additional troops to Iraq, the percentage who saw significant progress there trended sharply higher from the summer of 2007 through the end of last year." Washpost
———————————————————————-
Kilcullen's graphic (above) on the elements of insurgency is interesting and instructive. He attempts in that "mess" to show how complicated this kind of warfare may be. Imagine how much more complicated are the efforts necessary to counteract all of that. Those efforts collectively make up what is call "counterinsurgency." (COIN)
I did COIN. I did it in South America. I did it in SE Asia. I did it in Arabia. I did it.
It works. It worked in Iraq. It has been very expensive in Iraq, expensive in money, expensive in political capital, and very expensive in blood if some of that is yours.
Was it necessary to do COIN in Iraq? Yes. It was. The ground was ripe in Iraq for irregular warfare against the US occupation. The "human terrain" was perfect for it. The illusions that accompanied the occupation made the US occupying force a perfect target for irregular warfare. Having made so many mistakes in Iraq, COIN was the only method that would bring the US success in Iraq other than mass murder. The Republican and neocon slogan word "Surge" is just code for COIN. The additional US troops were just part of that COIN effort.
Afghanistan is another place where COIN can work. The ground in Afghanistan is even more fertile for long term irregular warfare against the foreign other than was Iraq. Irregular warfare in Afghanistan is an age-old way of life. In Afghanistan, the people in the next valley are often one's tribal enemy.
Nevertheless, COIN can work in Afghanistan. The question is not if COIN will work in Afghanistan. The question is whether or not we should pay the exorbitant price that COIN will exact from us for the privilegege of using this methodology in that country.
Ten years? 150 billion dollars? 5,000 dead (ours)? What will the cost be? Do I know? No. Neither does anyone else, but everyone who knows anything knows that it will be very expensive.
There are other ways to accomplish the goal of "neutering" Islamist extremists. I, and other people have suggested them. None of them involve becoming Afghanistan's "godfather." pl
Pat
Why does our political “leadership” want to become Afghanistan’s “godfather”? Is it just ego and vanity?
I can see that the cost argument will not carry much weight since its “only” taxpayer money and military family blood!
I saw an article somewhere on the tubes that cited a conversation between Obama and McKiernen (sp?). the gist:
Obama: what do you intend to do with the 30K troops?
McK: ummmm…well..hem & haw
Obama: only 17K troops for a guy who can’t describe the reason he needs 30K troops.
evidently a conversation with the Joint Chief of Staffs went similarly.
q. what is the endgame in Afganistan?
a. *crickets*
Over ten years that $150 billion would be very low. $150 billion per year is the more correct number.
Cost of the Wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and Other Military Operations
Through 2008 and Beyond – Center for Strategic
and Budgetary
Assessments (pdf)
How many ‘western’ soldiers would be needed to do real COIN in Afghanistan? 200-300,000 at nearly a million a year (logistics in Afghanistan are much more expensive than in Iraq)?
Is anyone willing to spend that?
I don’t understand what you mean by it can “work?” Just what would you define as it “working?” Isn’t this the same area that defeated every outside invader since Alexander’s time? Did it work for him? Did it “work” for the British? Did it “work” for the Russians?
I think Americans in general are fearful of establishing some kind of protectorates in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet they have never been really given good explanations of both wars other than the GWOT. When will someone be allowed to articulate the underlying rationale, not just for or against the effort, for either event. After all soon it will be a decade since it all began. What is the effort supposed to accomplish? What resources will be needed and for how long? We may have issues closer to home (Mexico) erupting that require armed force to meet. PL gives us please you rationale NOW for both efforts and as a former INTEL officer what facts you see that justify your conception of the US role and needs? Thanks!
“The question is not if COIN will work in Afghanistan. The question is whether or not we should pay the exorbitant price that COIN will exact from us for the privilegege of using this methodology in that country.”
Sorry, but I think that is the wrong question.
The question is not SHOULD, but CAN.
CAN the US pay for the exorbitant price that COIN will exact from you?
The world and USA are going for a big Depression. Currently, the big US banks are “zombie banks” and that is a recipe for a prolongued recession. The house’s prices will continue to fall until 2010 or maybe 2011-2012. GM and Chrysler are bankrupt and Ford is not far away that.
The coust can be too big for an economy that will be weak for 5 or more years.
Empires like the Roman fell because they don’t were capable of support the Legion’s cousts.
WRC
I have never sought to justify any such relationship and have always opposed it. I am not going to seek to justify it now.
KM
If you are going to play here you will have to educate yourself. I am getting tired of telling people the same things over and over again.
COIN is a specific form of warfare developed in the 20th Century for the purpose of defeating insurgent campaigns. Political Action + Nation Building + counter-guerrilla operations would be shorthand for the method.
There are many books on the subject. Someone here will suggest a few.
The Russians, the British, the Macedonians, etc. never did COIN in Afghanistan. They just fought there. pl
How do we also implement COIN in Pakistan, specifically the NorthWest Frontier and tribal areas? Pashtunistan extends into both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban draws support from both areas.
O.K. here comes a radical idea that might work:
1. Buy the Tribal Areas from Pakistan for 50-100 billion dollars (forgive me BG Ali).
2. Offer the Pashtuns (Pathans, Pashtos, or Taliban) a free and united Pashtunistan in exchange for handing over all of al-Qaeda.
3. Also offer them a cash-buyout to be determined latter as an additional incentive.
Tribal honor would be saved because they are doing it for the homeland plus this will be cheaper in the long-run for America.
The Pashtuns were drug-growing, goat-herders when the Colonel was in Vietnam.
They were drug-growing, goat-herders when the Soviets invaded.
They were still drug-growing, goat-herders after 911 and in twenty years I can predict they will be doing the same.
As for Pakistan, well they never really controlled that area anyways.
I noticed that Pat did not say we could “win” in Afghanistan, but instead merely said that COIN could “work”.
I thank him for the essential discrimination.
To “win” is far too much a personal and subjective term.
That COIN could “work” may have its genesis in that timeless quote of Archimedes of:
“Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to place it, and I shall move the world.”
Yea, infinite resources coupled with infinite patience, then stuff can happen.
And as Pat notes, the real question is whether we, the Americans in particular, and the West/NATO in general, are “willing” to pay the price.
WaPo’s “cheerleading” polls notwithstanding, I believe the conventional wisdom is more predictive.
Americans, and the West/NATO, like a “free lunch”.
Meals that max out our credit card in blood and treasure tend to be skipped.
Give us our “Happy Meals” and we be happy.
Make us pick up the tab for folks we don’t even know, we be not happy.
“I did COIN. I did it in South America. I did it in SE Asia. I did it in Arabia. I did it.”
Pat, looking back at your career, would you say your work was worthwhile?
Would you say you were on the morally right side of these fights?
Was your work for the good of the world as a whole, or just the USA, or both?
Not looking for a fight here, but your work, was at major turning points of history, and thus merits these questions.
Sincerely,
Don S.
http://www.wikileaks.org/leak/us-call-south-afghanistan-coin-2006.pdf
Farmer Don
Sam Huntington wrote in “The Soldier and the State” that he thought that “in the military modern man can find his monastery.” I found mine.
Cato
Was Cato a censor? Ah- Pakistan. They have to do COIN in Pakistan or whatever it is they decide to do. pl
Col. Lang wants us to distinguish the military and the political.
Yes, the military side, using COIN, can “work” IF we put in enough money and bodies (that’s a big IF, as noted).
So, what is the political objective? If it is sufficiently clear and compelling, then yes, the United States will devote the required resources. It’s in the political sphere that “win” is defined.
We would all like the politicians to stop weaseling around with other people’s children and money.
Instead, the politicians will not decide. They will put in not enough resources and keep the political goals (the “win”) vague. This maximizes the opportunities for blame shifting.
When, as a result of this half strategy, the U.S. is forced into political failure, it will be the White House incumbent who takes the blame. Hence, the desire to put off the tough decision and leave it up to the next guy.
I think we should first do nation building in our own country, building up our educational system, our health care system and our infrastructure. And then and only then move our eyes towards Afganistan and Pakistan.
A friend sent me the article in today’s WAPO by Henry Kissinger: “A Strategy for Afghanistan”. My reply was:
These people who pontificate from the ivory towers of Washington etc forget a couple of basic points about Afghanistan :
(1) However effectively your troops can fight the insurgents in an area, to the people of that area you are, and will always remain, foreign occupiers. Unless you are prepared to stay there forever, the insurgents will always come back when you depart. What kind of victory or success or solution is that?
(2) The Taliban have no interest in waging jihad outside their borders. Based on their experience, they are unlikely to allow al-Qaeda to set up bases in their areas of control in Afghanistan. This lesson can be reinforced by carrying out air strikes on any suspected bases.
One way to neuter a religious/nationalist patriotic self-defense movement is to stop killing them and their country’s non-combatant men, women and children and get out of their country. Any of our national security geniuses given that some thought?
Also, what’re the code words for bribery, ethnic cleansing and negotiated truce?
this is from Al jazeera
“Last year, Ahmed Jan, an intermediary for the Taliban and tribal elder from Helmand province, was sent on behalf of the Taliban to Kabul for talks with the Afghan government, our correspondent said.
Jan was arrested after US officials discovered talks were to take place, and is now being held in US custody at Bagram, an Afghan political figure told Al Jazeera.
With the arrival in Kabul last month of Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan of the new administration of Barack Obama, the US president, resistance to talks with the Taliban may change.
Ahmadshah Ahmadzai, another former Afghan prime minister, said trying to bring all Afghan parties – including Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader – to the negotiating table was the only option.
“If Mullah Omar agrees [to talks] and those around him do – this is the real Taliban faction – then they can bring peace.”
Degennaro said: “It’s really important to at least test the waters and see what’s happening, and what response we’re going to get, which is probably what they’re doing right now.”
The Afghan foreign minister is currently in Washington DC to discuss the future of the region.”
There’s a traditional/classical view that says development and governance aid are necessary preconditions for COIN “success” – in other words, have at least a framework in place that includes a popularly elected government with the minimum of functionality, such that state organs are in place to receive the benefits from COIN operations which remove or neutralise anti-government insurgencies. Now, what we’ve heard from Obama/Gates (setting the generals aside for the moment) is continued “anti-terrorist” operations aimed against al-Qaeda and affiliates, and the Taliban, on either side of the Afghan-Pak borders will claim immediate priority; the “nation-building” commitments have yet to gain any traction, judging from public comments already put out or leaked, not only on the part of Americans but those originating from Nato/Isaf sources as well. Lots of boilerplate stuff about “needs”, but little momentum behind implementation of programs at the scale actually required. The WaIndy has run several good articles currently (gathered by Spencer Ackerman) summarising the situation in Afghanistan, and “what is to be done”:
Preempting a Progressive Split on Afghanistan
http://tinyurl.com/buznn3
Shadow-Pentagon Think Tank Releases New AfghaniPakistan Policy Paper
http://tinyurl.com/au2vgv
Essentially, there is a “progressive” v. “centrist” division, i.e., “development first” as opposed to “COIN-now”, and for those interested, the above links will provide ample arguments for each side. But again, we have to deal with not only in-country realities, but the domestic situation in the States as well, where – if stated honestly – the “sufficient funding and long time commitments” to gain even a modicum of “success” in Afghanistan doesn’t have much of a public reservoir of support. Of course, Obama could just continue with the incrementalist approach: a half-arsed “development” effort linked to a narrow military objective, and the war could just drag out for the next several years at basically a stalemate. IMO, the administration has to go “all in” in order to pull off something close to the ideal outcome, and that just won’t be happening, because of the potential political downside, especially given the parlous state of the US financial/economic status.
I doubt we can afford to rebuild another country right now. We’ll be lucky if we can rebuild our own. Those are simplistic statements, I think, but one thing about this sort of war is that you have to be willing to commit to it as a country. I suspect a lot of Americans feel as I do right now.
If we can’t afford this war, and we can’t get enough help in fighting it, then we should figure out how to leave while causing the least amount of damage.
Pvt. K.
Y’r a bitter man, laddy. I hope you realize that I would agree with all of that.
barrisj
You missed the part in which I said that developmental aid is an intrinsic part of COIN? How did a smart person like you miss that? You must be a diplomat or a political scientist. Actually “the generals” are not advocating anything other than classical COIN. i.e., CI=Political action+ developmental aid + counter guerilla operations.
Careful that you don’r slip into systemic anti-military thinking. Like ant-semitism and a few more “anti-s” that rots the brain.
pl
Be curious to know how an Israeli pre-emptive strike against Iran would effect Kilcullen‘s “conflict ecosystem” in Afghanistan. The Gaia approach. Or maybe the wrathful Kali approach.
Regardless, based upon Dennis Blair’s conclusion that Israel and Iran will engage in a “major military confrontation” in 2009, it seems to me that US analysis should (and maybe already does) proceed upon the assumption that such a war will take place. Odds exist that such a catastrophic event would send shockwaves throughout COIN operations around the globe and perhaps even call for an adaptation of Bernard Fall’s time tested formula.
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=85662§ionid=351020101
a couple of notes:
Afghanistan is deeply messed up because of good reason. It is a very old place and historically very difficult place to conquer. It’s a place where empire goes to die. Everybody underestimated the afghanistan challenge.
The valley and mountains are perfect place for hide out and small trade route. No major size of infantry can ever enter afghanistan for millenias. Roads are narrow and the logistic are impossible. There are only two successful pure military conquest: Alexander the great and the mongolian. Alexander army size, organization and technology was several hundred years ahead of anybody in the area. His army number was nearly the size of small kingdom in that area.
Second was the mongolian, their trick is to enter fast and kill everybody who they think are useless to their cavalry conquest.
The last one is Islamic conquest, a combination of cavalry and social engineering.
Everybody else failed to create consistent government. China, Persian, Indian dynasty, British Empire, Soviet, Pakistani Secret service.
The reason of failure are all the same throughout history: logistic which leads to breaks down to military effectiveness. Afghanistan cultural fracture which is a direct result of each empire tried and failed conquest leaving pieces of its influence. Coherent national culture never really congeal because afghanistan is the balance between stagnancy of isolated mountain and vibrancy of cosmopolitan global trade. And lastly, it has always been the boundaries of competing regional power. It’s the flux in great power equilibrium.
So looking at recent history we have predictably odd events: stingers vs. mi-24. Taliban blowing up giant buddha statue. Or Marxist-Islamic Speeches by a mullah. Al-Qaeda (modern counter insurgency guerilla + religion + multi-national logistic organization)
… , afghanistan from military point of view has very deep history. Every single world power since the beginning of time has been there except the Roman. Military technology hit a wall in afghanistan. So people in charge better quit the clown show and start sitting down seriously.
Some people would classify me as a right wing warmonger. Wether that is true or not, I can recognize a losing hand, and Aghanistan is a loser.
There is always a right time and place to fight, but this mountainous”sand pit” is not it!
The Colonel is the expert, and if he says a COIN strategy can work there. Then given time, I expect it can.
But we as a nation simply do not have the TIME or TREASURE to spend on that God forsaken land. Which as near as I can see holds none of our vital national interest.
I didn’t vote for Obama, but as he goes so probably will the nation. I wish him a successful Presidency. Marching on into an Afghanistan quagmire will probably doom him from the start.
Right now, Afghanistan is still perceived as Georgie Bush’s “screw up”, soon Obama will in the public mind inherit the blame.
We finaly got a few things to at least temporarily break our way in Irag. Let’s not push our national luck.
Obama needs to blow off the camapign rhetoric about “the real fight is in Aghanistan”. He should declare victory, load our boys up on C-130s. And get them to hell out of there while the getting is good!
KM,
There is a site that has a soup-to-nuts reading list called Abu Muqawama:
http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2007/10/great-counterinsurgency-reading-list.html
Some of those are articles
and essays more than books and don’t take very long to get through.
Where to start? Bernard Fall?
Passing judgment is so easy from thousands of miles away.
I spent a year in A’stan as an advisor shortly after the Taliban was toppled. I can’t tell you how many Afghans implored us to help them develop a country worth living in — patriots willing to work directly for the government, a growing middle class of merchants who had crawled out of hiding, wait staff in restaurants.
I can’t relate to them as mere objects or foreign policy pawns. I would like to think that there are enough of them to get things going right if we give them the power to do so. The challenge is to “get it right”.
Col. Lang…having stated more than once either explicitly or implicitly, the easiest course when faced with an anti-government (“our” government) insurgency always will be to bring down the military hammer, then do the necessary cleaning-up, i.e., “nation-building”, which – in some cases – results in propping up flawed or unpopular “leaders”, and then begins the cycle anew. Whether – for example – you sign onto the views of Ahmed Rashid, or other close observers of post-Taliban Afghanistan, you must admit that after 7 years of “aid and reconstruction” FUBAR, to try to restart the clock with yet another “dedicated commitment” to salvage Afghanistan is a mug’s game. Given the “facts on the ground”, it is almost impossible to predict if even a fraction – or if any – of developmental support will eventually reach its respective target, no matter of how much more funding is allocated. Most of the participating countries sort of “get it”, thus the “donor fatigue” we are now seeing. Which leaves only the military component, with its concomitant civilian casualties, 3am house raids, burgeoning jail populations, etc.,etc., the entire panoply of foreign occupation-induced trauma. It’s not a question of knee-jerk “systemic anti-military” reaction on my part, but more of a recoiling against militarism as a policy imperative rather than an adjunct in a nation’s foreign affairs. There was some early talk from the Obama camp about “negotiations” and “diplomacy” in a first-line approach to sorting out the Afghanistan business, but we hear little of that today. I fear that any “new thinking” that may be brought to bear will be subsumed by COIN arguments, where those conditions that best suit such a course of action simply don’t exist, full stop. Which brings us round to your POV: COIN can succeed if and only if sufficient funding, troop strength, and an enormous patience amongst the US public be directed to the objective at hand. What seems to be lacking, however, is any sensitivity to how all this plays with the Afghan people…are they really granting “the West” the “privilege of using this methodology” in their country? And – ultimately – does it matter?
Colonel –
Off topic I know but could you give any insight now or on a future post regarding DOD intel undersecretary (and retired Air Force Lieutenant General) James Clapper. He was appointed by Bush and has been retained by Obama. I realize that his background was not in HUMINT like yours. But he did serve as DIA Director for awhile.
Colonel, Sam Huntington once advocated accepting Vietnam for what it was, and not what we wanted it to be.
He always explained that what was the reason we lost Vietnam.
Focus on the rural, tribal “imagined communities” and not modern democracy we wanted to create.
In Afghanistan, we face a similar situation, because we either have to accept a tribal, Islamic fundamentalist whose main industry is Heroin or we reengage on the foolish notions of turning the Afghans into Switzerland.
Our military can do anything we order it to do, the question is can we really accomplish the political needs of Politicians to make the long-term commitment required.
We must accept Afghanistan for what it is, not we want or can’t afford.
In four years, Obama will probably need a withdrawal from Afghanistan to get re-elected.
That is not enough time for COIN to work.
“Just make them an offer they can’t refuse.”
The Pashtun did not become drug producers until the the Mujaheddin began using it to finance their war against the Russians, back in the 80’s.
Before then, opium growing was a tiny, miniscule part of their economy. Where opium is grown today, typically walnuts were before.
People here can debate whether or not this involved official or “plausibly deniable” U.S. involvement if they wish, but it’s a fact that, up until the eighties, the Golden Triangle was by many times over the world’s “Opium Garden”. As Afghanistan production increased, cultivation in the Golden Triangle decreased.
As regular lurker on this blog, what i’m most curious about are the ideas presented in a recent article in The Nation, suggesting that COIN is really just a euphemism for “Colonialism.” I thought the reasoning a bit stretched, but provocative.
Colonialism traditionally involved the energetic resettlement of the colonizers among the colonized (and, less so, vice versa). The current political and cultural situation seems to make such exchanges virtually impossible. Yet clearly, the U.S. is in Iraq because of oil, and that is an unambiguous colonialistic motive.
So I’m curious if anyone else here finds any truth in the analogy. Is it worthwhile to liken COIN operations to colonial-era policies? Is it really just “lipstick on a pig”, or are there substantial differences that I don’t understand?
Sincerely —
CH
Col. Lang…having stated more than once either explicitly or implicitly, the easiest course when faced with an anti-government (“our” government) insurgency always will be to bring down the military hammer, then do the necessary cleaning-up, i.e., “nation-building”, which – in some cases – results in propping up flawed or unpopular “leaders”, and then begins the cycle anew. Whether – for example – you sign onto the views of Ahmed Rashid, or other close observers of post-Taliban Afghanistan, you must admit that after 7 years of “aid and reconstruction” FUBAR, to try to restart the clock with yet another “dedicated commitment” to salvage Afghanistan is a mug’s game. Given the “facts on the ground”, it is almost impossible to predict if even a fraction – or if any – of developmental support will eventually reach its respective target, no matter of how much more funding is allocated. Most of the participating countries sort of “get it”, thus the “donor fatigue” we are now seeing. Which leaves only the military component, with its concomitant civilian casualties, 3am house raids, burgeoning jail populations, etc.,etc., the entire panoply of foreign occupation-induced trauma. It’s not a question of knee-jerk “systemic anti-military” reaction on my part, but more of a recoiling against militarism as a policy imperative rather than an adjunct in a nation’s foreign affairs. There was some early talk from the Obama camp about “negotiations” and “diplomacy” in a first-line approach to sorting out the Afghanistan business, but we hear little of that today. I fear that any “new thinking” that may be brought to bear will be subsumed by COIN arguments, where those conditions that best suit such a course of action simply don’t exist, full stop. Which brings us round to your POV: COIN can succeed if and only if sufficient funding, troop strength, and an enormous patience amongst the US public be directed to the objective at hand. What seems to be lacking, however, is any sensitivity to how all this plays with the Afghan people…are they really granting “the West” the “privilege of using this methodology” in their country? And – ultimately – does it matter?
barrisj
mike
I have a suspicious nature, and I think we both know Clapper.
I worked for a number of directors of DIA. He was not my favorite. Nor was I his. That was a long time ago and I hardly remember the points of disagreement.
Nevertheless, I understand that he has done a good job as DoD intelligence chief and I am not surprised that Gates wants to keep him. pl
Just to add a late parse of the Colonels words, which fits into the equation.
“COIN can work.”
does not mean in will work. War (and most human endeavors) often do not proceed the direction forecast for unforeseen, random, reasons.
So is the treasury worth the potential?
Plus, I think if we keep pushing on the Russians (financially these days), then they will find a way to push back. I can guess a likely location….
‘Colonialism traditionally involved the energetic resettlement of the colonizers among the colonized (and, less so, vice versa).’
Not at all. Look at the Egyptian experience, for instance. Colonial settlement was big in parts of (sub-Saharan) Africa and of course in America, but in much of India not only was there little colonial settlement, but many of the existing Indian governments were left in place until 1948.
COIN is by definition a colonial technique, because it is not about imposing the will of one government upon another (as in classic nineteenth century European warfare) but of a government on non-state actors. Of course British experience shows that it can be used as part of a strategy of colonial exit as well as colonialism per se.
Andrew
Highlander, You say you re considered a right wing war monger, I consider myself left wing, and while I am not a pacifist, I am also not a warmonger. However, I agree with you 100%. Scary thought isn’t it.
Nancy K and Highlander:
I consider myself left wing, and while I am not a pacifist, I am also not a warmonger. However, I agree with you 100%
As do I, and I’d not consider myself left or right in orientation, or particularly pro- or anti-military (much of my career has been spent in national security circles).
I think the principle that folks of all political persuasions can agree on here is that of benefits vs costs. We have seen the immense costs of the so-called “war on terror”, but the benefits are harder to define, much less to imagine.
Exactly what benefits accrue from our being in Afghanistan? Who gains those benefits? Are they worth the costs in blood and money?
I find that the most reasonable understanding of this situation is found in Luke (12:34)… For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.
So where exactly is America’s heart?
The recent comments by feocito and china-hand raise important issues.
We do need to consider carefully how to make things work given the mess we and our friends out there are presently in. We cannot simply walk away from the mess which WE to a large degree have made. We have to devise an appropriate policy and extract ourselves from the mire in an honorable manner and in consideration of the operational security of our troops.
Feocito reminds that there are those in Afghanistan who wish for some positive engagement with the US. China-hand reminds that the narco problem was exacerbated by ourselves. On the other hand this latter problem was exacerbated by some French whispers, as I recall from my own conversations with a certain influential “high ranking” French official (now deceased) who wanted the narco weapon aimed at the Soviets.
Every day that passes there seems to emerge more confused advice by the welter of various “players” (some neocon and MANY otherwise) inside the Beltway from all manner of think tanks and etc. Do some seem a bit COIN-ish in direction?
But how best to formulate the problem (challenge) we are dealing with? What are the facts bearing on this problem? How should we assess these facts? What are the realistic and effective policy options?
Col. Lang has indicated that COIN, although a valuable tool in the right circumstances, is not the correct choice in present circumstances we face and other methods are available to us and are preferable.
IMO he is trying to help us understand that the COIN option in this case means a long and sustained and expensive in blood and treasure undertaking that we cannot afford and that the weary and distraught American people would not support over the long term. Thus, we have to carefully think through other options.
Col. Lang – I am curious as to your thoughts about the appointment of Chas. Freeman.
Lobe calls it a ‘stunning’ appointment. That might be an understatement:
http://www.mepc.org/whats/usleadership.asp
G. Hazeltine
It IS “stunning.” Freeman is the ideal man for the job. pl
PL,
In your reply to Don you quote Huntington “in the military modern man can find his monastery”. Can you please eloborate as to what that quote means to you.
Thank you
Re COIN . I thought the Russians tried to do loads of nation building in Afgh ? I thought a lot of the ‘ nation building’ we’d done consisted of repairing Russian roads , dams , schools etc .
I thought the Macedonians had a policy of buying vicious local warlords to look after their conquests . Because the US thinks that policy has worked in Iraq , doesnt follow it would in Afgh .
http://www.a1b2c3.com/drugs/opi012.htm
Driven by the unequaled profitability of heroin, the Cali cartel has introduced opium cultivation to the northern slopes of the Andes, harvesting some 20 tons annually since 1991.
Increased opium supply has led to a dramatic proliferation of heroin abuse around the globe–a phenomenon so vast that we can speak, without hyperbole, of a globalization of heroin consumption.
Paralleling the rise of use in established consuming regions like Western Europe and North America, heroin abuse shot upward in new areas–Eastern Europe, southern China, mainland Southeast Asia, India, and Pakistan. Rising from a situation of zero heroin addicts in 1979, Pakistan had, according to official statistics, 5,000 addicts in 1980, 1.2 million in 1985, and 1.7 million in 1993.
Col. Lang–
I still do not understand what you mean by “work.”
Do you mean that after COIN has “worked” we will see the local population from which we have extirpated the insurgents welcome us forever as an occupying force?
Or, do you mean that after the US makes COIN “work” the people from whose midst the insurgents have been driven will then turn to the government and we can leave?
Thamk you,
dipsop
Start with Galula. Short and readable, hits lots of relevant stuff for Afghanistan, like geography.
Steve
Saw an interesting remark on Marvi Memon’s website, Feb 26th diary entry, “give us the drones and we will do it ourselves”. Wonder about expert opinion re that. Seems sensible if the approach is to avoid US negative image yet get job done of keeping supply lines open.
Pakistan is simmering again …
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aGe4Dz3GglVQ&refer=home
Meanwhile, the government is still trying to recover a senior American United Nations official kidnapped last month in the southwest. And Zardari is facing the prospect of public demonstrations over a court ruling that barred his chief rival, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, from public office.
Pakistan has arrested 100 people in connection with yesterday’s attack, GEO television reported, without saying where it got the information.
Succeeding Bhutto
Sharif, who is backing a call for nationwide anti-government protests beginning March 12, accuses Zardari of being behind the court ruling against him. Zardari, 52, was elected last year following the December 2007 assassination of his wife, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.
While Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik said in a statement in Islamabad that “we suspect a foreign hand behind this incident,” Salman Taseer, the provincial governor of Punjab, of which Lahore is the capital, noted parallels between yesterday’s attack and November’s terrorist assault in Mumbai, India, in which 164 people died.
Pakistan last month announced it would prosecute at least two members of the banned Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba guerrilla group among those it accuses of plotting the Mumbai violence.
As in the raid on India’s financial center, the guerrillas in Lahore were wearing sneakers and carrying backpacks, automatic rifles and grenades in a coordinated ambush, video footage indicated. Police said all 12 gunmen escaped.
seriously, this is the most important news out of afghanistan. (they just want fun gadget and shiny objects like the rest of the planet. next up fast food join.)
http://www.businessinsider.com/former-taliban-ambassador-addicted-to-iphone-2009-3
One byproduct of the Taliban’s ouster: There’s a tech boom going on in Afghanistan. For a profile on the subject, the AP interviewed Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, a former Taliban ambassador who spent almost four years in Guantanamo — and is now “never without his Apple iPhone.”
AP: Zaeef, who reconciled with the Afghan government after being released from U.S. custody, says he uses his iPhone to surf the Internet and find difficult locations, employing the built-in GPS. He even checks his bank account balance online.
“It’s easy and modern and I love it,” Zaeef said as he pinched and pulled his fingers across the iPhone’s touch screen last week. “This is necessary in the world today. People want to progress.”
http://icga.blogspot.com/2009/03/bhasin-pakistan-matryoshka-doll-of.html
The second development contributing to the emergence of a new form of terrorism is the gradual distancing of the Taliban from the al Qaeda. Though rarely realized the Al Qaeda and Taliban are historically and ideologically distinct. The Al Qaeda is inspired by the more extremist Wahabi School of Islam and does not recognize national boundaries. The mission of the Al Qaeda is to establish the rule of pure Islam across the globe. The Taliban are ideologically linked to the Sufi and Deoband Schools of Islam and largely comprise of local fighters from tribal Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban also favor spreading the message of pure Islam but their operational sphere is limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nationalism is a strong sentiment among the Taliban which distinguishes them from the Al Qaeda.
This difference in ideology has become prominent in the past year. In February 2008 there was a statement by Taliban leader Mullah Omar that his movement wanted to maintain positive and legitimate relations with Afghanistan and its neighbors. Mullah Omar’s contention is the stationing of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and not the existence of Afghanistan under non-Taliban rule. In the words of Mullah Salam Zaief, Taliban’s Former Ambassador to Pakistan, “The conflict in Afghanistan doesn’t mean [the Taliban] has to confront the world…Taliban doesn’t want to rule the world.” As early as 2005 Ayman al-Zawahiri had pointed out that the Taliban members had retreated to their tribes and villages after the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan and showed little attachment to the global Islamist struggle. In making peace deals with the Pakistani Government, the Taliban are attempting to regain local orientation and avoid entanglement in a never-ending global jihad.
quick thought: Can we stop sending a**hole as negotiators, or is it a policy up top to screw with people?
second. $2B???!!!. THAT’s entire afghanistan annual budget! WTF. if the point is to fix afghanistan, that much money would have fixed most of afghanistan basic problem. (why do we need a giant air logistic base? just because that’s how we do thing? Are we fighting taliban air force or al qaeda tank division? )
… and the clown show continues.
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Kyrgyz_open_for_talks_on_US_base_999.html
In an interview with the BBC, Bakiyev said a new deal could be forged that would reverse an order he gave last month to close the Manas airbase, a vital support post for operations in Afghanistan.
“If the United States wants to maintain its airbase at Manas, the doors for talks are open…. In this case, the conditions of the agreement would be different,” Bakiyev said, according to a transcript issued by his office earlier.
“Negotiations on the US airbase at Manas could be renewed,” he added.
Bakiyev said he understood the need to stabilise Afghanistan and hinted he wanted a better offer than the current US financial package.
“Kyrgyzstan… is interested in stabilisation of Afghanistan. We’re ready to look at new American proposals.
“We deserve more respect…. Our partners, whether Russia or the United States, should be able to listen to our opinion,” he said.
The Central Asian state ordered the closure last month in a move analysts described as linked to Russian opposition to US military moves in the region and a Russian offer of 2.3 billion dollars in aid and loans for Kyrgyzstan.