I Told You So.

If this source is not George Casey I would be surprised.  Anyone else who said this would be on his way out of Iraq by now.  Pat Lang

“Both Americans and Iraqis need "to start thinking about and talking about what it’s really going to be like in Iraq after elections," said the military official, who spoke in an interview on the condition he not be named. "I think the important point is there’s not going to be a fundamental change."The official stressed that it was "important to calibrate expectations post-elections. I’ve been saying to folks: You’re still going to have an insurgency, you’re still going to have a dilapidated infrastructure, you’re still going to have decades of developmental problems both on the economic and the political side."”  Washington  Post

It is ungracious to say, "I told you so, but I am not feeliing gracious about this.  I would not write about this subject in this way but the claim has often been made by those "exposed" by the failure of policy in Iraq that "noone could have known."  Rubbish!  In fact any number of people of my acquaintance who had knowledge of Iraq, the Arabs, guerrilla warfare and a variety of similar subjects were easily able to forecast that the present situation was likely to result from the flawed logic that dominated planning for Iraq.  I cite my own example becasue I know it best.

From the apparent beginning of serious planning for intervention in Iraq, I have said, and written and preached that:

-Occupation of Iraq would be widely resented by a lot of the population who would likely rise against a prolonged foreign military presence.

-An effort to define poliical power in Iraq based on "one man" one vote" rather than community interests would be seen as a direct threat by the Sunni Arabs who would act accordingly.

-Dissolution of the Iraqi civil service and military would leave Iraq in a chaos that would facilitate the insurgency or insurgencies and deprive that state of the means of resistance.

-I believed that the dissolution mentioned previously might prove a fatal mistake.

-Counterinsurgency operations required by the rising that the policy we intended to follow would incite would require a much larger counterguerrilla force than we intended to keep in the country.

-Such a rising would center on the resentment and fears of the Sunni Arab population who would not want to lose the position of dominence which they have enjoyed in Iraq for over a thousand years.

-Iraq would prove to be not a "nation-state," but rather a melange of ethno-religious communities who only very imperfectly saw themselves as related and who would lapse into communial struggle for dominance in the event of our prolonged presence and intervention in their affairs.

-Elections in Iraq which ignored communal interests would be a praiseworthy effort in themselves but would not be seen by disadvataged communities as a solution to their communal problems.  In that context no amount  of constitution writing or referenda on constitutions would be likely to affect the willingness of dissidents to end support for the revolt.

-The war will go on indefinitely until a political soution is found.  The constitution and its ratifying process will change nothing in the combat situation if they do not reflect the perceived interests of the Sunni Arabs.

I see no reason to change my opinion about present and future conditions.  It would appear that this "Senior officer" source agrees with me. Pat Lang

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/10/AR2005081000289.html