We maintain and continue this committee of correspondence in memory of our founder and mentor, Colonel W. Patrick Lang. The image to the right is Marcus, a character from William S. Burroughs’s “The Coming of the Purple Better One.” Colonel Lang would refer to Marcus sometimes in clever jest, sometimes in biting social commentary and sometimes simply because he liked Marcus. May everyone who corresponds here do so in a similar spirit.
Essential Writings on History, War, Religion and Strategy
From the Introduction:
“In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Col. Lang created his own blog which to this day still serves as a committee of correspondence for a large network of former military and intelligence officers, diplomats, and scholars of international affairs.
Since its launch in 2005, the Turcopolier website has had over 40 million unique visits.
Since leaving the government, he has also authored five books, including a Civil War espionage trilogy, a memoir of his years in government service, and a primer on human intelligence.
This present volume—his sixth book—is an anthology of some of his most important writings. The content speaks for itself. So have at it.”
New York CNN — US stocks rose sharply Wednesday morning following a decisive and consequential victory for former President Donald Trump in Tuesday’s US presidential election. The Dow soared 1,309 points, or 3% in morning trading, reaching a new high. This is the first time the Dow has gained more than 1,000 points in a single day since November 2022. If the Dow maintains its implied gains throughout the trading session, it will mark the sixth-best point gain ever for the index — but nowhere close to a record percentage gain.
The S&P 500 and the tech-heavy Nasdaq both rose by 1.9%. Markets were mostly juiced by the fact that the election was decided relatively quickly. The election — and the widely held belief that Trump and his allies could contest the result in courts — has served as a cloud over the US economy and stock market in recent months. Markets, in particular, crave certainty, and the clear path forward will allow companies to adjust their business and hiring plans. “There’s clarity: We’re not going to see another January 6th event. The market is breathing a huge sigh of relief on that,” said Michael Block, chief operating officer at AgentSmyth. “The mainstream consensus was that we weren’t going to know. And we know.”
But stocks may also be reacting to Trump’s victory, in particular. Trump flipped several swing states from President Joe Biden’s 2020 victory, and Republicans also took control of the Senate. Several key House races remain undecided. A so-called red wave could usher in an era of deregulation and other pro-business laws and policies that investors believe could benefit the stock market. “There is this huge perception of business friendly, tax-friendly regime coming into place, especially with them winning the Senate,” said Block.
JPMorgan analysts predicted in a report ahead of Tuesday’s election result that under a “red wave,” stocks stood to gain through the end of 2024, but “the uncertainty around policy execution would become more prominent in 2025.”
https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/06/investing/dow-stock-market-trump/index.html
Comment: Well, Wall Street’s happy. The dollar surged as well. The real shocker is that it looks like Trump also won the popular vote. That hasn’t been done by a Republican in decades.
Trump’s message of the country is going to hell in a hand basket and he alone could fix it sold well across the country. Harris’ message of more of the same fell flat. The American people apparently do want to go back. Now we’ll see if mass deportations and wholesale tariffs can please the masses. Who knows. Maybe it will work. At least there won’t be another January 6 debacle.
One mystery I see is the story of record voter turnout and 20 million fewer voters. And that’s in an across the board well secured election. Someone was full of crap. Maybe that will settle out in the next few days.
TTG
ERIC KOLENICH | Richmond Times-Dispatch
In November 1864, a regiment of Black soldiers in thenUnion army was deployed to southeastern Henrico County. On election day, 194 of the soldiers stood in a single-file line and dropped paper ballots into a box. Every one of the soldiers cast a vote for President Abraham Lincoln.
The election took place outside Fort Harrison, so close to the front lines of the Civil War that Confederate soldiers could see them voting. Although it was barely noted at the time, their votes were an important piece of history. The soldiers are believed to be the first Black members of the U.S. Army to vote in an election, and theirs may have been the first votes cast by Black Americans in Virginia.
Their story was uncovered by a local historian for the National Park Service earlier this year. On Saturday, the park service held an event at Fort Harrison commemorating election day 1864. What happened that day raises questions about how different people saw race in the 1860s, and it highlights the importance with which white and Black Americans held the act of voting.
Gorman’s discovery began when he read a book of news articles written by a Black Civil War correspondent named Thomas Morris Chester. Gorman, who has worked for the park service for 26 years, read an article describing how some of the 5th Regiment of the United States Colored Troops cast votes on election day. Gorman didn’t immediately realize the importance of what he read. Then he found the entire newspaper clipping from Nov. 11 in the Philadelphia Press, a Black newspaper. The headline read: “Election day – Some of the Colored Troops Voting – The Result in General Butler’s Army.”
The historian began considering the timing of the article and did more research. He found two letters from soldiers and another news article, and he started to understand the big picture. Chester was apparently the only journalist who made note of the Black soldiers voting. Newspapers run by white publishers did not cover it. The race between Lincoln and George B. McClellan, former commanding general of the U.S. Army, was a “hotly contested, all-eyes-on-it election. It didn’t make the narrative,” Gorman said. “It should have been a bigger story.”
Comment: Another article from my local paper, although it came from the “Richmond Times Dispatch.” This one’s quite appropriate for this election day’s eve. The NPS historian, Mike Gorman, may have found this story in his own research, but I found an “Emerging Civil War” article from 2022 describing this event based on the news articles written by the Black Civil War correspondent, Thomas Morris Chester. A book of his dispatches from the Virginia front was published in 1989.
Still, I’m glad Mike Gorman found the story and ran with it. A commemoration of the Event was held at Fort Harrison this past Saturday and it will now forever be part of the Fort Harrison and USCT story.
TTG
By Robert Willmann
Like Mother Nature, mathematics is impartial. The financial or fiscal year of the U.S. government starts on 1 October and ends on 30 September of the following year, with its name being the year of the last nine months. Fiscal year 2024 started on 1 October 2023 and ended on 30 September 2024. Two financial documents provide a small view into the massive federal organization — the Daily Treasury Statement and the Monthly Treasury Statement. These are available from the Internet website of the Department of the Treasury.
The Daily Treasury Statement starts off with a little joke, saying that it shows the “cash and debt operations of the United States Treasury”, but the “detail, rounded in millions, may not add to totals” [1]. So we have to add six zeroes to each number we see on there. The wonderful base 10 number system has one zero for the tens, two zeroes for the hundreds, three zeroes for the thousands, six zeroes for the millions, nine zeroes for the billions, and 12 zeroes for our new friends, the trillions.
On page three is Table IIIC, Debt Subject to Limit. Total public debt outstanding is $35,464,674,000,000. Total public debt subject to the “debt limit” (wink, wink) is $35,354,856,000,000. At the bottom of each column is “Susp-1”. This is the second little joke, in the form of a footnote, except that the joke is on you. On page 4, the footnote says: “Table IIIC — Debt Subject to Limit. Susp-1 — Statutory Debt Limit temporarily suspended from June 3, 2023 through January 1, 2025. Unamortized Discount represents the discount adj. on Treasury bills and zero-coupon bonds.”
A child might ask, “Mommy, how did the debt limit get suspended? And why was it suspended until 1 January 2025?” To answer these questions, a look at the footnote says that the debt limit disappeared on 3 June 2023, a year and five months ago. On 31 May 2023, I wrote an article here explaining what was about to happen in Congress with the proposed law H.R.3746, and its scripted professional wrestling show to raise the debt limit.
Sure enough, the bill was passed and became Public Law 118-5. It was approved by the House of Representatives at 9:25 p.m. on 31 May 2023 with a vote of 314-117, and by the Senate on 1 June 2023 with a vote of 63-36. On 3 June 2023 president Biden signed it [2]. Section 401 appears at the very end of the law. 401(a) removes the debt limit and the candy store is open through 1 January 2025, after the election for president, vice-president, and some members of Congress. Here is that roadside bomb, in the “Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023”–
“Sec. 401. Temporary Extension of the Public Debt Limit
“(a) In General. — Section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code, shall not apply for the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on January 1, 2025.
“(b) Special Rule Relating to Obligations Issued During Extension Period. — Effective on January 2, 2025, the limitation in effect under section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code, shall be increased to the extent that–
“(1) the face amount of obligations issued under chapter 31 of such title and the face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of the Treasury) outstanding on January 2, 2025, exceeds
“(2) the face amount of such obligations outstanding on the date of the enactment of this Act.
“(c) Restoring Congressional Authority Over the National Debt.–
“(1) Extension Limited to Necessary Obligations. — An obligation shall not be taken into account under subsection (b)(1) unless the issuance of such obligation was necessary to fund a commitment incurred pursuant to law by the Federal Government that required payment before January 2, 2025.
“(2) Prohibition on Creation of Cash Reserve During Extension Period. — The Secretary of the Treasury shall not issue obligations during the period specified in subsection (a) for the purpose of increasing the cash balance above normal operating balances in anticipation of the expiration of such period.”
Sections 401(b) and (c) want to say what happens on 2 January 2025, after the New Year’s Eve parties and New Year’s Day. A new debt ceiling is automatically created at however big the national debt is, as long as Congress appropriated money that is to be paid before 2 January 2025. And, the Treasury Secretary is not to issue a whole lot of new debt before then to create a giant cash reserve “above normal operating balances”. What is a normal operating balance? The Daily Treasury Statement of 30 September 2024 says it is $885.7 billion. The daily statement of 10 October says $783.3 billion.
The Monthly Treasury Statement for September 2024 is the final one for that financial year [3]. Lines 32-33 on page nine show “interest on debt securities (gross)” as $1,133,037,000,000. Lines 16-21 on page 19 give more of a breakdown on the interest on the public debt. The last two lines of page 35 state the gross interest paid as outlays for each month of the 2024 fiscal year. On page 38, “net interest” is given for the year as $881,651,000,000. Net outlays are $6,751,552,000,000 and receipts are $4,918,736,000,000, which give us the deficit for 2024 as $1,832,816,000,000.
A favorite con of Congress that has shown up in the last several years is that they are going to reduce the deficit, debt, or [fill in the blank] by some amount “over the next 10 years”. More than 20 years ago, a fad started in which laws were given the name of an advertising slogan, an acronym, or both. Such as, “The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023”.
The monstrous problem of debt described here applies only to the United States Government. It does not include the debt of state and local governments, or the oppressive problem of debt carried by individuals, companies, and corporations.
Rising prices (price inflation) and massive illegal immigration severely degrade and damage our society and way of life, and there has been some talk about them during the political campaigns this year.
But the debt bomb was tucked away and hidden one year and five months ago by politicians of both major political parties who knew exactly what they were doing when they eliminated the federal debt limit, which included protecting themselves through the elections of this year.
The second day of January 2025 is 59 days from now. What is Congress going to try to do?
It is time for situational awareness.
[1] The Daily Treasury Statement of Monday, September 30, 2024.
[2] Public Law 118-5. The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023.
http://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/3746/text
[3] The Monthly Treasury Statement for September 2024. You have to scroll down and click on the “Published Reports” button to download the 40-page report in the pdf computer format.
Cover of the September 2024 Monthly Treasury Statement.
Page 9 of the September 2024 Monthly Treasury Statement.
Page 19 of the September 2024 Monthly Treasury Statement.
Page 35 of the September 2024 Monthly Treasury Statement.
Page 38 of the September 2024 Monthly Treasury Statement.
In the modern era, the proa cause was first taken up by multihull designer Dick Newick, who in 1967 designed CHEERS, a 36-footer he called the “Atlantic proa.”Unlike a traditional Pacific proa, which always keeps the ama on the windward side, the Atlantic proa has the outrigger on the leeward side. With Tom Follett at the helm, CHEERS won third place in the 1968 Observer Singlehanded Trans-atlantic Race (OSTAR), becoming the first American boat to complete the race.
The potential of the type was spotted by the British yachtsman and mustard millionaire Timothy Colman, who set a world sailing speed record of 26.3 knots with his 56′ proa CROSSBOW in 1972. He topped that three years later, clocking 31.2 knots, and went even faster in 1980 with his hybrid proa-catamaran, CROSS-BOW II, this time bringing the record up to 36 knots. Since then, proas have consistently claimed world sailing speed records (when not challenged by wind-surfers and kite surfers), the most recent being the carbon-fiber proa SAILROCKET 2, which Paul Larsen sailed to a record of 65.45 knots in 2012. One of the biggest names in the proa world is Russell Brown of Port Townsend, Washington, the son of cruising-multihull pioneer Jim Brown of Virginia. The younger Brown built the 36′ JZERRO, which weighs just 3,200 lbs and is capable of 22 knots, and sailed her across the Pacific from San Francisco to New Zealand in 2000. More recently, JZERRO was acquired by Ryan Finn of New Orleans, who in 2022 sailed her singlehanded 13,500 miles from New York to San Francisco, making her the smallest craft to accomplish that feat.
Despite these remarkable achievements, there is still a pervasive view that proas aren’t viable sailing boats. “It has been said that the multihull community is the lunatic fringe of the sailing community, and the proa community is the lunatic fringe of the multihull community,” according to proa enthusiast Simon Penny, a polymath theorist and teacher with a keen interest in Pacific cultures (see www.simonpenny.net). Yet the most common reason quoted for building a proa is getting the most bang for the buck. There’s simply no other boat that will sail so fast at so little cost.
https://www.woodenboat.com/sites/default/files/issue/WB298-TOC.pdf
Comment: This was an interesting article on proas in general and on one man’s adventure in building and sailing his proa. It’s the story of Willian Lewis, a Brit with a life long interest in wooden boats. He took two courses in sailing at the Wooden Boat School while his sons were attending college in the States and eventually signed up for a 40-week boatbuilding course at the Lyme Regis Boat Building Academy and Furniture School in Dorset, England. Being the oldest guy in the class, everyone expected him to choose a traditional sailing craft to build. Instead, the once sensible corporate lawyer threw caution to the wind and chose to build a shunting proa. He chose the Gary Dierking designed T2. He and his class built the boat. He christened her TINY GIANT and then learned how to sail her.
The entire article is well written in the standard Wooden Boat style. If you’re not a subscriber, you may not be able to reach it on the intertubes. If not, it’s worth your time to see if your local library has a copy. If you can’t easily get to it, here’s another passage covering what Willian learned about sailing his proa.
William told me he had had the boat out in winds of 20 knots or more. “She’s not as fast as a planing dinghy but faster than a normal 30′ cruising yacht. She has quite a big wetted-surface area, so it takes a bit of wind to unstick her, but she comes alive with 10 knots and will get up to 9 knots quite easily.” Winds of over 20 knots brought serious problems: “The sail’s tack started thrashing around wildly and bashing the hull and me when I tried to sort it out. That’s why it’s important to have the halyard handy, so you can dump the sail in an emergency.”
In many ways, trimming the sail is like trimming a gaff-rigged one: you need to ease the sheets and can’t expect to sail too close to the wind. With the wind forward of the beam and the sail set to get the center of effort in just the right place, she should sail herself in a straight line, though William and I didn’t quite achieve that on our trial run. The sail trim can also be adjusted by raking the mast to leeward to produce a better sail shape in light airs or to windward in a strong blow, like a windsurfer sail. Getting even more fancy, the windward brailing line can be tightened to give the sail a fuller shape, like using the “tunnel effect” on a lateen rig (see WB No. 270), although William says he hasn’t reached that level of prowess yet.
Steering with a paddle takes quite a bit of getting used to. William made it look easy, but I struggled with it, especially off the wind. As one sailor, Chris Grill, who sailed his extended T2 DESESPERADO from Mexico to Panama in 2011–12, wrote in his blog (grillabongquixotic.wordpress.com): “My dream is to steer with one foot whilst playing the fiddle and drinking gin-and-tonics, and steering oars are incompatible with that ideal.” Grill eventually fitted dual rudders, one at each end so one could be raised and the other lowered depending on the direction of the shunt.
One of the biggest challenges William has faced is getting the boat on and off its mooring. One thing you must avoid with a proa is allowing the sail to be taken aback, so heading into the wind to pick up a mooring simply isn’t an option. Instead, William usually drops the sail when he’s close enough to paddle the rest of the way if necessary, which is easier said than done when the river current is running at 4 knots, as it sometimes does in this section of the River Dart. Good sculling skills are an essential part of sailing a proa.
William was also planning to fit a stronger shunting rail, a strip of wood on the leeward side of the vaka that ensures the yard runs smoothly while shunting, to control the tack more effectively in strong winds. He is also going to fit a block-and-tackle to hold the aka more tightly into the ama and prevent it from coming loose. While some independent movement of the ama is desirable, too much play could damage the boat.
TTG
Despite the findings, NASA is still hoping to send humans to Mars.
The idea of living on Mars has peaked the interest of astronomers for many a year, but it may not be as feasible as we all think. After landing robots on the red planet with any hiccups, the next step for NASA is to get actual people on Mars. The space agency has said in the past that Mars is ‘one of the only other places we know where life may have existed in the solar system’. As a result, further exploration on the planet could help offer insights to the past and future of planet Earth.
So when are NASA hoping to get folks on Mars? Well, the space agency has suggested the tech could propel humans to the planet as early as the 2030s. But that doesn’t mean a long-term life on Mars is plausible or even possible.
Last year, researchers combined studies from the likes of UCLA, MIT, Moscow’s Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, and GFZ Potsdam to look into the potential impacts of life on the red planet. Researchers sought to answer two questions: one focused on the impact of particle radiation and whether it would pose too grave a threat to human life, and the second about whether the timing of a mission to Mars could protect astronauts and the spacecraft from radiation.
On the hunt for answers, scientists used geophysical models of particle radiation for a solar cycle and models of how radiation could affect both human passengers and a spacecraft. Following the study, which was published in the Advancing Earth and Science Journal, the researchers found that it would not possible for humans to stay on Mars long-term. They found that human exposure to radiation threats, including particle radiation from the Sun, distant stars, and galaxies, would exceed safe levels after four years on the planet. The scientists did determine that the spacecraft used to travel to Mars should provide enough protection for the trip to and from the planet – but if the material used to build the spacecraft is too thick, then it could actually increase the amount of secondary radiation.
Researchers also claimed the best time to leave Earth would be when the solar activity is at its peak and the most dangerous particles are deflected, thus shielding the astronauts from the worst of it. “We estimate that a potential mission to Mars should not exceed approximately four years,” the researchers explained. “This study shows that space radiation imposes strict limitations and presents technological difficulties for the human mission to Mars, such a mission is still viable.” In summary, there’s every possibility we may see humans on Mars in the coming years, but living there? Well, that’s a different story.
https://www.unilad.com/technology/space/mars-nasa-humans-live-safe-242588-20241024
Comment: I wonder how much thought Elon is putting into this question. A vast, self-sustaining research station manned by people serving a three year tour of duty is one thing, but a self-sustaining, permanent city of a million inhabitants is something totally different.
A few years ago Elon described his Mars colony in pretty pollyannaish terms. “As for the city itself, it will have “an outdoorsy, fun atmosphere,” Musk told Popular Mechanics in February 2019. So “you’d probably want to have some faceted glass dome, with a park, so you can walk around without a [space] suit.”
Elon better think about moving his Boring Company to Mars first and build a labyrinth of Morlock tunnels..
TTG
https://qz.com/elon-musk-spacex-mars-colony-domes-starship-tesla-1851587648
https://www.nasa.gov/humans-in-space/space-radiation-is-risky-business-for-the-human-body/
This is an analysis by Tatarigami. The Euromaidan Press describes him as a military observer, OSINT and GEOINT analyst, founder of Frontelligence Insight. They fail to mention that he is a former Ukrainian Army officer. He’s obviously a Ukrainian patriot and wants Ukraine to emerge victorious in this conflict. Even so, his comments and analyses are surprisingly evenhanded.
—
As tank reserves deplete and production stalls, intelligence analysis points to a critical deadline for Russia’s war effort. Yet Putin’s ability to sustain low-intensity conflict challenges this timeline
Ukraine may be entering the final stages of its war with Russia, with the war potentially drawing to a close by the end of 2025 and early 2026, at least according to Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Directorate of Intelligence. Budanov shared this projection based on intelligence data during the annual Yalta European Strategy meeting, an international platform that puts together prominent Western and Ukrainian figures. As the initial invasion has evolved into an attritional war, understanding the enemy’s will to fight, their resources, and their ability to replace losses becomes critical in order to calculate the trajectory of war. The specific numbers provided by Budanov and backed up by expert analyses provide factual substance to the discussion, making it more valuable for projecting accurate timelines.
Russian military production
Any attritional war ultimately becomes a test of societal endurance, war economics, diplomacy, and the ability to replace losses. As the war drags on, these problems intensify, pushing one side closer to a tipping point where continuing the war worsens their position. Military production and the capacity to replace losses are among the war’s tangible factors that can be calculated and projected well.
One notable point from Budanov’s conversation was Russia’s plan to produce 149 T-90M tanks in 2024. At first look, according to data from the open-source intelligence project Warspotting, Russia has lost approximately 47 T-90M tanks this year – a number notably lower than projected production, which makes it tempting to assume that Russia’s tank production is keeping up with its battlefield losses.
However, this is only a superficial assessment; the reality for Russia is far direr. Russia has been heavily relying on refurbishing older tanks, such as the T-72, T-62, and T-55/54 models, from its Soviet-era stockpiles. Most of its current tank fleet on the battlefield is relying on tanks no longer in production. While this has allowed Russia to preserve more advanced tanks like the T-90M, Russia’s Soviet reserves are depleting quickly, and the tank fleet is on a sharp decline.
OSINT analyst @Highmarsed, who tracks open-air storages and shares insights on X (formerly Twitter), provides a more detailed assessment. He reported that by 6 July 2024, Russia’s stock of T-55s had dropped by 31%, T-62s by 37%, and T-80Bs by 79%, with only 9% of T-72s removed from storage.
While these figures may not be exact, they provide a good idea about the rapid depletion of Russia’s tank reserves.
Additionally, OSINT analyst Naalsio, who tracks battlefield losses, estimates that by 4 October 2024, Russian forces had lost over 539 tanks and 1,830 vehicles in total (including tanks) in the Pokrovsk direction (formerly the Avdiivka direction) since 2023—numbers that far surpass Russia’s current tank production capacity.
Given that since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has lost over 3,000 tanks (information that can be independently confirmed by open-source projects such as Oryx or Warspotting) Russia has lost more tanks than it had in its entire prewar active-duty tank force, as well as and over 30% of its most advanced self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launcher systems.
A report from senior analyst Dara Massicot, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, further details that Russia is expected to exhaust its stockpile of multiple Soviet-era military equipment by 2026.
There are also clear challenges in replacing Russia’s air force losses. Some older jet models are no longer in mass production, and the new jet production is less impressive. For example, Budanov noted that Russia plans to produce only 14 Su-57 fighters in 2024.
That being said, it’s not all bad news for Russia: its Iskander missile production, particularly the Iskander-M, has ramped up significantly. While Budanov didn’t specify exact numbers, this aligns with reports from the ground about Russia’s frequent use of these missiles.
This is a serious problem for Ukraine, as it cannot currently fully protect itself from these missiles. The limited number of Patriot systems cannot fully safeguard cities and the entire frontline. Additionally, ballistic missiles themselves are a problem for most air defense systems.
Mitigating this threat will require a multi-layered approach: increasing air-defense numbers, as well as detection and warning systems. This should go hand in hand with allowing Ukraine to strike across the border with Western weaponry and developing deep-strike capabilities to neutralize these missile storages at a distance. Unfortunately, these factors largely depend on the West and its willingness to sustain investment in the war – something over which Ukraine has only limited control.
But can Russia expand its production further?
According to the same Carnegie Endowment report, Russia’s military equipment production, aside from drones, had plateaued as of early 2024. Further expansion is unlikely unless new factories are constructed or the government takes the significant risk of temporarily halting exports or shutting down production lines to retool and modernize existing facilities.
It’s important to note that we are now at the beginning of October 2024, and even if Russia were to begin constructing modern plants with all the necessary equipment and personnel, it would take well over a year to bring such production online. This means that any significant expansion wouldn’t be feasible before the second half of 2025. Currently, Russia is attempting to bridge the gap between its production capacity and frontline needs with the help of its foreign partners and allies.
According to Kyrylo Budanov, North Korea is Russia’s largest military partner in this regard, primarily due to the volume of artillery shell supplies. He noted that after a North Korean shipment arrives, combat intensifies within 8-9 days and this effect lasts for up to two weeks, showing a direct correlation between artillery shipments and combat intensity.
Given that North Korea has also been supplying Russia from its own stockpiles, it’s uncertain whether Pyongyang can significantly ramp up production to meet Russia’s demands. It’s also unclear how deeply North Korea is willing to draw from its own artillery reserves, especially when tensions in Korean Peninsula remain consistent
Domestic Ukrainian projects have had a significant, yet often overlooked, impact on the war effort
While Western technology receives much of the attention in political, diplomatic, and expert circles, the effect of Ukraine’s domestic production, development, and scaling of homegrown technology has been underestimated. General Budanov explained the importance of Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes deep inside Russia, including Moscow. These strikes have shaken the confidence of the Russian people, undermining the belief that their leadership provides ultimate security and ensures Russia’s military might.
As the war progresses, more Russians from various social backgrounds are questioning why the war is reaching their homes and whether their leadership can truly preserve Russia’s pre-war status as a formidable military power capable of protecting its citizens. But Ukraine’s successes aren’t limited to long-range drone strikes. Two other key innovations have also shaped the course of the war: unmanned surface vehicles (sea drones) and FPV drones.
In the early stages of the invasion, when Ukraine’s already small fleet was unable to resist Russia’s Black Sea fleet, Russian naval dominance seemed unquestionable. That perception started rapidly to change with the successful destruction of the missile cruiser Moskva – the pride of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. But that was only the beginning. The introduction of domestically developed sea drones has since become Ukraine’s surprise weapon, rapidly evolving into a core naval weapon, and despite having a largely non-functional fleet, Ukraine has managed to destroy a quarter of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. More significantly, these drones have denied Russia’s navy the ability to operate freely. Ukrainian grain ships now sail much safer, as any attempt to impose a blockade or attack risks immediate and effective Ukrainian retaliation in the Black Sea. This capability has enabled Ukraine to protect its maritime interests while deterring Russian actions in the Black Sea.
The widespread use of FPV drones – small, racing-style drones costing under $1,000, has reshaped the battlefield. These drones are capable of targeting everything from armored vehicles to advancing infantry and reconnaissance drones and even helicopters. During the artillery shortages of 2023 and early 2024, FPV drones became a crucial tool in the arsenal, often serving as the primary means to engage the enemy at longer distances, with some able to fly up to 20 kilometers using transmitter drones.
Through grassroots efforts, volunteer organizations, and some government assistance, Ukraine has managed to scale the production of drones and standardized munitions for them. While there remains a shortage of drones and a lack of sufficient state involvement in their procurement for military units, the number of drones on the battlefield has surged from just dozens to tens of thousands in under a year, making them an essential part of the war theater.
Investing in Ukraine’s domestic production and pursuing joint projects with Western countries could be one of the most effective paths forward. This approach can help to reduce the political risks and fallout associated with gaining permission to strike deep inside Russia with Western missiles – something Ukraine has already managed to achieve independently, without resulting in over exaggerated fears of nuclear missile launches.
A self-sufficient Ukraine is more beneficial to its partners, easing the political friction in the West over its own dwindling military supplies. This will help Ukraine to take an important role in a changing security and geopolitical environment, where it can serve as a key partner for Europe in the defense area. With its proven expertise and production capabilities, Ukraine will organically contribute to the Western defense efforts through collaborative projects.
Not just about the military
As General Budanov notes, Russian internal calculations suggest that if Russia doesn’t exit the war by the anticipated time frame, it will be unable to claim “superpower” status in the foreseeable future — at least 30 years. Instead, the most it can hope for is regional leadership. Internal Russian analysis predicts only two superpowers will remain: the US and China, a scenario referred to as “The Rise of China” and “The Domination of America,” with no place for Russia on the global stage. This projection isn’t driven solely by war production challenges but also by a deteriorating financial and economic situation, slowing growth, and expected setbacks.
Former French military intelligence officer Pierre-Marie Meunier, analyzing 2023 data from Russia’s Central Bank, highlights a sharp decline in Russian exports. Goods and services exports fell by 29% and 17%, respectively, from 2022 to 2023, while imports rose by 10% and 5%, resulting in a sharp drop of the trade surplus. In September of 2024, Russia raised its key interest rate to 19%, with its inflation rates reaching over 7%.
Meunier paints a grim picture: in a country where over half the population relies on state subsidies, where the poverty rate exceeded 13% in 2021 (even with far lower poverty thresholds than in the West), and where 62% of Russians lack savings or the means to afford more than basic necessities, Russia risks facing a long-term economic crisis reminiscent of the one that preceded the fall of the Soviet Union. It’s fair to say that while sanctions haven’t stopped the war, they are slowly strangling Russia, making it increasingly difficult to manage the consequences of the war.
These mounting problems create potential grounds for future negotiations, which President Zelensky is aiming to leverage through the Peace Summit scheduled for November 2024, as he seeks a diplomatic resolution. However, the timeline suggested by General Budanov might prove more realistic than the November talks, with the situation in Kursk playing an important factor.
The Kursk Factor
Following Ukraine’s successful incursion into Kursk, Russian political elites are facing a new problem. If negotiations do take place, Russia won’t be entering from a position of strength: an autocratic regime appears weaker when forced to negotiate over its own territory. Any regime would seek ways to avoid being seen as weak or incompetent internally, so Russia will try to enter talks from a more favorable position. This suggests Russia may be hesitant to engage seriously in negotiations come November, likely delaying any substantive talks until they attempt to retake Kursk. While Russia is currently struggling to dislodge Ukrainian forces from the area, they are steadily building up troops, preparing for a larger operation in the near future.
While logical, this scenario carries serious risks for the Kremlin: failure to retake Kursk could further damage Putin’s image as a leader who not only failed to defend Russian territory but was also forced to negotiate over it. Despite the state’s propaganda of a powerful Russian army, his inability to reclaim these lands would undermine his internal image.
On the other hand, we must consider the possibility that the importance of Kursk and its impact on Russian elites and society may be overstated. They might simply overlook it until the situation becomes an accepted and irrelevant fact, with Kursk becoming a minor factor in Russian decision-making. This would be especially true if Putin can demonstrate consistent gains in Donbas, pushing further into Ukrainian territory and shifting the focus away from losses elsewhere.
Limitations of this analysis
The analysis can’t be considered full or complete without some self-reflection and acknowledging doubts about the data. While the numbers may seem consistent, they don’t necessarily reflect Putin’s rationale, which could operate on entirely different assumptions, like viewing the West as weak or Ukraine’s government as unstable.
The low number of vehicles and economic difficulties might not be enough to compel Putin to end the war. After all, prior to the beginning of the invasion, many individuals and even some professional analysts questioned Russia’s intentions based solely on the number of troops stationed at the border. They concluded that the forces were insufficient to overtake Ukraine and thus believed that Putin would not proceed with an invasion.
He could very well scale down offensive operations, allowing his generals to consolidate gains. By heavily mining the frontlines and continuing missile strikes, he could keep Ukraine in a state of limbo – too dangerous for normal life or business to recover. With low-intensity combat and reduced military spending, Putin might be able to drag the war out, balancing between war and economics for much longer while waiting for the best possible terms in negotiations.
It is not entirely unrealistic, given that Europe’s trade with Russia’s neighbors, particularly in Central Asia, has been skyrocketing. This trend suggests that Russia may find a path to avoid economic collapse and could continue the war at a lower intensity by leveraging its demographic advantage.
Putin is acutely aware of war weariness in the West and operates under the assumption that Western leaders might lack the resolve and incentives to maintain high levels of aid to Ukraine. Foreign assistance is often an unpopular issue in domestic politics, becoming a frequent target for opposition parties that accuse the government of prioritizing foreign spending over pressing issues at home, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure.
Nevertheless, we can all agree that if the war does not come to an end, its intensity will likely decrease. This means Ukraine needs a long-term plan of action, whether that involves preparing for a potential second invasion or sustaining a low-intensity war.
Comment: A few days ago, James asked me, “Would you care to weigh in on those who think the tide is turning and the Russians will be at the Dnieper in six months?”
I answered, “If the Russians can keep an army in the field, I do think they can reach the Dnipro in 18 to 24 months. Ukraine won’t get their territory back unless that Russian army collapses. That is reaching the Dnipro west of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. They’re already at the Dnipro opposite Kherson, but they won’t be able to cross it.
My answer was based on the fact that both sides are exhausted. Russia is making slow, steady progress on the Donbas front at a great cost to the Ukrainians, but at a far greater cost to themselves. There are plenty of other factors, as Tatarigami pointed out, but I think it boils down to which side wants it more. Is the will of the Ukrainians to avoid subjugation stronger than Russia’s will to expand their territory. The Russians have already lost the argument on NATO enlargement. Not only did Finland and Sweden join NATO, but even if Ukrainian formal membership in NATO is far off at best, Ukraine will never be neutral. And NATO is more alive today than it was before the Russian invasion.
TTG
Lots of yard work and Halloween decorating to do. Knock yourselves out.
I did get to see the Commanders’ Jayden Daniels pull off a wild Hail Mary pass yesterday. I don’t watch much football, but that was an exciting twenty seconds.
TTG
The Israelis have launched airstrikes on Teheran overnight. So far, the biggest strikes have been informational. Images and videos of a refinery fire in Teheran from last year and other footage of recent strikes in Beirut are being passed off as successful strikes on Teheran. So far the BBC reporting is far less hysterical.
This attack has been anticipated since Iran launched nearly 200 ballistic missiles on Israel almost a month ago. In a statement announcing that the operation was under way, the Israeli military spokesman said Israel had the “right and duty” to respond and that its defensive and offensive capabilities were fully mobilised.
Iranian state media has confirmed that explosions have been heard in the west of Tehran. A news agency close to the Revolutionary Guards says that some military bases in the west and south west of the Iranian capital have been targeted. The extent of the attacks and the precise targets are not yet clear.
The Syrian state news agency says that Israeli airstrikes have also targeted some military sites in central and southern areas of Syria.
The office of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has released a picture of him in the operations centre of the military headquarters during the attack.
The Middle East Spectator is also somewhat subdued about the attack
Here’s what we know so far about the unfolding situation near Tehran: 1. Israeli Air Force jets are active in sky above Syria — Syrian air defenses near Damascus as active. 2. Planes en-route to Imam Khomeini Intl. Airport were diverted from landing. 3. Fake images of explosions are circulating the internet & social media platforms. 4. Confirmed visuals from south-west of Tehran show small fires & plumes of smoke, indicating possible projectile that downed, or possible small-scale attack with quadcopters – but no actual ‘airstrikes’ as of yet.
I would think Russia would have upgraded the air defenses in Iran recently. Perhaps they’re even manning some of these air defense sites, maybe even Syrian sites as well. How effective that would be is an open question. They can’t stop drone strikes across Russia, but dealing with more conventional aircraft and missile attacks might be something more up their alley.
We’ll know more in a day or two.
TTG
SEOUL/ROME, Oct 23 (Reuters) – The United States said for the first time on Wednesday that it had seen evidence of North Korean troops in Russia, and South Korean lawmakers said about 3,000 soldiers had been sent to support the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine with more to follow.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, speaking in Rome, said it would be “very, very serious” if the North Koreans were preparing to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine, as Kyiv has alleged, though he said it remained to be seen what they would be doing there. “There is evidence that there are DPRK troops in Russia,” Austin told reporters, using North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In Seoul, South Korean lawmakers said that North Korea has sent 3,000 troops to Russia and thousands more were expected to follow.
Pyongyang had promised to provide a total of about 10,000 troops, whose deployment was expected to be completed by December, the lawmakers told reporters after being briefed by South Korea’s national intelligence agency. The figure of 3,000 is twice a previous estimate of numbers of troops already in Russia. “Signs of troops being trained inside North Korea were detected in September and October,” Park Sun-won, a member of a parliamentary intelligence committee, said after the briefing. “It appears that the troops have now been dispersed to multiple training facilities in Russia and are adapting to the local environment.”
The Ukraine conflict broke out when Russia invaded its neighbour in February 2022 and has since developed into a war of attrition largely fought along front lines in eastern Ukraine, with huge numbers of casualties on both sides.
Austin said the alleged North Korean deployment could be further evidence that the Russian military was having problems with manpower. The Kremlin has previously dismissed Seoul’s claims about the North’s troop deployment as “fake news” and a North Korean representative to the United Nations in New York called it “groundless rumours” at a meeting on Monday. Both Moscow and Pyongyang have also denied weapons transfers, but they have pledged to boost military ties and signed a mutual defence treaty at a summit in June. The latest numbers came after Seoul’s National Intelligence Service said on Friday the North had sent some 1,500 special forces personnel to Russia by ship and they were likely to be deployed for combat in the war in Ukraine after training and acclimatisation.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has also accused Pyongyang of preparing to send 10,000 soldiers to Russia. On Tuesday he called on his allies to respond to evidence of North Korean involvement in Russia’s war.
Comment: Rumors and reports of these North Korean troops have been swirling for a while now. Up until now, there was no mention of this from the US government. It makes this administration’s policy of escalation management look totally impotent and even silly. North Korean artillery shells, missiles and missile men are already known to be in Ukraine.
Why is Russia doing this? Because they must. Attrition works both ways. The mighty Red war machine is reeling from three years of SMO. They aren’t collapsing and I doubt they will, but they’re hurting enough to go to Pyongyang, hat in hand, and plead for help. That doesn’t do much for the Kremlin’s reputation. China is clearly okay with this, but South Korea is raising a stink. I expect more support to Ukraine even if it’s done indirectly.
TTG
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1848720716771766752.html#google_vignette
CHISINAU, Oct 21 (Reuters) – President Maia Sandu said on Monday Moldovans had won a “first battle in a difficult fight” for their future, a day after a slim majority of 50.46% backed EU accession in a referendum that was clouded by allegations of Russia-backed meddling.
The knife-edge finish was a shock for supporters of Sandu, who had hoped the vote would deliver a firm message of intent to bring the ex-Soviet agricultural economy into the European Union by 2030 and leave Moscow’s orbit for good. “The people of Moldova have spoken: Our EU future will now be anchored in the constitution. We fought fairly in an unfair fight — and we won,” Sandu wrote on X. The result means a clause will be added to the constitution defining EU accession as a goal. Moldova began the long process of formal accession talks in June.
In a presidential election held alongside the referendum, Sandu won 42.45%, short of the 50% needed to win outright and paving the way for a Nov. 3 runoff against former prosecutor-general Alexandr Stoianoglo, who won 25.98%.
Earlier, Sandu, 52, had told Moldovans there was “clear evidence” that criminal groups backed by “foreign forces hostile to our national interests” had aimed to buy off 300,000 votes. “Criminal groups… have attacked our country with tens of millions of euros, lies and propaganda, using the most disgraceful means to keep our citizens and our nation trapped in uncertainty and instability,” she said. In the run-up to the vote, authorities said there had been Moscow-backed meddling attempts spearheaded by fugitive tycoon Ilan Shor, including an effort to bribe 130,000 people to vote “no” and support a specific candidate at the election. Shor denies wrongdoing.
The Kremlin, which denies interfering, denounced the votes in Moldova as “unfree”, casting doubt on what it said was a “hard-to-explain” increase in votes in favour of Sandu and the EU, and challenging her to “present evidence” of meddling. The EU defended Sandu and said Moldova had faced “unprecedented intimidation and foreign interference by Russia and its proxies ahead of this vote”.
Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, welcomed the outcome of the referendum in a post on X: “In the face of Russia’s hybrid tactics, Moldova shows that it is independent, it is strong and it wants a European future!” The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe said the voting campaigns had been marred by foreign interference and active disinformation efforts.
White House national security spokesperson John Kirby said Russia had been actively working to undermine Moldova’s election and its European integration. “Russia did not succeed, as the results demonstrate. Moldovan democracy is strong,” Kirby said, but added that he expected Moscow to try to influence the runoff election.
The future of the southeast European nation of under 3 million has been in the spotlight since Russia’s invasion of neighbouring Ukraine at a time of mounting confrontation between Moscow and the West. Ties with Moscow have deteriorated as Sandu condemned the invasion and diversified energy supplies away from Russia.
Moldova’s twin votes came ahead of next Saturday’s closely contested parliamentary election in Georgia, another former Soviet republic that aspires to join the EU, but which Russia sees as part of its historical sphere of influence. In a speech on Monday, Sandu said “there is still one more battle to fight”, urging Moldovans to back her in the runoff for the presidency.
Stoianoglo, who is backed by the traditionally pro-Russian Party of Socialists, has said that, if elected, he will build a “balanced” foreign policy involving ties with the EU, the United States, Russia and China. He boycotted Sunday’s referendum, calling it a ruse to boost Sandu’s re-election bid. He challenged Sandu to a televised debate ahead of the runoff.
Comment: The referendum vote was a close run thing. through most of the day, it looked like it was going to be defeated. The last votes counted were the diaspora votes from those who left Moldova for EU countries and Canada. Twenty to twenty five percent of Moldovans currently live outside of Moldova. Those diaspora votes turned the tide and narrowly approved the referendum to join the EU.
There are areas of Moldova that still strongly identify with the Soviet Union and Russia. That won’t change quickly, if at all. A good explanation of the politics of Moldova are in the linked article from the “New Eastern Europe” magazine. The article is from last June, but it’s definitely worth a read.
What I take from all this is that the Kremlin will not be satisfied with taking Ukraine’s western oblasts. That’s just a beginning. They don’t want any more of the old Soviet Union fleeing the Kremlin nest and joining the rest of Europe.
TTG
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